Monday, December 7 2020 15:07

ArmInfo.In an interview with ArmInfo, Michal Patryck Sadlowski, an expert on the countries of the former USSR, a lecturer at Warsaw University, founder of the G.  Shershenvich Institute of Oriental Law Foundation, comments on the  geopolitical results of the 44-day war.

The 44-day war, which resulted in the signing of a trilateral  statement, undoubtedly had a broad geopolitical context. Please,  share your vision of the role of Russia, Turkey, the United States  and the European Union in this war. Which of the centers of power, in  particular, became the main beneficiary of the bloodshed with the  participation of Armenians and Azerbaijanis?

I think that Russia, Turkey and personally the President of  Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev: Russia retained its presence in the region  and significantly increased its influence over Yerevan and Baku. And  in the foreseeable future, Moscow has enough tools to significantly  influence Armenia, Artsakh and the authorities in Baku. In the short  term, Russia has many variations for this, especially in comparison  with its potential that has been dwindling in recent years. In this  light, from now on, it will undoubtedly be very difficult to decide  something in Artsakh without Moscow, while, for Ilham Aliyev, in  particular, without Turkey as well. The President of Azerbaijan,  perhaps, now looks like a winner in the eyes of many Azerbaijanis.  However, in reality, this is a bitter victory for Azerbaijan.

But for Aliyev himself, the most important thing is power, and now he  has received new foundations for legitimacy. He can now be compared  to his father. And in the culture of Azerbaijan it's very important.  As regards Turkey, everything is quite complicated. First, Russia  officially allowed Turkey to enter the South Caucasus. For what?  Because it is much weaker than the West and perhaps with Turkey it  will be easier for Russia to sort out its contradictions with NATO.  At the same time, there was no precedent when Russia, together with  the NATO country, draws a map of the world and everyone just watch it  and does nothing.

May it be that Moscow is dragging Turkey into some of its new  projects? Or maybe all this was already inevitable? Indeed, for 26  years, Turkey has been constantly increasing its influence in  Azerbaijan, and it had to somehow be pulled out of there. Including,  by demonstrating to Baku that Turkey has become a big problem for it.  We must not forget that Moscow was well aware and understood that  Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan was growing, and this process shoul  have somehow been slowed down. This is also an important issue.  Russia does not want to lose Azerbaijan. This is clearly visible. And  this is one of the main tasks of Russian foreign policy in the  Caucasus.

Judging by the results of the war, Turkey's participation in this war  in one form or another, and the final point set by Russia, Artsakh  has become another arena of geopolitical confrontation between Moscow  and Ankara. And the long-term talks in Ankara between representatives  of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry of Russia and Turkey  once again demonstrated the complexity of the partnership between the  presidents of Russia and Turkey. In this light, is it possible to  state that in Artsakh Erdogan's neo-Ottoman project collided with the  first rudiments of the practical implementation of Putin's project on  the actual reincarnation of the Soviet Union?

I don't think Russia has a plan to revive the Soviet Union. Despite  the mistakes made by Vladimir Putin, for example, in Ukraine, being a  very clever politician, he clearly realizes that there is no return  to the Soviet past. This ideology no longer exists. But on the other  hand, Russia wants to remain an empire. It strives to remain a  full-fledged heir to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in the  sector of external influence and territories. That is why Russia  cannot afford to lose its influence on Yerevan and Baku. Until that  point of view in the Kremlin is changed, Russia will hold on tightly  in the region.

The South Caucasus is the gateway to the south of Russia. And Moscow,  of course, strives for Armenia to remain exclusively in the zone of  Russian influence. So yes, Turkey and Russia met in Artsakh, but they  have been meeting in the region for many years and now it is time for  Moscow to demonstrate the limits of its own zones of imperial  influence and to outline the boundaries of Russian interests for  Turkey. And the war in Artsakh is part of this complex process. It is  important to note that Russia in the future will have big problems in  the post-Soviet space: people who were born under the Soviet Union  will no longer be the elite of the former republics. And Russia is  quite worried about it.  Israel's participation in the war for  Artsakh was expressed not only in the 44-day supply of arms to  Azerbaijan, but also in the supply of instructors. Why, in your  opinion, apart from the purely financial side, are the Israelis  interested in Azerbaijan. And what role does Azerbaijan's now  expanded neighborhood with Iran play in this interests?

In general, Azerbaijan is a good, just excellent partner for Israel.  It has money, pays well and buys weapons, which, at the same time,  can be tested immediately. So to speak: < right off the bat >. And of  course, Iran can be criticized in Baku. And the issue of Iran  occupies a very important place on the Israeli- Azerbaijani agenda. I  think that only a very stupid politician would refuse to use this  opportunity. This is geography. At the same time, Baku can talk with  Washington through Israel. To the extent that would not lead to  Moscow's indignation. After all, Jews are everywhere and Baku knows  this.

Does the actual loss of Artsakh by Armenia contain prospects for new  opportunities for Armenia in terms of foreign policy orientation, as  happened in 2008 with Georgia? Or will the linkage with Russia grow  even more?

Perfectly understanding the complexity of the current situation in  Armenia, I believe that the outcome of the war is a chance for  Yerevan. In my opinion, the Armenian elite should focus on creating a  modern, strong state. It must be understood that there is no place  and time for a state of the nineties model in Armenia. If Armenia  wants to survive in this ultra-difficult place, than it must think  from this perspective:  It should uncompromisingly create strong  bodies of administration, local government and the army; build a  civil society, in order to slow down the emigration of people from  the country, to raise the regions; develop IT.  Now Armenia must look  at itself from the outside. And, of course, there is the issue of the  Diaspora, I think it is necessary to define a new model of  cooperation between the Diaspora and Armenia as a state, because now  Armenia cannot learn all the best from Armenians from all over the  world. I think that Armenia did not use the potential of the Diaspora  during the conflict either. Defeats always happen, and as strange as  it may sound, this is a normal phenomenon in history and politics.  Poland, for example, lost the Second World War. We lost a lot of  people and territories then.

Then the Soviet Union decided our internal issues. But you have to  live and work. Especially considering that for many years Armenia has  practically played a big game with the big powers of the region and  the world. It can be proud of this, but as of today it's already in  the past. Many Armenians believed that Artsakh would simply be theirs  forever. I think this is a classic mistake of all countries that have  achieved great success in international politics. And if Armenia  understands this mistake, being at the same time moderately proud of  the successes of the past, then everything, God willing, will be  fine. Armenia is a country of specialists in geopolitics.

Armenia has many opportunities, but I understand that there are also  many restrictions. In general, I think that the best solution for  Baku and Yerevan would be a peaceful division of territories, not a  war: regions to Azerbaijan, and the former NKAO and a safe corridor  to Armenia. And what did Azerbaijan achieve as a result of the war?  Entire regions have been destroyed, heavy losses, and above all a  vague geopolitical situation. At the same time, Aliyev can now be in  power for a very long time.  Nevertheless, I think it is necessary to  somehow work to convince Baku that the conflict is not in the  interests of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Maybe Armenia somehow needs  to start talking with both Turkey and Azerbaijan? And if they don't  meet halfway, then this will become an important message for Europe.   We, too, are beginning to look closely at Turkey, and a lot of issues  are dissatisfying for us. Especially considering that Turkey is a  NATO country. Geopolitically, not everything is bad either. If there  is no Armenia, then there is no Russia in the Caucasus either. The  whole question is, does Russia understand this? Armenia is  undoubtedly an excellent ally. The whole question is, who should  understand this?  Moscow or Yerevan? At the same time, even taking  into account various options, Yerevan should also have normal  relations with Moscow, and this is an important task for Armenia.  Even at the expense of the West, you have to be honest in this issue. 

Now the US and EU do not have one solid concept of policy towards the  Caucasus. There was an election crisis in the United States. Europe  has serious problems with Covid-19 and structural problems in the EU,  especially budget related ones. So, the West, to some extent, forgot  about the Caucasus. There are also processes in the direction of  combating religion in the EU countries. And for me it is painful to  watch the indifference to the defense of Armenia as a Christian  country. Europe simply looked at the tragedy of Armenia, at the  destruction of its heritage. An example is France and Germany, which  for many years fought with the traditions of Europe, and now for many  the traditions of Christianity do not matter. But this is a big  mistake. Armenians are our family and we shouldn't abandon it.

If there is no Armenia in the Caucasus, then in the cultural sense,  in the sense of the system of values, there will be no Europe here  either. Our borders will shrink. Many in Europe, especially in  Poland, mistakenly think that they just need to support Turkey to  fight against Russia. I personally doubt that in the future Turkey  will play the role of an exclusively rival to Russia. On the other  hand, I think that Armenia was unable to promote itself correctly,  especially after the Velvet Revolution.  Armenia should have a  reasonable and clear position, there should be a clear proposal so  that we in Europe know what Armenia expects from us. And what can  Armenia offer us. Policies that rely solely on human rights grants  are bad policies. And I can clearly see this in the example of  Polish-Armenian relations.  Everything seems to be fine, but there is  not enough specifics, the purpose of these relations is not visible.   And here, especially now, we need a conversation between our  diplomats and politicians. Western diplomats are also to blame for  often saying what Armenians or Azerbaijanis wanted to hear in Yerevan  and Baku. As a result, the conflict only worsened. Another thing is  that Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in turn, often did not want to  listen to the advice of our experts, ambassadors and politicians.

The trilateral statement formalized the results of the war, but by no  means the final settlement of the conflict, in fact, sidelining the  rest of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries: France and the  United States. Paris has already reacted to the Russian-Turkish  initiatives with two parliamentary resolutions recognizing the  independence of Artsakh. And, apparently, this process will still  find its continuation. How do you see the final settlement of the  conflict and do you see it at all?

I think that from the point of view of history, the conflict between  Armenians and Azerbaijanis was inevitable due to the young age of  your statehood after the First World War. You simply did not have  time to figure it out for yourself, to figure out your relations with  the Azerbaijanis. Poland then had 20 years of independence, we had  the opportunity to fight for our borders. Armenia and Azerbaijan had  communism and control from Moscow. There was no freedom at all. So  there was some kind of statehood, but there was no independence.  Therefore, the conflict and war for Artsakh in the period from 1988  to 2020 were inevitable. And all the victims were not in vain. All of  them are important and they all had their own purpose, their own  destiny. Don't forget about them. This is the salt of this earth. For  me, this conflict is generally very important, because it is clearly  evident in Artsakh that international law does not have a basis  solely for one interpretation or understanding. 

The Armenian people have also demonstrated their righteousness. They  demonstrated the impossibility of referring exclusively to the  territorial integrity of Azerbaijan after 1991 and that there are  other arguments and a different reality. And finally, the Caucasus is  the border of different worlds and centers of power.  And,  unfortunately, if the rivalry and struggle between them continues,  the small countries will have to get involved in these conflicts in  order to survive. But maybe this is the main issue for Baku and  Yerevan today? Therefore, I think that it can be difficult to reach  the final one. But you have to try.