Wednesday, May 20 2015 08:04

May 12 marked the 21^st anniversary of the ceasefire agreement you prepared. Over the past two years the ceasefire has been breached more frequently than throughout the previous 19 years. What do you think has changed so much in the conflicting countries and in the geopolitical situation in the region in 2014-2015? 

 

Both countries, as well as third parties have many reasons for the escalation of the Karabakh conflict. But none can replace the two causa causans of the conflict. The conflict would not escalate so quickly if not for one of the causa causans. One of them is of military- technical nature but has a political subtext; the second one is of domestic policy nature. In the first one - one of the conflicting sides denies to honour the commitment undertaken by the three parties:  withdrawal of troops from the line of contact after the cessation of fire. Almost three months prior to the cessation of fire - on Feb 18, 1994 the agreement on withdrawing the troops had been endorsed in the report of proceedings at the meeting of the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of defence and the commander of troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. If all the sides wish to secure the ceasefire this is a rudimentary demand in respect of the settlement of armed conflicts. So, it is no coincidence that withdrawal of troops is so topical in Ukraine. The second causa causans is the ruling elite's interest in one of the conflicting sides maintaining the fomenting tension. This allows the side to reinforce its authority by playing patriot and demonstrating intolerance towards the status quo - under the pretense of a harsh external situation the authorities try to suppress the domestic dissent. By the way, Baku obviously has a lopsided perception of "status quo" - as if all is about the intolerance towards the occupation of territories. The whole current negative situation is intolerable - the constant threats of war resumption, armament race, suppression of freedoms, etc. Not only the onslaught of the foe, but also their own miscalculations and Baku's tenacious nonwillingness of bringing the war to an end in 1992-1994 have resulted in the occupation. Would there be many occupied territories if the UN Security Council's April 30, 1993 resolution had been implemented? Yet someone never wanted to implement the UN Security Council's 4 resolutions and this is the result we have.

 

Is there an alternative or a need to sign a new agreement to settle the situation around the Karabakh conflict? 

 

In the Karabakh peace process the problem is seated in inability of one of the parties to

Negotiate. The refusal to pull back troops is just one of the cases when Azerbaijan has violated its commitments. It was Azerbaijan that breached the short-term truces several times. It was Azerbaijan that has repeatedly disputed obvious things. Quite lately, an Azerbaijani pro- governmental parliamentarian, supposedly, a well-known political scientist (Rasim Musabekov - editor's note) has disputed the permanency of the ceasefire treaty, saying it was allegedly achieved for a period of 10 days. That parliamentarian - political scientist appears to have no idea that all the ceasefires brokered by Russia in the course of the war had clearly defined terms.  It turns out that all the three parties to the conflict and the mediator simply forgot to indicate it. By such statement he offends unintentionally the idolized national leader too.  It turns out that a blatant error happened under him. Very often the parties agree on delicate terms without any words or figures, just "on default."  The ceasefire treaty is permanent as no terms are indicated there.  All the parties to the Karabakh conflict realized that fact and were not deceived by anyone. Therefore, one of the major terms of the new agreement on Karabakh must be a distinct stand of the world community and the mediators on inadmissibility of such low negotiability of the signatory-states. To overcome it, it would be reasonable to agree on ratification of a future agreement on ceasefire by Azerbaijan, first and foremost.

 

Are there necessary conditions or preconditions for a real Big Peaceful Treaty on Karabakh - something Baku regularly insists on? Or do you think there is no alternative to the status quo?  

 

Unfortunately, there are no such conditions, but it is necessary to create them. I disagree with the statements saying that there is no alternative to the status quo. It is necessary to not only withdraw troops from the lands taken but also prevent any threats and absurd arms race. As the parties to the conflict insist on their own consistency of actions in the settlement process, two vicious cycles have emerged in the process. Baku seeks to restore its control over 7 regions hinting that it is the only way to peace. But how and through what measures is it achieving de-occupation? Threats to resume war and arms race, which has a reverse effect. No one will cede its favorable and reinforced positions far from its borders and take more vulnerable ones closer to its borders amid direct threats of military actions. It is a deadlock. Yerevan and Stepanakert demand guarantees of non-resumption of the military actions to gradually leave the territories taken in the course of the combat actions, which, meets the Statement of the CIS Council of the Presidents adopted with participation of Heydar Aliyev on April 15 1994. The mediators give a higher priority to maintenance of the truce rather than to withdrawal of troops. Baku's efforts to avoid the other important issue - the status of Nagorny Karabakh - through the most democratic way - a public referendum - is not clear either. All this makes Baku's own suggestions unsound. On the other hand, Baku impedes the right way towards political, peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict and hereby runs contrary to the document Heydar Aliyev had agreed upon. 

 

The Iranian analysts and experts have repeatedly voiced an aspiration to considerably expand the political and economic presence of Iran in the South Caucasus. The matter also concerns Iran’s involvement in the Karabakh peace process. How would you assess these prospects?

 

Notwithstanding Iran’s active mediation on the Karabakh problem in the early 90s, it would be uneasy for Teheran to get involved in the process again. I suppose Iran will be interested in the settlement of the conflict and can even contribute to its resolution as a neighbor rather than a mediator.

 

International observers have qualified the May 3 parliamentary elections in Karabakh as legitimate, democratic and transparent. Does the establishment of legitimate state power institutions in Artsakh hinder or does it contribute to the resolution of the Karabakh conflict? Do you think Stepanakert should become a full-fledged party to the conflict?         

 

Karabakh was initially involved in the talks and agreements with Baku. Karabakh's participation is necessary indeed, because the conflict is deciding the fate of the Karabakh people. It is absurd and absolutely irrelevant to do that without the Karabakh people's participation. During the war, Baku signed documents with Armenia and Karabakh thrice and over 10 times, respectively.  So, what was Karabakh, if not a party to the conflict? I am convinced this status of Karabakh is undisputable. One can recognize or refuse to recognize the state or the elections in it, but the obvious thing is that the elections in Karabakh are a good step towards stabilization of the situation in the region. Is it better to hold no elections at all or to have a military dictatorship? It would be good if all the entities of the region held elections as regularly, democratically and publicly as Karabakh does, instead of making their bows to the power elite's dictate.