Wednesday, January 24 2024 18:20

ArmInfo. Azerbaijan's lightning attack on Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023 ended three decades of de facto independence for the breakaway region. Previously, the Armenian-populated Nagorno- Karabakh Republic had  shown remarkable durability, enabled by support from Armenia and Russia, the latter more after the Second Karabakh War of 2020. 

This is stated in A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in  2023 and Future Implications report by the Foreign Policy Research  Institute.

As the authors of the article note: "However, changed regional and  global power dynamics since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine  in early 2022 encouraged an opportunistic Azerbaijan, backed by  Turkey, to deliver the death knell to Nagorno-Karabakh.  Prior to  Azerbaijan's latest assault, two wars had been fought over  Nagorno-Karabakh. The first began as a limited conflict, which turned  into a larger- scale war when the USSR dissolved. Its ceasefire in  1994 resulted in the establishment of the de facto independent  Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The second war, in 2020, resulted in  Azerbaijan reversing the gains of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and  further isolating the territory. Russia mediated the ceasefire and  thereafter stationed peacekeepers in the region.  Many issues are  still unresolved in this long-running conflict. The biggest concern  is directing much-needed humanitarian aid to those displaced by the  latest violence.  There also remains potential for future Azerbaijani  incursions into Armenia to secure a path to its exclave of  Nakhchivan," they say.

However, the report states that, Nagorno-Karabakh has important  implications for other international conflicts grappling with the  competing principles of territorial integrity and national  self-determination. The principle of nonuse of force is also affected  by the fall-out of this dispute, risking the normalization of  international violence with impunity.  "The US has limited foreign  policy options to affect the current situation on the ground. One  approach is to expand the American diplomatic footprint in the region  to reinforce its influence. More consequentially, it should work with  the European Union and regional players to implement an enduring  monitoring mechanism to prevent renewed escalation. This effort  should focus on reducing human suffering while improving the quality  of life of people displaced by violence, and be pursued with a  presence on the ground in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to facilitate  the potential return of refugees to their homes," the report notes.

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijani forces initiated a massive attack  on Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated and effectively  self-governing region inside internationally recognized Azerbaijani  territory. Russian peacekeepers, stationed in the area since 2020,  did not step in to stem the fighting but intervened to arrange for a  cease-fire. Within 24 hours, the Nagorno- Karabakh leadership gave  in, and, for the first time, Baku could claim full control over the  contested territory. This ended 30 years of de facto independence for  the tiny statelet. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic-never recognized by  any sovereign state including Armenia-was initially declared by its  president as formally ceasing to exist on January 1, 2024. That  decree was later annulled by the government in exile. 

Despite being portrayed in the West as a "frozen conflict," there had  long been a risk of renewed violence in Nagorno- Karabakh. Peace  negotiations over several years made no substantial progress,  arguably because of a lack of interest from major power centers and  because the status quo had displayed enduring stability. At the same  time, the military build-up in Azerbaijan and occasional minor-and a  few major-flare-ups suggested further rounds of fighting, culminating  in the Second Karabakh War of 2020. Since the autumn of 2020, the  situation in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, also referred to as Artsakh  by Armenians, has been kinetic and fast-moving, regularly drawing in  the active mediation of external actors, including the US The  fighting in September and the subsequent mass exodus of the  100,000-strong Armenian population from Nagorno- Karabakh may end up  being only the latest chapter in further violence and displacement to  come.

This report has two objectives: first, to present an account of the  conflict with an emphasis on analytically useful categories and  context up to the present, and second, to discuss local, regional,  and global consequences of the latest developments of the dispute,  including policy implications and recommendations.

The authors remind that the US has spoken about the deployment of an  international monitoring mechanism, under UN auspices. This line of  action should be pursued with a presence on the ground in Armenia and  Nagorno-Karabakh, facilitating the potential return of the refugees  to their homes.  At the same time, it is stated that among the most  salient unresolved aspects of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War  relates to transportation infrastructure. 

The authors remind that "According to the cease-fire agreement of  2020, the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan would be given access to  the rest of Azerbaijan -"unobstructed movement of persons, vehicles  and cargo in both directions," under the supervision of Russian  border security forces.  Yerevan has consistently interpreted that  clause as a general expectation of opening all borders for all the  states in the region, each in charge of its own territory. Baku has  suggested extraterritorial sovereign rights over what has come to be  called the Zangezur Corridor."

"Yerevan has consistently interpreted that clause as a general  expectation of opening all borders for all the states in the region,  each in charge of its own territory. Baku has suggested  extraterritorial sovereign rights over what has come to be called the  Zangezur Corridor.

Zangezur can be a loaded toponym, evoking nationalist Azerbaijani  readings of history and echoing Azerbaijani discourse about Armenians  having moved to the Caucasus only in recent times, in the 19th  century. The panhandle region in question is also commonly called  Zangezur in Armenian, although its more formal name as a province of  the country is Syunik. Irredentist claims to Syunik and other parts  of Armenia have been prevalent in Azerbaijani media since 2020. The  Azerbaijan Refugee Society was renamed the Western Azerbaijan  Community in 2021, pushing forward the idea of the return of  Azerbaijanis who fled Soviet Armenia at the end of the 1980s and  beginning of the 1990s. Armenian refugees from Soviet Azerbaijan  during the same period, meanwhile, are not accorded equivalent  consideration. This is another example of mirroring discourse  mentioned earlier-"Western Azerbaijan" reflects "Western Armenia,"  which is a term common in Armenian discourse to refer to territories  in central and eastern Turkey that had been populated by Armenians  since antiquity until the genocide during the First World War.

There are serious concerns of an armed incursion on a large scale by  Azerbaijani forces beyond Nagorno-Karabakh in order for Baku to  secure a passage across Syunik/Zangezur. Iran shares concerns about  such a prospect as well and about the corridor as such, as it could  risk its sole land border with Armenia. The road through  Syunik/Zangezur is an important trade route for Iranian goods. It  avoids passage through Turkey-a Western, NATO ally-and Azerbaijan,  which has close security ties with Israel, rumored to be a base of  intelligence operations directed against Iran. As such, Tehran and  Baku have a rocky relationship which has seen ups and downs since  2020 in particular. However, recent talk of an alternative or  supplemental route through Iran to connect with Nakhchivan may allay  broader regional security concerns.  The strongest indicators of  increased regional and global attention to Syunik/Zangezur have been  the frequent visits by diplomats and international engagements with  the area, going so far as the opening of an Iranian consulate in the  provincial capital, Kapan. Russia too plans on establishing a  consulate there, as does France," the report reads.

The full text of the Report can be found at the following link:  https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/01/a-frozen-  conflict-boils-over-nagorno-karabakh-in-2023-andfuture-implications/.