ArmInfo.Stratfor, an American strategic intelligence publishing company, has published an article titled " Reassessing the Risk of an Escalation in Nagorno-Karabakh".
The article is presented in full below, "As peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan stall, violent flare-ups either in Nagorno-Karabakh or on their common border are increasingly likely, even if a large-scale Azerbaijani military operation or direct Iranian involvement in the conflict remains unlikely. On March 30, Azerbaijan's defense ministry said its soldiers had seized a number of territories near the border with Armenia. Several days earlier, the ministry also announced its units had taken ''necessary local control measures'' to cut off an alternative dirt road that Armenians had been using to access the Nagorno-Karabakh region amid Azerbaijan's ongoing blockage of the Lachin Corridor's main road connecting Armenia proper to the disputed territory. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan had warned on March 22 that a rise in ''sharp rhetoric and threats'' from Azerbaijan in recent days had raised the risk of ''new aggression against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh'' and ''ethnic cleansing.'' Azerbaijan's actions and Armenia's warnings are the latest signs that bilateral tensions are rising as the peace talks and enforcement of the two countries' 2020 cease-fire appear to have stalled.
In a statement issued on March 25, Russia's defense ministry said Azerbaijan had violated the cease-fire that ended the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh by crossing a line of contact, and asked Azerbaijani troops to withdraw from the new positions they had taken along the Armenian border.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has offered fluctuating assessments in recent weeks regarding the state of negotiations and the possibility for escalation amid the lack of apparent progress. At a March 14 press conference, he said that the ''risk of escalation is very high,'' adding that this conclusion was ''from Azerbaijan's growing aggressive rhetoric, and of course other information,'' a likely reference to reports of Azerbaijani military equipment movements. But in a bid to emphasize that Azerbaijan would be responsible for any provocations, Pashinyan also tweeted on March 25 that ''there will be a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan... There won't be new escalation! The international community must strongly support this narrative.''
On March 19, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev warned that the ''one condition for [Armenians] to live comfortably'' in Armenia is that Yerevan ''must accept our conditions.'' He then repeated his threat to not recognize Armenia's territorial integrity, a reference to the possibility of Azerbaijan seizing parts of southern Armenia to establish a land corridor to Azerbaijan's Naxcivan exclave.
On Dec. 12, a group of Azerbaijanis blocked the road linking Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia through the so-called Lachin Corridor. Ten days later, Pashinyan said Russian peacekeepers' failure to unblock the corridor violated Russia's 2020 cease-fire obligations. Russian peacekeepers have been unwilling to forcibly remove the Azerbaijanis, despite the fact that unobstructed movement on the road is explicitly required in the deal.
Recent events show that the negotiation process is at risk of losing momentum, opening the possibility of renewed efforts by Azerbaijan to demonstrate its leverage, including with force, which will likely eventually kickstart diplomatic progress. On Feb. 16, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan announced that his country had presented Azerbaijan with the latest draft of a comprehensive peace treaty. Two days later, Azerbaijan then removed a sticking point in negotiations by offering to allow checkpoints on the proposed Zangezur transit corridor through Armenia in exchange for checkpoints on the Lachin Corridor. Armenia will not accept an adjustment to the terms of the Lachin Corridor unless it comes as part of the implementation of a comprehensive peace deal. However, Azerbaijan's offer nonetheless constituted progress, as topics such as regional transit corridors and border demarcation are now largely matters of technical details, leaving the future of Nagorno-Karabakh as the primary obstacle to a peace deal. Further diplomatic progress, however, has faltered since Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev's last meeting on Feb. 18, and it's unclear when the leaders (or other high-ranking officials from the two countries) will next meet. So long as talks appear stalled, Azerbaijan will likely turn to small-scale violations of the cease-fire to seize tactically advantageous areas in Nagorno-Karabakh, or similar actions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Baku has used this strategy on multiple occasions since the cease-fire was signed in November 2020 to force diplomatic progress by simultaneously demonstrating and increasing its leverage.
In separate phone calls with Pashinyan and Aliyev on March 20 and March 21, respectively, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken offered continued U.S. assistance in facilitating bilateral peace discussions amid rumors of escalating tensions.
The deadliest recent major escalation occurred in September 2022, when over 100 Armenian soldiers were killed after Azerbaijani troops occupied a section of the undemarcated border. Pashinyan appealed to trigger the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Article 4 mutual defense clause to restore Armenia's territorial integrity from Azerbaijani encroachment and to ensure the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops. But the Russia-led alliance failed to respond in a meaningful way.
Despite its recent aggressive actions, Azerbaijan remains unlikely to launch a large-scale military operation to seize large swaths of new territory in Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia, as less costly methods can enable Baku to maintain progress toward its goals. Each time Azerbaijani forces gain ground, it improves their tactical position - even if those territorial gains only move the de facto line of contact by a matter of meters. Such maneuvers also increase the Azerbaijani government's negotiating leverage by making the threat of a large military operation more potent. Compared with large territorial seizures, this strategy enables Azerbaijan to continue gaining ground and increasing its leverage - all without the risk of triggering another full-blown war with Armenia, as well as international condemnation (and likely sanctions). Baku thus has little incentive to attempt a military operation to seize most or all of the remaining territory in Nagorno- Karabakh, and/or an operation to seize portions of southern Armenia. Moreover, Azerbaijan has little interest in unnecessarily jeopardizing a peace deal likely to be largely in its favor. Despite Armenia's efforts to flex its relations with countries including Russia, the United States, the European Union and even Turkey through the ongoing normalization processes, it is very unlikely that Yerevan will be able to secure any sort of foreign partnership capable of seriously undermining Azerbaijan's leverage. This means that Azerbaijan does not see a large-scale invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia as a time-sensitive necessity, despite its public suggestions to the contrary.
The recent deployment of EU monitors on Armenia's side of the border may help further deter Azerbaijan from conducting a large-scale attack. In March, an EU monitoring mission consisting of 100 unarmed monitors arrived in Armenia. Like the Russian armed peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh, their mandate is scheduled to last until 2025. But unlike the armed Russian peacekeepers, the EU monitors will only be able to work on the Armenian side of the border, meaning their mandate could be extended by Yerevan.
In recent weeks, Armenia has made progress in normalizing ties with neighboring Turkey, which is Azerbaijan's closest ally. For Armenia and Turkey, such efforts to restore their bilateral ties offer leverage they can use to constrain Azerbaijan from making excessive demands in peace talks, as Baku would prefer that any steps toward Turkey- Armenia normalization be preconditioned on securing a deal ending its conflict with Armenia.
Iran, meanwhile, will continue actions aimed at deterring Azerbaijan, maintaining already high tensions between the two countries. Azerbaijan's repeated violations of the 2020 cease-fire - combined with the Russian army's setbacks in Ukraine - have eroded both the authority of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the credibility of Russia's commitment to protecting Armenia from Azerbaijani encroachment. This has concerned nearby Iran by raising the specter of a large-scale Azerbaijan invasion of southern Armenia that could block trade routes connecting Iran to the Black Sea. Such an invasion could also put the entire border under the control of Azerbaijan, an ally of Turkey that has recently been cozying up to Israel as well - two of Tehran's top regional rivals. Within this context, Iran has been stepping up efforts to threaten Azerbaijan in the hopes of deterring it from attacking southern Armenia. In recent months, the Iranian government has ramped up diplomatic engagement with Armenia, as demonstrated by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani's March 22 visit to the country. The Iranian military has also made threatening maneuvers near the Azerbaijani border and has peddled propaganda showing the possibility of attacks on Azerbaijani cities. Amid Russia's failure to halt Baku's continued encroachment and latest provocations, Tehran will continue to take these relatively low-cost actions, which are aimed at forcing Azerbaijan to plan as though the possibility of Iran joining the war cannot be excluded, thereby making military solutions in the region much more complicated for Baku. But unless Azerbaijan actually tries to seize territory in southern Armenia, Iran is highly unlikely to directly intervene in the conflict, given the domestic political implications this would have for the regime and the possibility of war with NATO-member Turkey as a result.
In recent weeks, social media accounts affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps began sharing videos of Shahed-136 kamikaze drones crossing the border with Azerbaijan over the Aras River. The videos were widely seen as a threat to forcefully respond to any Azerbaijani attempt to unify the Turkic world by seizing southern Armenia and establishing a land connection with its Naxcivan exclave.
An Azerbaijani lawmaker known for being an outspoken critic of Iran was injured by gunfire outside his home in an apparent assassination attempt on March 29, the same day that Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Israel. The State Security Service of Azerbaijan called the incident a terrorist attack but Baku has been reluctant to officially implicate the Iranian government. This was the latest of numerous incidents in recent months that suggest escalating tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan, including a Jan. 27 shooting at the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran."