Serzh Sargsyan: Package of documents presented by RA government aims  to shift responsibility for consequences of  its failed policy  regarding  Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to others

ArmInfo.  Third President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan commented on the  release of documents by the RA government regarding the negotiation  process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

According to the former president, the package of documents presented  by the RA government is nothing more than a simplified and  simultaneously futile attempt to shift responsibility for the  catastrophic consequences of the current authorities' failed policy  regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since May 2018. "A very  simple question arises: if, according to the current Armenian  authorities, the negotiation process and the co-chairs' proposals  benefited only Baku, then why did the Azerbaijani side reject all of  these proposals, criticize the co-chairs, and even call for the  group's dissolution, at least from 2008 to 2018?  Azerbaijan, unlike  Armenia, refused to accept as a basis the five statements of the  presidents of the co-chair countries-Russia, the United States, and  France-on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, rejected the  statements adopted by the OSCE foreign ministers within the OSCE  Ministerial Council in 2008-2017 and the statement adopted at the  OSCE summit in Astana in 2010, or subsequently abandoned the original  agreement. Azerbaijan, unlike Armenia, rejected the agreements  reached at the summits in St.  Petersburg (June 17, 2010), Astrakhan  (October 27, 2010), Sochi (March 3, 2011), Kazan (June 24, 2011),  Sochi (January 23, 2012), Vienna (May 16, 2016), St. Petersburg (June  20, 2016), and Geneva (October 16, 2017). Having reached an impasse  in the negotiation process, Azerbaijan repeatedly threatened to  withdraw from it by 2018, but did not take this step, fearing open  confrontation with the co-chair countries with an international  mandate to mediate the conflict settlement - the three permanent  members of the UN Security Council - Russia, the United States, and  France - and, accordingly, fearing an open clash with the entire  international community. 

At the same time, Baku, by repeatedly violating the ceasefire and  torpedoing the negotiation process, constantly provoked Yerevan to  refuse negotiations in order to blame Armenia for the failure of the  peace process. However, the Azerbaijani side was unsuccessful.  Moreover, the positions of Armenia and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs  became virtually identical, as has been publicly stated on numerous  occasions. By rejecting almost all proposals and initiatives from the  Co-Chair countries or constantly retreating from existing agreements,  Azerbaijan was effectively opposing not only Armenia but also the  international community in its approaches to conflict resolution,"  the former president noted.

He emphasized that after the change of power in Armenia in the spring  of 2018, the need and importance of continuing efforts aimed at  preserving, strengthening, and further improving everything achieved  over the years of peace negotiations became clear. It also became  clear that any deviation from this could have unpredictable  consequences. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs also shared this  opinion. However, after May 2018, the new Armenian authorities  announced their decision to begin negotiations from "their own  position," effectively abandoning the results of the previous years'  negotiating work, without even explaining to the co-chairs what  exactly this "position" was. While they had previously been  repeatedly assured that Armenia's position was in line with the  approaches of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, Yerevan was seen by the  international community as an unconstructive party in the negotiation  process.  "And after the new Armenian ruler, "putting himself in the  shoes of a madman," began to express doubts about the possibility of  resolving the conflict through negotiations, Baku got what it had  been unable to do for years: accusations of Armenia's refusal to  negotiate as a pretext for war. 

Could the war have been stopped? Probably yes, if they had been  prepared for an adequate counteroffensive and had there been support  and understanding from their allies and the international community,  which would have taken decisive measures to immediately end the  fighting. We witnessed this development in April 2016, when, having  failed diplomatically, Azerbaijan unleashed aggressive actions  against Nagorno-Karabakh, attempting to force its approach into the  negotiation process. However, due to the obvious diplomatic,  political, and military mistakes of Pashinyan and his team, Armenia  found itself in an extremely dire situation in 2020, leading to a  crushing military defeat with thousands of casualties and the loss of  Artsakh. Allegations that during the negotiation process, Russia and  other co-chair countries, in order to resolve the conflict, allegedly  offered Azerbaijan the return of seven districts under Armenian  control around Nagorno-Karabakh, without offering anything in return  in terms of status, security guarantees, or other characteristics,  are not only untrue but also do not stand up to scrutiny. The Minsk  Group co-chair countries have repeatedly stated this, and documents  published by the current Armenian authorities on December 2 clearly  confirm this.

 From December 2008 until the summit of the presidents of Russia,  Armenia, and Azerbaijan in Kazan on June 24, 2011, the parties held  negotiations on an agreement on the "Basic Principles" with the  mediation of Russia and the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. Twelve  bilateral (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and trilateral (Russia, Armenia,  and Azerbaijan) presidential summits were held, as well as three  dozen meetings of foreign ministers. Azerbaijan has consistently  shied away from the agreements reached. This culminated in the Kazan  Summit, when, contrary to the expectations of the co-chair countries,  Azerbaijan effectively abandoned the agreed-upon text, proposing more  than 10 amendments. Following Kazan, from 2011 to 2018, the co-chairs  continued their efforts to find ways to resolve the conflict.  Following the draft "Basic Principles" discussed at the Kazan Summit  (the last working document to be submitted to the OSCE Secretariat  along with all working documents agreed upon prior to 2011), not a  single working document has been the subject of negotiations between  the parties. 

It is no coincidence that Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly stated that  "no documents exist other than those submitted to the OSCE." All  proposals developed from 2011 to 2018 were presented to the parties  in a "non-paper" format and differed from the document discussed in  Kazan in June 2011 only in form, not in content. The latest versions  of these "non-papers" were formulated as three interconnected  documents, forming a single whole, which together retained almost all  the elements of the Kazan document and represented a solid framework  for enshrining a comprehensive approach to the settlement of the  Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. The "non-paper" presented to the parties  in Krakow on January 18, 2018, consisted of just three points on a  single page, which the co-chairs proposed could be included in a  possible future joint statement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku  also rejected this proposal. Only in June 2019, a year after  Pashinyan came to power, was the first official (not "non-paper")  document signed by the co-chairs since the Kazan summit presented to  the parties. This document contained the same proposals as those  presented in April 2019, but without the co-chairs' signatures. What  provisions have been developed jointly with the Co-Chairs on the  Karabakh settlement since 2008? 

Interim status. Until a final decision on status was made,  Nagorno-Karabakh received a temporary status with a detailed  description of its mechanisms, namely: the formation and functioning  of legislative, executive, and local authorities, courts,  self-defense forces, and law enforcement agencies; observer status in  the OSCE; the right to join international organizations, where  Nagorno-Karabakh's temporary status will not be viewed as an  obstacle; the implementation of external relations in the areas  specified by the agreement; foreign direct investment; assistance  from international donor organizations and foreign states; and access  to international markets. In practice, all of this, as the Co-Chairs  themselves noted, meant "status quo plus," and not the abolition of  Karabakh's existing status. 

Final legal status. It was assumed that the final legal status of  Nagorno-Karabakh would be determined by a popular vote, which would  enshrine the free expression of the will of the population of  Nagorno-Karabakh (the co-chairs insisted on this in all their  proposals, despite Baku's demand for a referendum on the status of  Nagorno-Karabakh to be held throughout the territory of Azerbaijan),  and would be legally binding.

It was emphasized that the wording of the question or questions put  to the vote would not be limited in any way, implying a choice of any  status. The population participating in the vote in Nagorno-Karabakh  was understood to include persons of any nationality in the same  proportions as in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988, according to the results  of the last population census conducted before the conflict  (according to the census, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh  at that time constituted 76%).

Security guarantees. The temporary status provided for multi-layered  security guarantees: a commitment by Azerbaijan not to use force  against Nagorno-Karabakh, international peacekeeping operations with  the deployment of peacekeeping forces, recognition of Armenia's role  as a guarantor of Nagorno-Karabakh's security, security provision by  the Nagorno-Karabakh self-defense forces, security guarantees from  the co- chair countries, as well as a corresponding resolution  adopted by the UN Security Council for this purpose.  A corridor  connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Until the final status was  determined, the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities were to ensure and  resolve all issues related to the security of the corridor through  the Lachin region, within the status quo that existed at the time the  peace agreement entered into force. The final status and width of  this corridor were to be determined in the context of the final  determination of Nagorno-Karabakh's status. 

Return of territories. As part of the package agreement, which  covered such details as the final status, the corridor, and other  elements, following the implementation of international and other  clear guarantees and security measures, including those of the UN  Security Council, after the peace agreement entered into force, the  return of five regions-Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrail, Zangilan, and  Kubatly-was envisaged. These regions would be demilitarized, and  peacekeeping forces would be deployed directly on the line of  contact, not in Karabakh. The return of the non-corridor portion of  Lachin and the Kelbajar region was envisaged in connection with the  agreement on organizational matters for holding a national referendum  to determine the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Opening communication channels. As part of the implementation of the  conflict settlement agreement, the Kazan document, as well as its  subsequent developments, proposed removing all reservations and  dissenting opinions from relevant international agreements  restricting freedom of communication routes, lifting blockades,  ensuring unimpeded transport and other communications, and opening  all borders and communication routes passing through the territories  of the parties (these restrictions were imposed by Azerbaijan  itself). Again, the discussion was about opening communication routes  throughout the region, and there was no emphasis on any specific  region or regions. All the co-chairs' proposals envisaged a package  solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem with a phased implementation  of the interconnectedness of all components of the settlement," said  the third President of the Republic of Armenia. 

He added that it is very strange, if not disgusting, to see, in a  small, selective list of dozens of existing documents on  Nagorno-Karabakh published by Armenia's current rulers, references to  statements by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the 1994 Budapest Summit  and the 1996 Lisbon Summit. No less paradoxical is the publication  and references to resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in  1993 on the Karabakh issue. None of these documents, with the  exception of the Azerbaijani one, have been mentioned or referenced  by anyone-the UN, the OSCE, or the co-chair countries-for at least  ten years after 2008.

"Pashinyan and his team have effectively become supporters of the  Azerbaijani leadership. Furthermore, the current authorities ignore,  as Baku has done for many years, the statements on Nagorno-Karabakh  adopted at the OSCE Summit and the Council of Foreign Ministers in  2008-2017, not to mention the crucial statements on the Karabakh  settlement by the presidents of the co-chair countries - Russia, the  United States, and France - issued in 2009-2013 in L'Aquila, Muskoka,  Deauville, Los Cabos, and Enniskillen. Just as the equally  significant statements adopted at the meeting of presidents and  foreign ministers in Vienna on May 16, 2016, and at the summit in St.  Petersburg on June 20, 2016, are ignored, numerous joint statements  by the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are also being  forgotten.

By publishing a series of documents with a link to the website of  former Russian Co-Chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, V.N. Kazimirov, the  Armenian government pretended to ignore the key trilateral, permanent  ceasefire agreements between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and  Armenia in 1994-1995, achieved largely thanks to Ambassador  Kazimirov. The list goes on. This is precisely the legacy the  Armenian government inherited regarding the Karabakh settlement,  which the Pashinyan government handled so incompetently and with such  tragic consequences. It would be logical to suggest that the current  Armenian authorities publish documents on Nagorno-Karabakh adopted  after 2018. Let's hope that copying them won't take too long. And  this publication will serve as clear evidence of the legacy Pashinyan  will leave for future Armenian leaders. After all, upon coming to  power, Pashinyan promised to "inform the people about everything"-who  "gave him the mandate." However, this promise was transformed into  videos posted on Facebook of bike rides around the world, selfies,  eating pies, and so on. And finally, as a culmination, came the  utterance: "No matter what it takes, we will negotiate." And what was  remembered about Pashinyan's policy toward Nagorno-Karabakh? Only two  theses remained in the public consciousness: the first, "Artsakh is  Armenia, that's it," and the second, "Nagorno-Karabakh is  Azerbaijan." 

The publication of documents on Nagorno-Karabakh on December 2, 2018,  conceived by Pashinyan and his team, was intended not only to  discredit the previous authorities, led by three presidents, by  manipulating public opinion and attempting to blame them for the  failure of their defeatist policies, presented as peacekeeping. It  was also aimed at distracting people from the heavy burden of the  tragic consequences of the current authorities' incompetent policies.  However, this attempt completely failed and effectively resulted in  the self-exclusion of Pashinyan's team and the admission of its full  responsibility for what had happened," the third president of Armenia  stated.