ArmInfo. The so-called Munich theses of Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan are evidence of changes in the position of Armenia on the Karabakh settlement. A similar opinion was expressed by ArmInfo, chief science officer of IMEMO, President of Society of Caucasian Studies Experts Alexander Krylov.
"This position was previously based on the right of the people of Karabakh to national self-determination, by recognizing NKR independence by Azerbaijan and then transferring to it the control of the regions along the NKR. Today, according to the Armenian Prime Minister, the NKR is an independent state similar to Azerbaijan after the collapse of the USSR. And, accordingly, without a full Stepanakert's participation in the negotiations is impossible to resolve the conflict, "he said.
Prime Minister Pashinyan the day after the meeting with Ilham Aliyev, published the "Munich principles" according to which: 1 - Artsakh is a party to the conflict and the negotiation process, without which it is impossible to resolve the conflict. 2 - Artsakh cannot endanger its security. 3 - It is impossible to resolve the conflict with one or two actions. In the negotiation process, microrevolution is first necessary, then mini-revolution, and only then - a breakthrough. 4 - Any solution to the problem should be acceptable to the people of Armenia, the people of Artsakh and the people of Azerbaijan. Armenia and Artsakh are ready to make serious efforts to find such a solution. Azerbaijan should demonstrate such readiness. 5 - the Artsakh problem has no military solution.
According to expert estimates, the principles mentioned in Pashinyan's "Munich principles" are unlikely to provoke optimism in Baku. Especially in conditions of the transit of power observed in Azerbaijan. Krylov even estimates hints of some concessions to Azerbaijan on the Karabakh issue as fraught with serious domestic political risks for the Aliyevs. Pashinyan's situation is similar due to the acute internal political struggle and the expected reform of the Constitution.
In this light, Krylov, at least at this stage, does not see trends to soften the positions of Baku and Yerevan and, accordingly, prospects for breaking the current impasse in the settlement process. Baku's lack of hope for a military solution to the problem through a quick blitzkrieg forces him to a policy of war of attrition in the hope of either surrendering or creating conditions for the same victorious Blitzkrieg. Meanwhile, such a war on the depletion of Armenia, according to expert, is expensive for Azerbaijan itself.