The coup on the night of November 10 would have turned into a loss of  statehood for Armenia

ArmInfo.Professor of the Georgian Technical University, doctor of international relations, conflictologist Amiran Khevtsuriani in an interview with ArmInfo  comments on the results of the 44-day war between Armenia and  Azerbaijan. Speaks about the internal political events in Armenia,  and also compares the internal and external political post-war  situation in Georgia and Armenia.

The results of the 44-day war for Artsakh came as a complete surprise  to the Armenian society. The reasons for the defeat have just begun  to be analyzed, and on an emotional level, society as a whole is  still not ready to accept them for granted. Comment on the situation  with the sober look of a conflictologist.

First of all, I would like to note that the past war showed that  Armenia was not ready for any of its components. Particularly  surprising in this whole story is that, as it turned out, for 26  years Armenia was just expecting this war, expecting a new round of  escalation of the conflict. But she did nothing to prevent it. And  all this against the background of how the enemy, Azerbaijan, who did  not hide his intentions for a day to try to return the territories,  spent billions of dollars on preparations for this war. And I just  refuse to believe that the Armenian intelligence did not have all the  information about this. And against the background of the colossal  difference between the Armed Forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan, none  of the previous authorities of Armenia made sufficient efforts to  eliminate this difference.

Do you characterize the defeat of Armenia as a military one, or was  it a defeat for the Armenian diplomacy?

Before the war, Armenia also lost the diplomatic war. And the formula  here is pretty simple. Military parity was violated in favor of  Azerbaijan. It is a fact. For example, the former commander of the  Artsakh Defense Army Samvel Babayan wrote to Prime Minister Nikol  Pashinyan about this fact, for example, back in 2018. Such an  imbalance in the balance of forces should inevitably have prompted  the Armenian diplomacy, the military-political leadership to be more  flexible on the diplomatic flank. In order to avoid war, or at least  as far as possible to postpone it. Back on July 20 of this year, I  wrote about the inevitability of a large-scale war, that the war was  closer than ever. And I was almost not mistaken in the dates.   Meanwhile, all these years, Armenian diplomacy has hung on a  strategic alliance with Russia. An alliance with a country that is  simultaneously supplying weapons to Armenia's enemy Azerbaijan. And  over all these years, Yerevan has not even attempted a diplomatic  breakthrough on the external front. All this together led to the  victory of Baku on the diplomatic front as well.

In Armenia, the November 9 Statement that ended the war is compared  in scale with the Moscow Treaty of 1921, and its consequences are  regarded as a disaster. Share your rating.

Armenia was defeated in this war, and this is reality. And this  reality must be accepted by both the state and society. And of  course, political stabilization and a complete reset of both domestic  and foreign policies are needed. As for the results, these results  are not nearly as catastrophic as your opposition portrays them.   After all, the result of the war could have been much worse. However,  it should be admitted that, despite the military defeat, Armenia  still controls almost 80% of Artsakh and the Lachin corridor. It is  clear that already together with Russia. And of course, Arayik  Harutyunyan and his government are still in their places in  Stepanakert. Believe me, all this is very annoying for many in  Azerbaijan. And they are right. I, too, in their place would not like  all this.

What do you mean when speaking about the need for a complete reboot  of Armenia's domestic and foreign policy?

In my opinion, in the near future, the main task for Armenia is to  achieve internal stability and neutralize destructive revanchists. In  the same 2008 war, Georgia lost to Russia. And even then, our  opposition demanded the immediate resignation of the current  government. However, most of the Georgian society did not follow her,  and the government was re-elected by the society through democratic  elections within the time frame established by the Constitution. I  think that this is exactly how it should be in the case of Armenia.  Yes, one can talk endlessly about the mistakes of Prime Minister  Pashinyan, but today the main thing is institutional stability. I do  not exclude early elections in Armenia, however, they should be based  on a general consensus and carried out by the current administration.  Some probably believe that Armenia survived thanks to the November 9  agreement on Artsakh. I think that Armenia survived in Yerevan. I  don't even want to imagine what Armenia would be like today if a coup  took place on the night of 9-10. I think this would really turn out  to be a loss of statehood for Armenia. The "bad" Pashinyan and his  government are much better than those revanchists who, despite  minimal support, are still trying hard to seize power. It is  completely absurd and unfair to directly accuse Pashinyan of  unleashing and losing the war. Pashinyan reaped what was sown for 24  years. Thus, 16 parties and their supposed leader Vazgen Manukyan are  a complete disaster for Armenia. Their political reincarnation is  unthinkable. I think that modern Armenian society will simply not  allow this.

In a sense, Georgia in 2008 and Armenia in 2020 have a certain  similarity. After the war 08.08.08 Georgia radically and finally  revised the vector of foreign policy. How do you see Armenia's  foreign policy prospects?

First of all, I would like to note the foreign policy assets of  Georgia and the prospects for the development, in this light, of the  Armenian-Georgian relations. As you know, Georgia has very good  relations with both Azerbaijan and Turkey. And our country is not  going to revise these relations, because this does not proceed from  our national interests. At the same time, Armenia, despite all the  expected difficulties on this path, simply needs to reconsider its  foreign policy vector. After all, it was the strategic partnership  with Russia, and Armenia's membership in the initially stillborn  organization - the CSTO - that brought Armenia to this day. And in  this context, in my opinion, the example of Georgia is important.  Russia will either get used to the fact that it has finally lost  Georgia, or normal relations between us will never be restored.   Georgia will never become part of Russia again. We want only  good-neighborly relations, but only after the de-occupation of our  territories occupied by Russia. Consequently, our external vector is  unshakable and is focused on integration into Western international  structures, and this will certainly happen today or tomorrow. And no  blackmail will stop us on this path. In this light, I think this  factor is important for Armenia as well. And if Armenia is really  going to somehow get out of this whole situation, first of all you  need to think about normalizing relations with Turkey. Let me be  clear, I do not consider those experts who question the prospects of  Turkey's NATO membership as serious analysts. Turkey will never leave  NATO.  Moreover, Turkey, which is not a NATO member, is not  attractive to Russia. Moscow needs Turkey as a periodic, ad hoc  partner exclusively within NATO. And in the end, Armenia should think  about normalizing relations with Azerbaijan. Like Azerbaijan, think  about the normalization of relations with Armenia. We all know that  neighbors are not chosen. How many more generations must kill each  other for it to become finally clear to both Armenians and  Azerbaijanis? This nightmare must finally end.