Andrey Areshev: There are objective restraints to the United States’ policy in Armenia

There is an
opinion that the OSCE Minsk Group is no longer able to resolve the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Is there an aternative to it? Can this problem be
solved if Armenia unilaterally recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh? What consequences
may this have?

The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is stuck. The existing
Minsk Group format is not effective just like its alternatives, particularly,
the so-called Prague process (the Russia- mediated meetings of the Armenian and
Azeri presidents). Having at least some channels for cooperating and exchanging
information is better than having no such channels at all. President Serzh
Sargsyan has made his position clear on whether Armenia will recognize
Nagorno-Karabakh or not. It’s hard to add anything to it.

A few days ago Azeri mass media reported
Azerbaijan's decision to stop all negotiations for buying new arms from Russia
and a simultaneous decision by some European producers to soften their arms
sale terms for the South Caucasus. If the media did it on purpose, what was
their goal?

The reported shift in Azerbaijan's choice of arms
suppliers reflects the evolution of its foreign policy. In Russia we can see
attempts to separate politics from business, particularly, from
military-technical cooperation. But the loss of mutual confidence between
Russia and Azerbaijan and their reluctance or inability to solve their pending
political problems could not but affect their bilateral ties. The recent
hysteria in the Azeri press, the refusal to let some foreign journalists into
the country, the conference on the future of South Azerbaijan are all parts of
this tendency.

Could you share
you vision of further political developments in Azerbaijan in view of the
forthcoming presidential election and worsening relations with Iran and Russia?

The wish to make Iran subject to external control is
the key driver of the current processes in the Middle East. Azerbaijan, who has a long border with
Iran, cannot avoid being part of these processes. The Azeris are reported to be
actively contacting with the Israelis and the Americans. This cannot but worry
the Iranians. All this may have quite different outcomes.  Religious forces are getting increasingly
active in Azerbaijan. They are appealing to the hearts of the people and are
urging them to consolidate against some external enemy. Here Azerbaijan is very
much like the Middle East countries that have now become arenas of serious
conflicts. So, even though the forthcoming election of the Azeri President will
go well, in the future we may expect some very unpleasant surprises.

Some experts believe
that Russia’s insistence with respect to Armenia has enabled the United States
to strengthen its influence in the country. What tendencies do you see here?
And who and why is interested in the BARevolution in Armenia?

What the United States is doing in the post-Soviet
area is a very systematic and multilevel activity aimed at major social and
political groups. Just look
how active American NGOs are in Russia and how much money they get for their
activities. In Armenia things could not be different. Everybody knows that
Raffi Hovannisian appeared in the country after the earthquake of 1988, when
the Soviet Union decided to open its border to external assistance. He was the
first head of the Yerevan Office of the Armenian Assembly of America, an organization
that has very close contacts with the US State Department. It was really
amazing how he managed to secure most of the protesting votes in the last
presidential race after serious difficulties in getting into the parliament
just a year before. But there already were such examples in the post-Soviet
republics that fell victim to so-called color revolutions. The characteristic
qualities of the United States' activity in Armenia are high adaptability and
political efficiency, active lobbying and effective use of funds. As far as the
work with political elites and expert communities is concerned, here the
Americans are like a duck to water and can hardly be outdone by the Russians. I
don't think we need doing this, but we still ought to watch how they do it,
particularly, how they use their contacts with diasporas for gaining influence
on certain countries, be it Armenia, Ukraine or any of the Baltic or Caucasus
states.

Moscow
should learn from Washington how to effectively cooperate with the authorities
and the opposition of a partner-state creating a situation when any initiatives
of a rival to promote its integration project would face quite serious and
'objective' difficulties. Of course, I mean the Eurasian integration project.
The USA will offer Armenia opening of the border with Turkey as an alternative
to it. This is connected with the interests of the USA, first of all.  Normalization of the Armenian-Turkish
relations is of big importance for the USA for a range of reasons, including
the upcoming centennial of the Armenian Genocide (in 2015). To neutralize the
efforts of the Armenian lobby, it will do its best to demonstrate, at least,
little Armenian-Turkish 'progress' implying also normalization of economic
ties. However, one can hardly imagine actualization of the given process
without resolution of the Karabakh conflict mostly on conditions of Baku and
discrediting of the idea of Eurasian integration of Armenia that implies
development of relations with Russia as such. Given the serious positions of
the West in the information space of the country, such attempts will be
regularly made also in future. The U.S. and the Western policy in the region,
specifically in Armenia, have some objective restraints despite powerful
PR-campaign and persuasion. "Russia could take an advantage
of those restraints, in case of a bit foreign policy creative beyond official
speeches and irritating red tape. Cooperation with Baku is more important for
the USA rather than with Yerevan. And no partisan media is able to deny that circumstance. As
regards the so-called "European integration," it has a certain price
for Yerevan. It is quite possible that the role of Kosovska Mitrovica is
prepared for Stepanakert, but never the role of Pristina. All these
circumstances could become a subject of a constructive dialogue of Moscow and
Yerevan. The
contacts of our countries have upwards trends in 2013, just after outbreak of
'European activity' in Armenia in the end of 2012, which inspires with certain
optimism.

Can the May 5
elections into Yerevan’s Elders Council trigger new mass protests?

I think these elections may become an example of
constructive rivalry between the ruling regime and the opposition. It will be a
good test for the opposition's ability to act jointly to improve the lives of
the people. Unless this is done, the outflow of human resources will continue
and this may prove bad for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Both the
opposition and the ruling regime seem to be worried about the existing
social-economic problems and realize the need for changes. But any fraud during
this election may dispirit the people and lead to a new outburst of social
confrontation.

On Apr 24 Armenia's Deputy Foreign
Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan said that it is not expedient for Armenia to appeal
to appeal to international courts for recognition of the Armenian Genocide and
elimination of its consequences. Is this process moving in the right direction?

I think the efforts to convince big international
players to recognize the Armenian Genocide have geo-political implications.
This process will be continued on both regional and national levels and may
have serious political consequences for the Armenian- Turkish rapprochement and
the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.