November 9 statement was opportunity to save Artsakh - Robert  Kocharyan 

ArmInfo.  Not a single opposition political force in Armenia has spoken about invalidating the November 9, 2020, trilateral statement that ended hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone. This was stated by Armenia's second president, Robert Kocharyan, in an interview with Channel 5, referring to the 44-day war and the mistakes made by the authorities during those days.

Kocharyan stated that all political forces understood that, despite  the document being quite problematic and recording the war's dismal  results for the Armenian side, the November 9 statement was  nevertheless an opportunity to preserve Artsakh. "At that moment, we  had to cling to this document and do everything possible to ensure  its implementation. Compare paragraph 9 of this document with the  similar paragraph of the Washington document of August 8 of this  year. They are identical in content, the only difference being that  back then, there was Artsakh and the Lachin corridor," the politician  said.

Kocharyan is confident that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's  refusal to implement paragraph 9 of the trilateral statement of  November 9, 2020, led to the blockade of Artsakh and its loss. He  also believes that a similar Washington document is now being  presented as the deal of the century, especially given the loss of  Artsakh and the Lachin corridor.

Regarding the reasons for the loss of Artsakh and the outbreak of  hostilities, the second president of Armenia noted that approximately  a year before the start of the 44-day war, it was clear to him that  everything was being done to provoke a war. He is confident that the  war was caused by the breakdown of the negotiation process, and due  to the fault of the Armenian side. "The Armenian side has refused to  negotiate for the first time in the history of negotiations.

In 2021, the Armenian authorities refused to negotiate on the  proposal of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, declaring that they were  starting from scratch and let them negotiate with Nagorno-Karabakh.  And with the phrase 'Artsakh is Armenia, period!' Nikol Pashinyan  dashed all expectations. Add to this the discrediting of the army  command, which led to the weakening of the army, the deterioration of  relations with a strategic ally, and the discrediting of the CSTO,"  the politician said. For the international community, the Armenian  side was the one torpedoing the negotiations.

According to him, under the current circumstances, Azerbaijan had no  choice but to launch military action.  Kocharyan is confident that  the policy pursued by the Armenian authorities since 2018 to weaken  the army was one of the positive signals for the outbreak of  hostilities. He added that another pretext for Azerbaijani aggression  was the operation on the northeastern border of the  Armenian-Azerbaijani border, the scale of which was inflated and  almost equated in significance to the Battle of Sardarapat. Kocharyan  is confident that the above-mentioned circumstances created the ideal  conditions for Azerbaijan to initiate war, and given Armenia's  breakdown in the negotiation process, no one condemned this  aggression.

He also noted that in recent years, the Armenian prime minister has  openly stated that Artsakh was a burden for Armenia, and by  relinquishing it, Yerevan freed itself from this burden and "gained  independence." The former Armenian president expressed his conviction  that the war would not have happened if the Armenian authorities had  not made these grave mistakes.

When asked what the outcome of the Artsakh negotiation process would  have been without the Armenian authorities' actions, Kocharyan  expressed his belief that the negotiation process would have ended  with the adoption of a modified version of the Madrid Principles. "If  Nikol Pashinyan had joined the negotiation process in 2019-the OSCE  Minsk Group proposal was a good one-then everything would have ended  with the signing of such a document," Kocharyan said.

When asked whether any of the authorities consulted him during the  war, Kocharyan denied it, adding that Pashinyan is incapable of  accepting anyone's advice. "The most incomprehensible thing for me is  that during the war, on October 18-19, Nikol Pashinyan rejected the  Russian side's offer to end the war.  Azerbaijan agreed, but Nikol  Pashinyan rejected it, knowing full well he would lose the war, since  the General Staff reported that the army did not have the resources  to continue military operations. This decision cost our people at  least 2,500 additional deaths and 5,000-6,000 wounded," the  politician noted.

Kocharyan also added that he was in Karabakh on the second day of the  war, and what he saw in the first two days convinced him that the  Armenian side would lose. "Every day, through Bako Sahakyan and  Arkady Ghukasyan, I tried to convince Arayik Harutyunyan to do  everything possible to stop the war. I had a clear plan of action,  but Arayik Harutyunyan was afraid to meet with me, conveying through  Bako Sahakyan that 'the Armenian prime minister would eat him if he  met with me.' In other words, at that time, people feared Azerbaijan  less than the Armenian prime minister," he continued.

Kocharyan added that he was certain the Armenian side would lose  because such personnel changes had been made in the Armenian army,  and people incapable of making decisions had been appointed to  leadership positions based on loyalty to the authorities. According  to him, another indicator of a negative outcome for us was the  shameful mobilization organized by the current authorities.

The politician is certain that the current authorities failed to take  a single normal step during the fighting, starting with distributing  combat medals to the commanders of the retreating army. According to  him, this was done not to reward combat effectiveness, but to  encourage defeat. "The disinformation spread during the war became  the main cause of desertion. The management of the war was a failure  on all fronts," he said.

Kocharyan also noted that on the second or third day of the war,  almost the entire population was evacuated from Nagorno-Karabakh,  even from remote rear-line villages where it was unnecessary.  According to him, this created panic and a mood of surrender in  Nagorno-Karabakh.