As parliamentary elections end in Turkey, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (-Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi - AKP) is anticipated to share the power with one of the three parties elected to the parliament. Can AKP’s coalition partner be predicted yet?
There is no consensus on AKP's coalition partner in the Turkish elite so far. However, in Turkey this word is a synonym to the world crisis, I think. So, the AKP will try its best to avoid coalition, not least because the parties that entered the parliament are Erdogan's ideologies rivals. Nevertheless, the AKP is able to form a coalition with the National Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP) as both the parties are nationalist and will have at least something in common. Anyway, the coalition will not be a success given the serious discrepancies and nihilistic approaches of the forces that were elected to the parliament. In this light, I think the AKP may attempt to create a minority government that will probably face serious problems during any voting. The Constitution of Turkey enables the Party to do it. After all, the AKP can bribe at least 20 parliamentarians from the other three parties to push through its bills with "the majority" of votes.
I cannot but ask if there are new forces in Turkish Parliament that are called “system opposition” in Armenia?
I believe that the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) - a Kemalist and social-democratic political party in Turkey - will try to undertake the role of the system opposition in the parliament. As to the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic party (Halk?n Demokrasi Partisi, HDP), it will not enter the coalition, given that their election campaign was based on harsh criticism of the AKP. Ex-president Abdullah Gul has already called on the AKP to form a ruling coalition saying the Party must learn to form the government in cooperation with political forces
Can we say that parliamentary election returns have put an end to Erdogan’s presidential ambitions as he used to imagine them?
I believe, The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has lost the sympathies of the major part of the electorate because of Recep Erdogan and his unrealistic ambitions. The major part of the Turkish society has clear political preferences. The remaining part constitutes 3-5%. Even if Erdogan had managed to enlist the support of those 3-5% of voters, his party would all the same have failed to receive 330 seats to reform the Constitution. In this light, I can say that the ambitious goals of Erdogan and his team were doomed to failure.
Nevertheless, the parliamentary election results have turned Recep Erdogan into a technical figure the way it happened to Abdullah Gul…
Despite the controversial situation, Erdogan will remain a fighting president rather than a ceremonial one. Erdogan has staked his entire political capital; therefore he would rather agree to a self-destruction than a compromise limiting his power. Nevertheless, the politician Erdogan's ascent that started in the late 1990s has stopped. Now his career will experience a continuous standstill. In other words, these elections did not mark the end of Erdogan, they have ushered in a new stage of Erdogan's career. As for the role of the AKP leader, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, I do believe that Davutoglu should not have played the first fiddle in Erdogan's orchestra given Davutoglu's luckiness in the backstage politics. Davutoglu joined the public politics at the discretion of Abdullah Gul, and since the mid-90s he has perfectly performed the functions of an unofficial advisor to the Turkish authorities, a theorist and then a "gray figure". Nonetheless, "academician" Davutoglu failed to feel the real pulse of the Turkish voters and kept building his campaign speeches in the style of a classical scientific lecture. This was one of the reasons why the public failed to consolidate around the AKP. So, he is also to blame for the AKP defeat at the elections.
AKP voter base was growing until the 2011 parliamentary elections. What sweeping changes could have taken place in the past 4 years in Turkey and around Turkey to cause such changes in voter base’s preferences?
At least two important factors have had an important role in these changes. The first is the change of Erdogan-Fethullah Gülen friendly relations into hostile ones. Millions of Gulen’s supporters and associates in Turkey could not have but noticed that, therefore they have deduced an appropriate inference. In this matter the proislamic voter base has faced the formation of certain vacuum, which was followed by 8-9% of AKP’s votes being allocated among other forces. Gulen’s pre-election campaign was accompanied by unhidden anti-governmental propaganda through the front pages of his own newspapers. This could only be the result of Erdogan’s ill-considered, heat-of-the-moment actions. The second factor was the result of Kurdish consolidation, which was evidenced during the recent elections. Ethnic minorities such as Yezidis, Assyrians, gypsies have gathered around the Peoples’-Democratic Party – this resulted in extra 3% for the HDP. The Armenians living in Turkey have backed HDP this time given that in 2011 they voted for the AKP.
Is it possible that the recent elections might result in Fethullah Gülen’s growing authority and political heft?
I believe these factors to be consolidated in time. The recent elections have proved that Erdogan is facing serious problems without Gulen’s support. Erdogan’s speeches often contradict his ally Ahmet Davutoglu’s statements. These very people have either conscientiously or not caused AKP’s failure during the June elections.
Most believe Fethullah Gülen to be the provider of the U.S. interests in Turkey. Can it be said the States have obtained new leverages against Erdogan and keep him in their wardship?
I believe that the US has regained old leverages. For an instant Erdogan believed Turkey had become powerful enough to talk to the States and West on equal terms, even raise voice and blackmail them. The West used the June elections returns to directly prove to Erdogan how futile and ungrounded his pretensions on his unlimited power and Turkey’s independence are.
What of the relations with Armenia and the opening of borders? Is it from the same kettle of fish?
Definitely. Moreover, it is expected that the situation will escalate in case AKP and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) build a coalition. This will be followed by Ankara’s fueled anti-Armenian propaganda. As a matter of fact, the Nationalist Movement Party was blaming Davutoglu of attempting at improving relations with Armenia during the pre-election campaign. Even the fact of three Armenians at Turkish Parliament has resulted in stained relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. MHP has always been proud of its relations with Azerbaijan. This party claims to be the only one to have no names of Armenians on its lists. Therefore, these three Armenians can hardly change anything. Nevertheless, it is better to have them in parliament than not. Garo Pailian can make use of the Turkish parliament rostrum to raise the issue of recognizing the Armenian Genocide. The other two newly-elected deputies have hardly anything to do with the Armenian community, therefore, we can expect some results from Garo Pailian only.
Speaking of the Armenians living in Turkey – we often mention only the Istanbul community, however, there are millions of hidden Armenians, as well as those who have embraced Islam and so on. is it possible to define their approximate number and ethnic affiliation?
The issue of hidden or Islamised Armenians is rather complicated. I believe it is wrong to speak of them using common criteria. We cannot rank them among Armenians and vice-versa. In this matter the Turkish Armenians should be divided into 4 groups: the first group comprises Amshen Armenians who have been living in that area since the 17-18th centuries. They embraced Islam back in those days. However, they have somehow preserved their identity, the language, dialect, customs and traditions. In turn, these Armenians can be divided into two subgroups – Eastern Amshen Armenians who speak Armenian and openly state to be of Armenian origin. Given the fact that most are atheists it can be said there is no religious barrier among them. Despite losing the language Western Amshen Armenians have preserved the customs- the, for example, celebrate “Vardavar”. Many of them claim to be Turkish. Hidden Armenians have preserved their identity through same-nationality marriages. They make almost 200 thsd of the population. The third group comprises Islamized Armenians who have lost their identity, spoused with Muslims and so on. As for the fourth group – these are people of Armenian decent who do not acknowledge to being Armenian. There is also the group of Christian Armenians from Constantinople. It is no secret that the Turks kidnapped 200-300 thsd Armenians women and children in during the Genocide. Their offspring live in Turkey up today. The total number of these people is 2-3 million. All of them have various political preferences. I can state that most Amshen, as well as hidden Armenians have voted for the pro-Kurdish party during the June elections.
Are those power centers, that have a finger in the Turkish pie, interested in our compatriots in geopolitical matter?
Definitely, especially given the interest towards these people since the Russian Empire days. Ahead of another Russian-Turkish war the imperial intelligence would organize expeditions to study the Armenians, who had embraced Islam in the 17-18th centuries. In the 20th century the Americans, British and the League of Nations showed interest in this area. The Germans were interested in this topic given the growing number of Turkish migrants flowing into their country. I do not preclude that the so-called Armenian-Muslims will be of great topicality for these very nations. Though it is preferable that they be preferable for Armenia in the first place. It is of importance that most of these people acknowledge to the forced Islamization and aspire to “return”, they are interested in Christianity and the Church.
Can we say that there is fecund soil for the reunification of the Armenian world?
That soil is truly fecund. Armenia should first of all renounce the observer’s position to make use of the situation. We should become players who would direct the actions for these people are our compatriots first of all. I believe that Armenian communities in Van, Mush and Amshen are in our interests. We demand that “Surb Khach” church on Akhtamar, “Surb Karapet” in Mush be restored; yet we have no idea who would go there besides tourists. Meanwhile, people, who were forced to embrace Islam in 1894-1916, evidence the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Their existence also proves the 5th provision of the Convention on Genocide regarding forced conversion as genocide. Therefore, we can demand the recognition of the Armenian Genocide on behalf of these people, too. There are documents in Turkish archives that prove the forced Islamization of the Armenians. Therefore, we can neither speak of these people as Armenians nor deny their nationality. We take some actions towards our Turkish-Armenian compatriots, yet it is not enough.