ArmInfo. The rapprochement between Baku and Moscow is already a recorded fact, but the extent of the same anti-Westernism and pro-Soviet nostalgia between the parties is different, as well as the motivations for building value lines. This is how political scientist Sergei Markedonov commented on the working visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the Russian Federation.
The expert stated that Aliyev flew to Moscow on the birthday of the "leader of the world proletariat." At first glance, an ordinary diplomatic routine; All the kind words appropriate for such cases were spoken, positive assessments were voiced. However, there are several considerations that allow us to talk about this trip as an event more significant than just a meeting of two presidents," he noted.
At the same time, the political scientist noted that Aliyev's visit is taking place against the backdrop of a sharp cooling in relations between Russia and Armenia. And, on the contrary, the "Westernization" of Yerevan's foreign policy is moving forward by leaps and bounds.
"In the language of social networks, "everything is complicated" in Georgia's external borders and even inside. At the same time, Turkey's positions are being strengthened, and the Russian peacekeeping contingent is leaving Karabakh ahead of schedule, leaving behind conflicting emotions and assessments not only among Caucasian players, but also among neighboring powers and the countries of the adjacent Eurasian regions," Markedonov continued.
According to the expert, Russian-Azerbaijani relations developed in complex and contradictory ways in 1991-2024. "At first, Baku, probably even more than Tbilisi, looked like Moscow's most problematic partner in the Transcaucasus. Then the situation began to change. Since 2008, the term "strategic partnership" has come into circulation, which was nevertheless considered in comparison to the "strategic alliance" with Armenia. In February 2022, the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan agreed on "allied cooperation." Formally, the levels of relations between the two Caucasian states and Russia have leveled off. But does reality always correspond to formal statuses? Over the past few years, relations between Moscow and Baku have been going uphill, while relations between Moscow and Yerevan have been going downhill. It's just an observation of fact, without assessments in the "good-bad" format," the expert noted.
Regarding what strengthens the closeness of the positions of Baku and Moscow, Markedonov expressed the conviction that today, perhaps, this is rejection of the West, coupled with a value dimension. "It was not for nothing that the topic of BAM's anniversary was raised at the meeting between Putin and Aliyev . Since pro-Soviet nostalgia has become an integral part of today's Russian value space, a deja vu effect arises. In the last years of the existence of the USSR, the AzSSR enjoyed the support of the conservative part of the party-state establishment, while the "anti-Soviet-democratic "Armenia and Karabakh were highly respected by "systemic" and non-systemic "reformers" of varying calibers and varying degrees of radicalism.
But are the abovementioned conditions enough for a strong alliance? I would like to be an optimist, but my expert conscience does not allow me to indulge in "dizziness from success." After all, in addition to the elite, Azerbaijan has society (especially its youth segment) and social networks," the political scientist is confident. According to him, first, they should be carefully studied in order to understand, to put it mildly, the ambiguous perception of Russia and its policies in the Caucasus!
Markedonov does not consider it unimportant, reminding that earlier someone said such things about the importance of Armenia as well; these are just 'talkers' and 'scribblers'! But today one of these "scribblers" is making a turn in foreign policy in the course of his country.
"Add to this the factor of Turkey, which has its own importance, and not all Turkish interests coincide with Russian ones. But the level of strategic coordination between Baku and Ankara (let's also add Ankara- Washington and Brussels) is such that it does not allow Russia to get overjoyed. Let's not forget about the Iran factor, as well as Tehran's concerns about the strengthening of "pan-Turkism" in the region and, of course, the "Ukrainian issue," which previously did not bring Moscow and Baku much closer.
"Author, don't make me sad," my potential critic will say. Pessimism, of course, is not our method. But sober assessments without inflated expectations and with an understanding of possible problem areas are more important than honeyed and sugary delights. The rapprochement of Baku and Moscow is already a recorded fact. And any friendship is better than enmity and misunderstanding, no matter who argues. But the volume of the same anti-Westernism and pro-Soviet nostalgia is different among us, as are the motives for building value lines. It's worth understanding such things "on shore," before setting off on a long voyage," the Russian political scientist summed up.