Monday, April 13 2015 04:05

 

In Jan-Mar 2015, the Armed Forces of Armenia lost 26 servicemen versus 40 throughout 2014 and 29 throughout 2013. The escalation and sabotage attacks on the border are obvious. What are the reasons of such a policy aimed at intensifying the aggression?   

 

Unleashing aggression against one of the Armenian states is still unbeneficial for Baku. 'Returning' Nagorny Karabakh to Azerbaijan by force will be possible only after extermination of the local population and turning of the country into a burnt-land. I am sure in Azerbaijan they do not mull such option as possible. The number of casualties on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and along the Karabakh-Azerbaijan Line of Contact has grown dramatically due to the general tension in the region and world. These days people little think of consequences, often resort to weapons, and easier pull the trigger. Hopefully, Baku still realizes the aftermaths of fomenting tension and will not cross the red line.

 

Azerbaijan imports 85% of its arms from Russia, which has already supplied Baku with military hardware worth 4-5 bln USD. Armenia does not welcome that “weapon strategy” of Moscow, to put it mildly. How far-reaching are the goals of that policy? 

 

Russia has always made weapon deals with the whole world. Armenia is displeased with the military deals of Russia, but the discontent is unable to change the situation. I think the solution to the problem is the restoration of the world geopolitical balance which was broken following the collapse of the USSR. The balance should be restored via reintegration of the post-Soviet space around Russia. However, given that under the current conditions it is rather hard to carry out any integration projects, Yerevan should put up with the sale of the Russian military hardware to Azerbaijan.

 

The West’s response to the Moscow-Baku strengthening relations (the matter concerns not only military hardware deals but also energy projects) is the list of the Azeri officials, who are denied entry to Western countries. On the other hand, the United States has expressed willingness to develop relations with Armenia not only in economy but also in defense despite the presence of the 102^nd Russian military base in Gyumri. Can one speak of new trends in the geopolitics of the West and Russia in the South Caucasus?         

 

The United States will fail to develop defense projects with Armenia. The U.S. will at least have to coordinate such projects with Moscow.  The wish and the "expression of willingness" are a long way from the reality. The aspiration to keep a foot in both worlds is a rather suspicious strategy, especially in the modern world, which is being clearly polarized on the ideological and religious grounds. Given that the global policy trends and their practical content remain unchanged, it is unreasonable for Armenia to repeat the old mistakes.

 

Does the Lausanne framework agreement between Iran and six world powers create new opportunities for Tehran's regional policy with respect to the South Caucasus, Caspian region, and Russia?

 

Actually, the Lausanne deal is just a declaration of intent. The sides do not believe in each other's sincerity. Right after the deal, the European Union prolonged the sanctions against the Iranian bank and a number of ship-owning companies, which had previously been lifted by the EU, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry considers it to be non-constructive. The harsh statement of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who "has never been optimistic about the talks with the USA given the previous experience” clearly reflects the reality. In this light, it is early to display any attitude to that event. The chances for implementation of the Lausanne agreement are far from being 100%. As regards Tehran's regional policy prospects, that policy is intensively developing in Russia, especially after the new Iranian Ambassador Mehdi Sanai came to Russia in late 2013. Iran is actively promoting its economic, religious and ideological interests in the North Caucasus, first of all, in Ossetia, which has certain historical and language affinitive ties with Iran. Iran is also promoting its interests in Stavropol region, Chechnya and Tatarstan. The aggressiveness of the policy causes perplexity and concerns of the local Islamic spiritual leaders, because Iranians are Shias, and the major part of the Muslim population in the specified regions are Sunnis. However, Iran, like Turkey two decades ago, has no enough reserves of political and financial means to conduct a consistent assertive policy in the Caucasus. Iran will continue the current policy, but it will not reformat the region under Tehran's scenario.

 

The establishment of an actual customs point on the border between Russia and Belarus has once again revealed the flaws of the Eurasian Economic Union and the gap between realpolitik and Moscow’s integration projects. Can one say that Eurasian integration is still relevant?

 

Unfortunately, the time for real integration of the Eurasian space around Russia was missed yet in the 2000s. It is not so reasonable to build integration projects amid the Ukrainian crisis, which seems to have neither an end nor a solution. At the same time, no alternatives to the Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet space are observed either.  So, the given project remains topical, but it can be applied for the "ephemeral Russia" rather than the state, which really exists. Only the combination of the plans and the reality will put a real content into the Eurasian integration project. I hope that we will manage to see that real content.