Monday, November 30 2020 10:20

ArmInfo. On November 30, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan presented new facts of the situation during the war.

On his Facebook page, the head of the Armenian government noted that  on October 20, the second and third presidents of Artsakh, Arkady  Ghukasyan and Bako Sahakyan, proposed to organize a meeting of the  current and former leaders of Armenia and Artsakh, which would become  an expression of national unity during the war. "After some  discussion, I agreed. We agreed that when they give a signal that  they are ready for a meeting, I will hold it," Nikol Pashinyan  stressed.

He informed that Arkady Ghukasyan and Bako Sahakyan said at our next  meeting that nuances were added to the idea. In particular, it was  reported that the first and second presidents of Armenia Levon Ter-  Petrosyan and Robert Kocharian want to go to Moscow, hold high-level  meetings there, and our meeting will be organized after their return,  becoming a kind of information gathering, a more informed discussion  of the situation. ...

"I said that I was not against it, and even  announced my readiness to provide a state plane, let them go, meet,  return. However, after my consent, the former presidents of Artsakh  raised another question. They said that I need to mediate with  Russian President Vladimir Putin so that he received Levon  Ter-Petrosyan and Robert Kocharyan as special envoys. I replied that  I am in constant contact with the President of Russia. It happens  that I talk to him on the phone five or six times a day. And if he  asks me what exactly both ex -the president should tell the president  of Russia that they cannot tell me directly, what should I answer? ",  wrote the head of the Armenian government.

He stressed that the same question arose in the case of Russian  Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, when the ex-presidents of Artsakh  announced that our foreign minister should also act as a mediator in  order for Lavrov to receive special representatives. "Our Foreign  Minister is in constant contact with the Russian Foreign Minister,  their meeting was planned in Moscow. If Lavrov asks the same question  to our Foreign Minister, what should he answer?"

I suggested another  option. Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan will arrive on an official visit  to Moscow as retired presidents, where they will be guests of the  former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who is the deputy chairman  of the Russian Security Council. Arkady Ghukasyan and Bako Sahakyan  left, promising to discuss this option with Ter-Petrosyan and  Kocharyan. It turned out that the idea I proposed did not really  interest the latter. Bako Sahakyan unexpectedly informed me that Ter-  Petrosyan and Kocharyan had agreed to meet with Sergei Lavrov. In  that case, what do they want from me?  They agreed to go to Moscow  and meet. It turned out that we are talking about the passport of  Robert Kocharian, who is in court. I said, let them go to court, I  will ask the prosecutor's office not to object to the return of the  passport. The court returned Kocharyan's passport, but Ter-Petrosyan  and Kocharyan never left for Moscow.

This is what happened, "the head  of the Armenian government concluded.  A day earlier, Nikol Pashinyan  also said on his Facebook page that on October 19, Artsakh President  Arayik Harutyunyan called him and said that the war must be stopped.  He also said that he expresses this point of view not only on his own  behalf, but also on behalf of the retired presidents of the NKR  Arkady Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, as well as ex-presidents of Armenia  Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. "I called  Russian President Vladimir Putin, and he said that, in his opinion,  this should be done in accordance with the logic of the Russian  proposals. That is, to postpone the issue of status, transfer  territories, deploy Russian peacekeepers. I said that peacekeepers  should be deployed. along the former border of NKAO and the Lachin  corridor. He agreed, and we agreed that I would call again after  discussion. I called the President of Artsakh and said that the  option described above is possible. He said that I agree. After that  I called the representatives of the extra-parliamentary forces and  told them that he had made such a decision. "The reaction of many was  reluctant, some wrote on social networks that those who would keep  people from further struggle are traitors.

On the same day I called a  meeting of the Security Council with the participation of  representatives of the factions of the National Assembly. The  President of the Republic and His Holiness were also present. The  opposition was reluctant to accept the news, but I took the  conversation as follows: that he was not going to hold them  accountable. I simply informed them that I was not doing anything  secret behind the backs of the people. I could not make any public  statements, because if Azerbaijan rejected the offer after my public  statement, it would be the collapse of our entire resistance system.  I called the Russian president again and said that I agree. He said  he would discuss this with Aliyev until morning and call him back.  The next day, during a meeting with me, Bako Sahakyan and Arkady  Ghukasyan said that they did not agree with any agreement without  specifying the status of Artsakh or any mechanism of clarification.  In fact, they said the same on behalf of R. Kocharian, S. Sargsyan  and L. Ter-Petrosyan. But none of this mattered, because I had made a  decision and was determined to see it through.

The next day, by  agreement, the Russian president phoned. He said that Aliyev agreed,  but peacekeepers should not be deployed along the borders of NKAO,  since Hadrut and Talish are under their control, and Azerbaijanis do  not agree to withdraw troops from these areas, and peacekeepers  should be deployed on the territory with the de facto line of  contact. Also, the Armenian side must undertake to return  Azerbaijanis to Shushi. Thus, the ceasefire became impossible,  because if I agreed with the issue of transferring Hadrut, I could  not imagine the possibility of transferring Shushi to Azerbaijan. The  Russian President asked why I was against the possibility of  Azerbaijanis to return to Shushi. When I presented my arguments, he  said that it was logical, he was not well aware of some of the  nuances.

The problem was that in this case, there should have been  90% or more of the Azerbaijani population in Shushi, who would  control the road to Stepanakert. I am convinced that if I agreed to  hand over Shushi, Azerbaijan would set a new condition: the Krasny  Shuka-Shushi highway should be under their control. Thus, no  agreement was reached. At that time, Jebrail, Hadrut and several  nearby villages, Fizuli and Talish were lost. Earlier, a ceasefire  for humanitarian reasons was announced twice: once on October 10  through the mediation of the President of the Russian Federation, and  the second on October 17 through the mediation of the President of  France. Both mediation failed, "Nikol Pashinyan said.