Tuesday, May 24 2016 08:15

 What are the geopolitical consequences of the "four-day war" for Russia, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan? Can we say that the status quo of 1994 has been broken after the April aggression by Azerbaijan? What specific political processes do you anticipate?

 

It has become clear after the 'four-day war' in Karabakh that the conflict has been unfrozen. Under such conditions, the resumption of hostilities is quite probable. Certain circumstances, i.e. possible involvement of Russia and Turkey in the conflict may result in a regional law with unpredictable consequences for the entire South Caucasus conflict.  There is no longer any status quo in the Karabakh conflict zone. At the expense of tangible losses, the Azerbaijani side was able to take control over the Lele-tepe height, which means certain tactical success.  But it failed to keep control of any of the Armenian fortified points it had previously seized, though up to 800 Azerbaijani servicemen died during the 'four-day war'. During those days, the Azerbaijani armed forces lost 2 helicopters, no fewer than 40 tanks and 25 drones. I am convinced that no peaceful initiatives, particularly, no updated Madrid Principles can be implemented until the armed conflict is frozen. The  OSCE Minsk Group should take urgent measures to change the mandate of the relevant monitoring mission and consider withdrawal of light and heavy weapons from the front line. In addition, it is necessary to ban the use of military aviation, ballistic missiles, multiple- rocket launchers and Solntsepyok systems.

In the light of Russia’s strain relations with Turkey, the continuing policy of the West towards Russia’s isolation, the undermined Minsk agreements on Ukraine, Armenia unlike Azerbaijan has voted in favor of Russia at many international platforms. Therefore, Yerevan supports Moscow’s interests in the region. There are views that Ilham Aliyev at his talks in the West hinted that any blow on Armenia would be a blow on Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus. Eventually, the international organizations keep targeting their statements at both Azerbaijan and Armenia when calling the sides to the conflict to observe the ceasefire.  What do you think about it?  

So far, it is untimely to say that the Minsk-2 agreements on Ukraine have been failed.  Their format has been changed, as it is hard to achieve any result within the Normandy Four.  Now, a dialogue has been launched between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Russian President’s aide Vladimir Surkov. As for the relations with Turkey, the sides managed to avoid a military clash in Syria. Russia has not lifted the financial and economic sanctions against Turkey, but these are limited sanctions. If no cataclysms happen by the end of 2016, the bilateral relations may be restored certainly. I am speaking about the construction of Akkuyu NPP by Russian specialists.  The West continues its policy of restraint towards Russia (the isolation policy has been failed), at the same time cooperating with Russia for solution of the Syrian crisis and over Iran’s nuclear problem.  Much will depend on the policy of the new US administration.  

Moscow appreciates Yerevan’s support to its policy in the world arena and comprehends that Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev launched the “four-day war” and hoped for a successful blitzkrieg, as his army is bigger and is better equipped, particularly, with armored vehicles, fights jets, drones and electronic warfare systems. However, it did not happen mainly thanks to the heroism of the Armenian soldiers, their skilled and well-organized battle management.  Baku hoped to “liberate” at least several regions in the zone of security around NKR and gain a foothold there. This would enable Azerbaijan to hold the negotiations on Nagorno Karabakh from the position of strength.  Azerbaijan did not plan to attack from The Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic or the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which, as it turned out, aimed to hold Russia from interfering. Thus, Baku did not make a direct blow on the national interests of Russia in the South Caucasus. However, it made a challenge and Moscow responded to it immediately, which helped holding Azerbaijan from expanding the scales of the military actions.

In Vienna, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan made an arrangement actually preventing further military aggression by Baku and seeking to finalize the investigation mechanisms on the border. Do you anticipate that these arrangements will be implemented? 

It is evident that Azerbaijan is not going to provide Armenia with any guarantees that it will not use force in the zone of the Karabakh conflict, as it still hopes to settle the conflict by force. The role of the OSCE Monitoring Mission is increasing, but the mission must be made permanent and be provided with the necessary devices, such as orbital flight vehicles, drones, radars etc.  This will help launching the international mechanism of inquiring into incidents on the border, which will hold Azerbaijan from resuming the hostilities in the conflict zone.

Quite recently, deputy foreign minister of Armenia Shavarsh Kocharyan has responded to the views coming Moscow saying, “If Russia stops selling weapons to Azerbaijan, someone else will do it.” The deputy minister said the problem could be settled by imposing a full embargo on the arms sale to the sides to the conflict.  Russia, U.S. and France can initiate such process at the UN Security Council.  What holds these countries from such logical step that will greatly help establish peace in the region?

 

Even an embargo on the arms sale to the conflicting parties will not settle the current problem, since the sides have procured enough weapons, and Azerbaijan, first. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has launched the production (assembly) of some weapons, particularly the Israeli drones. Imposing arms embargo on the sides now will just increase the imbalance in the region. By some data, the possibility of implementing such contract pushed Baku to launch an offensive in NKR. Well, Russia, U.S. and France could initiate a resolution on arms embargo at the UN SC, but it will be in favor of Azerbaijan, which has not only accumulated sufficient weapons but also can produce some on its territory. Besides, Turkey, which is a NATO member, will be supplying weapons to Azerbaijan secretly and the West will close eyes on that.  Instead, the West will be closely monitoring if Russia supplies weapons to Armenia or not. Amid the relatively low oil prices in the world, Azerbaijan’s military budget for the current year has been reduced, which has endangered the implementation of some arms supply contracts. In such situation, it would be useful for Armenia to restore the balance of forces in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict zone by importing advanced Russians weaponry.

Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan has said recently that the “four-day war” made the government to revise its activity and initiated steps to meet the security challenges Armenia and Artsakh have faced. Among others, the prime ministers announced measures to toughen the internal administering. What do you think about this? Will the government revise some points of the contracts with Russia restricting the purchase of weapons by Armenia sidestepping the agreements with Moscow?

As far as I know Armenia has purchased some models of weapons and military hardware from China. In such situation, the scales of such arms procurement can be expanded, for instance, when it comes to night vision devices. I think Moscow will take that fact easy, considering the results of the “four-day war.” However, Yerevan needs relevant financial resources. Usually, Russia provides such weapons actually without compensation. I am speaking about the loans on very preferential terms.

What do you think about the possibility of NKR’s recognition by Armenia if Azerbaijan continues its military aggression?  How expedient it is and what consequences it may have?

Well, a Bill recognizing the Nagorno Karabakh Republic has been submitted to the Armenian National Assembly. It will be passed if large-scale military actions resume in the conflict zone. This will change NKR’s status from the unrecognized into partly recognized state, like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which actually rules out the implementation of the renovated Madrid Principles.  For the OSCE Minsk Group such developments are extremely undesirable. Therefore, the OSCE MG co-chairs may demand a concession from Baku suggesting it to involve Stepanakert into the negotiations as a full party in exchange for Armenia’s refusal from the Bill.