Political analyst: Election victory grants political force a mandate  to govern the country, not the right to transform its own worldview  into a state ideology

ArmInfo.  In a democratic state, an electoral victory grants a political force a mandate to govern the country, rather than the right to transform its  own worldview into a state ideology, according to analyst Suren  Surenyants.

He recalled statements made by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during  a government session on August 20, 2026. While presenting the draft  government program for the 2026–2031 term, the Prime Minister stated  that the ideology of "Real Armenia" had triumphed in the  parliamentary elections, establishing itself as the "official  ideology" of the Republic of Armenia.

Surenyants noted that this was followed by another notable  declaration: Pashinyan asserted that Armenia is entering a new  historical chapter known as the Fourth Republic. According to the  Prime Minister, the fundamental distinction lies in the fact that the  Third Republic was anchored "on the logic of conflict and  confrontation" from its inception, whereas the Fourth Republic is  being built on the "logic of peace."

According to the analyst, these formulations signal an attempt to  reframe Armenian statehood, historical continuity, and national  identity, raising several fundamental concerns.

The primary issue, Surenyants emphasizes, is the very concept of an  "official ideology." In a democratic framework, citizens vote for a  governing administration, not to relinquish ideological pluralism.  Elevating the ruling party's doctrine to the level of state ideology  crosses a dangerous line. Under such a premise, the political  majority transcends governance and presumes the authority to dictate  the "correct" interpretation of Armenia's past, present, and future—a  path that risks sliding toward ideological monopoly and  authoritarianism.

"The second problem the administration's attempt to characterize the  entire historical and political legacy of the Third Republic solely  through the "logic of conflict." he Third Republic emerged in the  context of the Soviet Union's collapse, the restoration of Armenian  independence, and the existential struggle for national  self-determination and security. While the Artsakh (Karabakh)  movement was a seminal component of this process, the analyst  contends that the foundations of the Third Republic extend far beyond  that singular movement. We are talking about the history of more than  three decades of Armenia's independent statehood. When this entire  period is presented as the result of the "logic of conflict," not  only the Karabakh movement, but also the political foundations and  history of the Third Republic are subject to historical re-  evaluation. Moreover, such a formulation comes dangerously close to  the narrative of official Baku, according to which responsibility for  the outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and war is  unilaterally placed on the Armenian side. The Karabakh movement was  not just a manifestation of the abstract idea of "restoring  historical justice." It was a struggle for self-determination,  security, and later for physical existence, "Self-defense. Placing  this story within the 'logic of conflict' means reassessing the  foundations of one's own statehood within the political lexicon of  the enemy," he  noted.

The third problem he identified was the foreign policy consequences  of such a reinterpretation. "When the leader of Armenia declares that  the previous republic was founded on 'conflict', and the new one is  called upon to overcome this legacy, this can be perceived as a  willingness to reconsider not only the political assessments of the  past, but also the state and legal positions that follow from them.  Such an approach expands the political space for the maximalist  demands of Azerbaijan and Turkey. If the Armenian side itself  delegitimizes its previous state and political concept, the enemy  naturally has a question: what next border is Armenia ready to  concede? Here the historical shadow of Alexandropol becomes visible.  Of course, this is not a mechanical identification of the 1920s and  2026.

 However, the historical experience of Alexandropol reminds us of a  simple pattern: the consistent belittlement of one's own state  positions after defeat does not soften the enemy's demands, but may  even push for the emergence of new ones. The Treaty of Alexandropol  of 1920 became a symbol of the political reality imposed on the  defeated and extremely weakened Armenia. Its historical lesson is  that the continuous retreat from one's own rights and state identity  The continuation of a historical foundation after defeat does not  guarantee peace. The enemy may see this not as the "logic of peace,"  but as weakness and a willingness to make further concessions. And  here, perhaps, the most important question arises: what, ultimately,  is the Fourth Republic? A change of republics usually implies a  fundamental transformation of the state or constitutional order.  However, in the case of Armenia, what legal and political reality has  changed so that the Third Republic can be considered complete and the  Fourth—a beginning? The Republic of Armenia continues to function  within the same framework of state continuity; state institutions are  preserved, the international structure remains," Suren Surenyants  concluded.