Wednesday, July 4 2018 12:22

ArmInfo.In view of the ceaseless attempts of Azerbaijan to manipulate the UN Security  Council resolutions on the Azerbaijan- Karabakh conflict, we consider it necessary to state the following:

The UN Security Council resolutions on the Azerbaijan-Karabakh  conflict were adopted in 1993, during the active hostilities, and  were aimed at putting an end to the war and to start political  dialogue. This was due to the main requirement of all four  resolutions - cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts.

The UN Security Council resolutions have never been implemented  due  to the position of Azerbaijan, which categorically refused to be  bound by the obligations to cease the hostilities, while insisting on  Artsakh's unilateral concessions undermining the military security.  Even after passing the resolutions, Azerbaijan had repeatedly  violated the ceasefire agreements, which is explicitly stated in  resolution 884, and rejected the proposals on the establishment or  extension of ceasefire.

Moreover, Azerbaijan failed to comply not only with the most  important requirement of the resolutions on an immediate ceasefire,  cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts, but also with all the  other ones: to refrain from any actions that obstruct the peaceful  solution of the conflict (Resolutions 822, 853); to continue the  negotiations through direct contacts between the parties (Resolution  853); to restore the economic, transport, and energy links in the  region (Resolution 853); to ensure the unimpeded access for  international humanitarian relief efforts (Resolutions 822, 853,  874).

Azerbaijan demonstrates the same selective approach to the "Adjusted  timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council Resolutions  822 and 853", which was agreed upon and proposed to the parties by  the OSCE Minsk Group. The basis of this proposal, supported by the UN  Security Council Resolution 874, is the provision on the recognition  of the leadership of Nagorno Karabakh as one of the three parties to  the conflict.

The episode with the May 1993 appeal of the Italian Chairmanship of  the CSCE Minsk Conference to the conflicting parties for confirming  their readiness to implement resolution 822 adopted on April 30, 1993  is a characteristic example of Azerbaijan's real and not declared  attitude to the UN Security Council resolutions. Despite the fact  that Azerbaijan was the initiator of passing this resolution, it left  the request of the Italian Chairmanship unanswered.  Through all its  actions, Baku demonstrated that it considered the UN Security Council  resolutions not as a means of ending the war, but as an instrument  for achieving a military advantage.

Azerbaijan's sabotage of the resolutions devalued them to an extent  that the UN Security Council ceased to adopt new resolutions, and the  mediators were forced to search another political and legal basis for  a ceasefire. It became the April 15, 1994 statement of the Council of  the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the  Bishkek Protocol signed by the Parliament Speakers of Nagorno  Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan on May 5-8, 1994, which ultimately  paved the way for the May 12, 1994 Agreement on a complete ceasefire  and cessation of military activities. It should be stressed that  under this agreement, all the parties publicly confirmed the  coordinates for the line of ceasefire, thus defining the status quo  post bellum. The violation of the line of ceasefire by Azerbaijan  during the April 2016 aggression became a serious challenge for the  entire conflict settlement process. Restoration of the line's  configuration as of May 1994 is an indispensable factor for  maintaining peace in the region and an effective deterrent.

Azerbaijan's attempts to present the UN Security Council resolutions,  which Azerbaijan itself violated, as having binding force in the  settlement of the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict have no legal  reasoning and pursue hidden goals that run counter to the negotiation  process.

Neither before nor after passing the resolutions, the UN Security  Council considered the issue of political settlement of the  Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict, refraining from direct mediation  initiatives in support of the CSCE / OSCE efforts, which is directly  stated in the resolutions. This is also indicated by the fact that  after signing the May 12, 1994 trilateral termless Agreement on a  full ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, the UN Security Council  no longer returned to the issue of the Azerbaijan-Karabakh conflict.

It should also be taken into account that according to the UN  Charter, the Security Council can make both decisions and  recommendations. When considering issues related to the legal force  of the UN Security Council documents, the International Court of  Justice concluded that the decisions of the Security Council are  binding for states, while the recommendations are not. All the  resolutions of the UN Security Council adopted with regard to the  Azerbaijan- Karabakh conflict are recommendatory and not binding.

If Azerbaijan really had considered the resolutions of the UN  Security Council as binding and referred to them, proceeding from the  interests of achieving final peace, then it would have implemented  the requirements and appeals of the resolutions, which mostly refer  to Baku.

On the contrary, the targeted policy of the Azerbaijani authorities  on destabilizing the situation on the Line of Contact between the  armed forces of the Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan, Baku's  refusal to implement confidence-building measures and to reduce  tensions, its propaganda of xenophobia and hatred towards Armenians,  refusal to negotiate directly with Artsakh, as well as its efforts to  isolate Artsakh by preventing the visits of representatives of  specialized UN agencies to the Republic run counter to the letter and  spirit of the UN Security Council resolutions.

Against the background of the incessant threats by the Azerbaijani  authorities and, in particular, the statements by the military  leadership that the order for the offensive will be given "at exactly  the right moment, taking into account the international political  situation", it becomes obvious that Azerbaijan makes another attempt  to manipulate the UN Security Council resolutions in the interests of  war, not peace.