Sergey Markedonov: It is early to speak of Armenia’s final geopolitical vector

Mr. Markedonov, the need for new negotiations for a new legally binding agreement with Yerevan is one of the 30 provisions of the Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga on May 21-22. Do you think the new relationship is leading Armenia to European integration?

We are accustomed to restricting the matter to membership or integration, whereas mutual relations are much wider. If a country has no chances to become an EU member in the future or, say, to receive privileges in Schengen visa matters, this does not at all mean an automatic break. I think one of the negative consequences of the Ukrainian crisis was the restriction of the entire EU-Ukraine relationship agenda to an excessively simplified two-colored scheme. Therefore, I would not unambiguously assess the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga as a failure or an achievement. The Riga summit demonstrated the process that had begun long before the summits in Riga and Vilnius - the process of fragmentation of the post-Soviet space, which is becoming an aggregate of multidirectional interests. Even the Caucasus countries have three different responses to the integration challenges: Georgia is strengthening the pro-Western vector, Azerbaijan is conducting a seesaw policy, and Armenia has made a pro-Eurasian choice. But this does not at all mean that these countries will adhere to one line only. For instance, the situation in Pankisi makes Georgia cooperate with Russia despite the current problems. The presence of France in the OSCE Minsk Group, the half a million Armenian community in France, one million Armenian community in the United States make Armenia look at the West. Azerbaijan is keeping its balance between various force centers and benefits from it. From this perspective, it is impossible to say that Armenia or any other country of the former USSR has made a final choice.

Europeans usually say there are no discrepancies between Armenia's Eurasian choice and the new forms of cooperation with the EU. Do you see any discrepancies?

I think it was the European Union that predetermined these discrepancies in 2013. Were it not for this fact or for the unambiguous rhetoric of Jose Manuel Barroso, there might be no Ukrainian crisis at all and the country would not face such a disastrous situation now. I hope the Ukrainian crisis will become a lesson for those who forced Ukraine - a country with a split identity - to make an unambiguous choice. Such methods in geopolitics are very dangerous for both Europe and Russia. 

Armenia has no problems with identity…

I agree with you. Nevertheless, Russia perceives the CIS states as an area of special interests. The attempts to take control of that area without taking into account that area's interests will certainly become a problem for Russia.

When asked about Armenia’s EEU prospects, many Eurasian experts prefer talking of the poor prospects of the EEU project itself. What do you think about it?     

Given that the Eurasian integration process is still being formed, we cannot make any far-reaching conclusions. Today, the Eurasian integration project is undergoing some appraisal. Unlike the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union is not a project about shared history. It is an attempt to build a certain integration structure, where the countries will have to share sovereignties. It is a complicated process. In this light, one should speak of Armenia's Eurasian prospects only in relation to the prospects of the EEU itself. The idea is quite interesting and it has all chances to grow into something accomplished. However, it is impossible to put the cart before the horse.    

In one of your statements, you have characterized the situation around the Iranian nuclear problem settlement as an equation in n unknowns…   

Normalization of the West-Iran relations will inevitably result in Iran's involvement in the energy projects of Europe. This will automatically change the role of Azerbaijan that is considered as a counterweight to Russia in hydrocarbon supplies to Europe. As soon as a country with a stronger potential emerges in this field, Azerbaijan's role will start weakening. Iran's involvement will diminish the monopolistic role of Russia on the European energy market.  Afterwards, Iran will prove capable of intensifying its regional policy. The issues on how it will conduct that policy and whose interests it will meet will obviously be included in the agenda.

And still, the Russian President's intention to lift the ban from the Russian delivery of S-300 missile systems to Iran demonstrates that Moscow understands the subtle aspects of the West-Russia fight for Iran…

Iran is rather influential and it cannot be considered as an appendix to others' interests. The identity of that country is not restricted to the Islamic factor, as many think. The factor of Persian identity should also be taken into account. In this light, Iran is not ready to play a pupil's role in the teachers' competition. Russia's interest in Iran is really evident given the long-term constructive interaction of Teheran and Moscow in the turbulent Islamic world. Iran has been stressing the unacceptability of violence and terrorism in the North Caucasus and has been supporting Russia's stand in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). However, even the fact that Iran is not interested in military internationalization of the Caspian region does not mean that all the positions of Iran and Russia are identical. Therefore, it is first of all necessary to determine the directions of that cooperation. The directions are obviously not enough to let us characterize it as strategic cooperation. There is certain interest in that important country that plays a significant role in the Caspian region, in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and on many geopolitical arenas. But the intensions should be strengthened and the lifting of the ban from the Russian delivery of S-300 systems is not enough for Russia to launch strategic partnership with Iran.

Is it possible to resolve the Karabakh conflict without taking Iran’s opinion into account? 

The Karabakh conflict should be resolved, first of all, by Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, it is impossible to do that without taking Iran's opinion into account. Very often we neglect the significance of neighborhood, whereas that neighborhood is sometimes so important that it overshadows other important and pragmatic reasons. The matter concerns the situation not only between Ukraine and Russia, but also between Cuba and the United States. There are numerous examples of a quite emotional policy when the matter concerns relations with neighbors. This is a special aspect that should not be neglected.         

What can you say about the prospects of a final deal on the Lausanne agreements?

Even if a final agreement is reached, it will not come into effect in the near future. Given any system's bureaucratic passivity amid the long-term sanctions against Iran, it is very hard to launch a "full astern" regime.    

Many experts both in Armenia and Azerbaijan point out Russia's role in the escalation of the tension along the Line of Contact in 2014-2015. They explain that Moscow seeks to keep Yerevan and Baku in its influence area. What is your opinion?   

I do not think Russia bears sole responsibility for the escalation along the Line of Contact of the Karabakh conflict parties. In fact, there are many reasons for the escalation. First of all, the parties cannot find a way out and start using other methods, including force methods. In addition, the conflicting parties are sort of testing the Minsk Group to see how competent it can be under the new geopolitical circumstances.      

Have the May 3 parliamentary elections in Karabakh become a step forward in the Karabakh peace process?  

First of all, the elections have become one more step to affirmation of the specific Karabakh identity. If the people vote and elect, it means they need to do that. It means they do not feel themselves as part of Armenia or Azerbaijan. Baku assesses the elections negatively, because they do not resolve the problem of territorial integrity.  Armenia takes a positive and optimistic view of the elections given that the elections give a certain time gain and adjustment to the gradually stabilizing realities. As regards the residents of Karabakh, they are striving to manifest their existence, which is denied by the leading players.