Clingendael Report: In short term EU has few possibilities to replace Russia as security and economic actor in Armenia

ArmInfo. EU is close to brokering a comprehensive peace agreement, but still faces several sticking points. This is stated in the Report of the Dutch Institute of International Relations Clingendael on the EU mission in the South Caucasus for March.

The document notes, in part: "Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the broader geopolitical confrontation that ensued has sent shockwaves through the wider Eurasian region, including the South Caucasus. It has intensified tensions and trends that were already present. It particularly eroded Russia's influence as a regional power and thereby created a certain vacuum that others - including the European Union - are eager to fill. The EU thus finds itself entangled in a geopolitical web of old alliances and rivalries, shifting allegiances and geopolitical tensions imported from elsewhere in the world. This study looks at how the EU can manifest its geopolitical ambitions in a strategically important and changing region that is an integral part of the European neighbourhood. It particularly looks at how the EU can contribute effectively to the resolution of several of the protracted conflicts that have troubled the region for decades.  This report first disentangles the geopolitical Gordian Knot of the South Caucasus by mapping the geopolitical dynamics, grouping them in five clusters and assessing how they changed after '24/2'. The first set are the traditional regional rivalries between Russia, Turkey and Iran and the way they relate to the three South Caucasus states themselves (also known as the '3+3'). The hostile relations and armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are central to these regional dynamics, with Turkey trying to leverage its strong links with Azerbaijan to increase its presence in the region while also tentatively exploring a modest "normalization" of relations with Armenia. Russia is increasingly defaulting on its security commitments to Armenia and prioritizes good relations with Azerbaijan. Iran and Russia are also increasingly building a pragmatic security partnership based on common antagonism towards the West. The second set of dynamics is the long- standing competition between the West and Russia over influence in Georgia. 

While it would be amiss to see Georgia as becoming more 'pro-Russian', its government certainly appears to become less pro-Western.

In addition to these two long-standing but changing sets of rivalries, the South Caucasus is also importing geopolitical tensions from two other regions: the Middle East and South Asia. Israel is building relations with Azerbaijan to contain the regional influence of Iran, while tensions between Baku and Tehran are increasing. Iran and Armenia thereby also share an interest in countering Azerbaijan's ambitions. Armenia, in its quest for alternatives to its dependence on Russian armaments, is increasingly reaching out to India while Azerbaijan maintains strong relations with India's regional rival Pakistan.  And finally, China - which has traditionally remained politically aloof from the South Caucasus - is increasingly interested in using the 'Middle Corridor' through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe to circumvent both the land route through Russia and the longer sea route. All these dynamics are difficult to encapsulate in a brief text and remain subject to further change, such as improved relations between Armenia and Turkey due to 'earthquake diplomacy'. Therefore, the report also includes an interactive geopolitical mapping tool where the reader can further explore the different bilateral relationships.

If the EU is to assert itself as a 'geopolitical actor' in this complex neighbourhood, it must first clearly decide what its key interests actually are.  This report identifies four parallel objectives that the EU pursues in the South Caucasus. There are 1) to export European values on good governance, democracy and human rights, 2) to promote stability and security, 3) to expand economic relations and secure energy and trade interests, and 4) to contain and even push back Russian influence. Problematically, we struggle to find an overall strategy in the EU's application of these sometimes conflicting policy goals. The EU appears to be caught up in a reactive, short- term and ad-hoc modus operandi. To ensure that its investments of financial and political capital are successful, the EU should develop and implement a more holistic and strategic vision, both for the region and for its relations with the individual countries.

In Georgia, the EU efforts to promote democratisation and European integration are facing obstacles. Georgian experts and politicians largely disagree with the EU's decision to grant Georgia a lesser status than Ukraine or Moldova. However, the report finds that there was a good case for the EU's July 2022 decision not to grant full candidate status, both for the credibility of the EU and to maintain pressure on the Georgian government to reform.  Political polarisation in Georgia has become a major impediment for the country's political functioning and EU integration. The EU - and Charles Michel personally - has been heavily involved but an EU-brokered deal broke down soon after it was agreed upon in 2021.  For the time being it may be better for the EU to leave Georgian political actors to demonstrate their seriousness and their will to resolve the issue, as well as to move forward while building on the Commission's requirements for acquiring EU candidate status.  When it comes to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the prospects for conflict resolution remain low. While the Georgian government equates the two regions to Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine, the nature and origins of the conflicts are starkly different. Russia has had to withdraw some troops from both regions to fight in Ukraine, but Moscow retains enough leverage to prevent the regions from opening up to the West and Georgia. The EU can make a modest difference by offering travelling and education opportunities for especially the Abkhaz and taking measures against the Russification of the regions.  The EU should also encourage Georgia to ensure a fair and realistic approach towards conflict resolution.  Perhaps the thorniest and high-profile opportunity for the EU to increase its regional influence is to facilitate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After 24/2 the EU increasingly finds itself competing directly with Russia. Moscow actively tries to keep the EU out of the process, puts

forward peace plans of its own and retains peacekeepe in Nagorno-Karabakh and a strong presence in Armenia, but its credibility as a security provider and its popularity in Armenia have shrivelled. Both Baku and Yerevan are seeing Brussels as a meaningful alternative but are wary of EU partiality influencing its position, either due to commercial interests towards Caspian energy or due to lobbying efforts by pro-Armenian factions in countries such as France. The EU is close to brokering a comprehensive peace agreement, but still faces several sticking points. The first and most complex one concerns the future of Nagorno-Karabakh. While nominally excluding this issue from the bilateral peace treaty, the EU should nonetheless not close its eyes to the fate of the ethnic Armenians.  The EU should press Baku to set up an internationally monitored arrangement that meaningfully guarantees the Armenians' security and human rights. The second point is the establishment of a transport connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan, which is greatly overdue but gives rise to security concerns in Armenia. It is therefore linked to the demarcation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani state border itself and particularly the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops from sovereign Armenian territory. The EU should deter further Azerbaijani attempts to impose its will on Armenia by force. It is therefore crucial that the EU has eyes and ears on the ground, which makes the recent decision to deploy a civilian EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA) a highly significant move - if it has the mandate and resources it needs to accomplish its tasks.  Finally, the report finds that in the short term the EU has few possibilities to replace Russia as a security and economic actor in Armenia. Despite the Armenians' deeply felt disillusionment with Russia, the Kremlin holds Armenia in a firm grip using its preponderance in the security, energy and media sectors. Russia's always unequal partnership with

Armenia is increasingly becoming a straitjacket. The E Armenian expectations about a 'quick fix' and in the meanwhile play the long game, using the CEPA framework to steadily reduce Armenian dependency on Russia. It should particularly strengthen Armenian democratic institutions to increase the country's resilience to Russian interference."