ArmInfo. The absence of normal engineering structures on the line of contact led to the "ceremonial" advance of the enemy army in the direction of Artsakh cities and their capture. A similar opinion was expressed to ArmInfo by the former Chief of the General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Norat Ter-Grigoryants.
"On the border in Artsakh there was no anti-tank defense, engineering barriers, and many other components of defensive fortifications. All this indicates mistakes in the actions of the military leadership, mistakes of the leadership of the Artsakh Defense Army, the Armenian Defense Ministry. In other words, violations of the rules of warfare, defense policy, the whole, "he stressed.
Along with engineering structures and concealment systems, according to the general's estimates, due attention was not paid to providing the defense line with multiple launch rocket systems, especially long- range ones. "We must understand that the mere presence of really good systems of Soviet, Russian production is no longer enough. Time moves forward, and with it military tactics, the operational situation and art are changing," he stressed.
Nevertheless, Ter-Grigoryants considers the purchase of modern SU-30 fighters by Armenia to be wrong. In his opinion, instead of 4 supersonic aircraft, the army had to purchase hundreds of UAVs, since the use of such fighters in a small territory of Armenia is considered by the military as ineffective. In this light, the general recalled that the Azerbaijani army won a victory over the Armenian army primarily through Israeli and Turkish drones.
"During these 44 days, our military leadership made terrible mistakes. And I assess its actions as chaotic, abnormal and contrary to all known laws of warfare. Just the call of the Supreme Commander to participate in hostilities, addressed to the volunteers, is worth it." the first days of the war. I talked about all this and tried to warn the army leadership even before the war. Unfortunately, in vain, "he stressed. Bringing the Armed Forces to full combat readiness, according to the general, should have been carried out through a mobilization plan developed by him and even providing for various trifles. Meanwhile, the uncontrolled recruitment of volunteers, in his opinion, only confused the entire army system. Moreover, the volunteers were used ineffectively, not according to their army specialties and qualifications, and were not in their places.