Sunday, March 22 2015 09:58

The Armenian foreign minister’s recent visit to
Israel has officially been qualified as a working visit. However, experts say
that Nalbandian visited Israel to enlist its support to the Armenian Genocide
centennial events. At what level may an Israeli delegation be present at these
events in Yerevan on April 24?  

 

I think
Israel has never before been so close to official recognition of the Armenian
Genocide. The thing is not the deterioration of relation between Israel and
Turkey, which has turned from the Jewish state’s ally into one of its most
furious critics and rivals. Nor is it the forthcoming change of the political
leadership of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, which actively resists such
recognition and is afraid that the recognition will spoil our country’s
relationship with Azerbaijan. Israeli people have just started to understand
the need to make that step and the public has come to a broad consensus on that
matter. During his term in the Knesset Speaker’s office, Israeli President
Reuven Rivlin had repeatedly advocated official recognition of the Armenian
Genocide. The prominent figures of the right wing Likud Party - Knesset Speaker
Yuli Edelstein, Coalition Chairman Ze'ev Elkin, and left wing Meretz Party
leader Zahava Gal-On also come out for recognition of the Armenian Genocide. In
addition, a civil movement calling for the Genocide recognition is gaining
momentum “in the streets” and in the social communities of the Israeli internet
sector. Public opinion matters much in Israel. The Armenian foreign minister’s
recent visit to Israel has not essentially changed the trends in development of
the Armenian-Israeli relations, which are all the same positive. In the
meantime, his meeting with President Rivlin has given a fresh impetus to those
trends.  

 

Israel will
no doubt attend the Armenian Genocide centennial events in Yerevan, but it is
not clear yet whom the Israeli delegation will include. One thing is clear:
unfortunately, the delegation will not include the top public officials. This
does not mean that Israel pays no proper attention to that event. The reasons
are just technical. The thing is that this year Israel’s Independence Day is
marked on April 22-23, Wednesday-Thursday. The President’s participation in
those festive events is compulsory, so he cannot simply leave the country. Then
Friday comes and the Friday evening is the beginning of Saturday (Shabbat),
which is a holy day of rest and the Jewish tradition bans any official foreign
trips on that day. In addition, one should not forget that Israel held
parliamentary elections on March 17. This means that the completion of the
coalition talks will be in full swing in late April and this will also keep the
incumbent Speaker of the Knesset Yuli Edelstein from leaving the country.
Nevertheless, the Israeli delegation will certainly include several
politicians, prominent scientists, historians and public figures.

 

How would you assess Netanyahu’s recent visit
to Washington? How realistic do you think the Iranian threat is for Israel
today? 

 

The right
and the left camps, the coalition and the opposition of Israel have no
discrepancies in the matter of the Iranian threat. The politicians, force
structures and experts are unanimous about the fact that Israel cannot let Iran
acquire nuclear weapons, because in that case the country’s existence will be
set on stake. Today Iran is the only country to say that Israel must be
destroyed. One cannot even imagine what will happen if Iran turns into a
nuclear power. It is no secret that the Israeli premier’s recent visit to
Washington and his speech at the Congress have harshly been criticized by his
opponents and the media outlets supporting them. They think that the premier’s
speech, which was not coordinated with Barack Obama, will spoil the Tel
Aviv-Washington relations and that the only goal of the speech was to enhance
Netanyahu’s popularity among the voters. I do not share that opinion.
Netanyahu’s visit could only indirectly be connected with the election campaign
in Israel, because the public opinion polls demonstrate that it had absolutely
no impact on the landscape before the election. In the meantime, the visit was
of much significance in terms of state interests.  It could not seriously damage the personal
relations of Netanyahu and Obama at least because it was impossible to spoil
them even more. At the same time, Netanyahu’s speech at the Congress saw a wide
public response and vividly made the White House Administration to think about
it. Obama’s team understood that they could, of course, sign an agreement with
Iran but this does not at all mean that they would be able to receive from the
Congress the needed funding for the agreement. The rhetoric of President Obama
and Secretary of State Kerry has considerably changed after Netanyahu’s speech.
Earlier they said that the agreement would be one of the best possible
agreements, but now they claim that the agreement has some problems and even
say that there may be no agreement at all. So, one can say that during his visit
Netanyahu achieved the intended purposes. The Israel-US relations are based on
strategic and geopolitical interests, and such interests always prevail over
the personal ones. Therefore, the military and diplomatic partnership between
our countries will be continued as long as we have common interests no matter
who exactly heads the country.

 

Iran’s new relations with Europe and the US are
gradually extending the geopolitical functions of Iran in the Greater Middle
East. Can you expect Iran to expand its role in the South Caucasus? 

 

Iran no
doubt contends for a status of a regional superpower. However, I think it is
early to speak of Iran’s new relations with Europe and the United States. Let’s
wait and see the further developments. Too many experts are convinced that
instead of recording a breakthrough the talks in Geneva may come to a dead end
again. Iran has always had interests in the South Caucasus and it will seek to
extend its role in that region. However, now Iran has enough problems in Iraq,
Lebanon and Syria, and the international sanctions have delivered an immense
blow on its economy. Teheran obviously needs no new confrontation, because any
attempt to extend its role in the South Caucasus may lead to clashes with both
Russia and the United States, which consider the region a zone of their own
interests. Therefore, Iran is unlikely to intensify its steps in the South
Caucasus. Iran will continue the “energy expansion” in that region as Teheran
considers it to be its foreign political goal. Without trying to oust Russia
from the energy market, Iran will seek to prevent the United States, NATO and
the EU from penetrating into the South Caucasus. Iran’s leaders are fanatics
but they are rather prudent fanatics. In the meantime, Iran is also on the threshold
of changes in its leadership and this may also cause unexpected turns in the
politics.

 

The West’s response to the Moscow-Baku
strengthening relations (the matter concerns not only military hardware deals
but also energy projects) is the list of the Azeri officials, who are denied
entry to Western countries. On the other hand, the United States has expressed
willingness to develop relations with Armenia not only in economy but also in
defense despite the presence of the 102nd military base in Gyumri. Can one
speak of new trends in the geopolitics of the West and Russia in the South
Caucasus?  

 

I think it
is more correct to speak of the old geopolitical trends than the new ones. The
United States and West have never concealed their interests in the three South
Caucasus countries. Neither are they going to cede their interests now. I was
not surprised at Washington's readiness to develop the military and economic
cooperation with Yerevan despite being in Russia's 'zone of influence,' since
the U.S. policy is based on the principle "losing a battle does not mean
losing the war." The U.S. seeks to maintain and increase its influence
everywhere it can reach, to try to influence through legal methods, and even
through illegitimate ones, if necessary. In such situation, Yerevan, Baku and
Tbilisi have nothing to do but maneuver between the USA and Russia trying to
protect their national interests and not to turn into a marionette.
"Relatively recently, we have already witnessed the West's attempts, also
successful ones, to intervene with the internal affairs of Georgia and
Azerbaijan. There were such attempts in Armenia too. I think, they will repeat
in future, and maybe, in the nearest future. In the light of the current
situation in the region, the political figures in Armenia, both the pro-
governmental and the opposition ones, need to show political wisdom and put the
national interests above the personal benefits. I'd like to add also the
ability to make well-thought decisions independently, and stop listening to the
advice or accepting the proposals of 'well-wishers' from abroad. Armenian
politicians have recently displayed such features and I hope they will do it
also in future.

 

Has the crisis around Ukraine strengthened or
weakened the superpowers’ positions in the South Caucasus? Has Ukraine adjusted
the positions of the USA, Russia and the EU in the region?   

 

It appears
to me that after the Ukraine crisis Russia will more than ever seek
rapprochement with the South Caucasus countries and try to increase its role in
the region. The U.S. and Europe will not cede their positions either. Here is
where we can face quite interesting turnarounds, including an attempt to repeat
the 'Ukrainian scenario' in the South Caucasus with some adjustments depending
on the local situation. Ukraine's crisis must become a lesson to learn for many
countries and peoples. Undoubtedly, the U.S., Russia and the EU have their
interests in the crisis, but what is the interest of Ukraine and the Ukrainian
people? I welcome the neutral stand of the South Caucasus countries and Israel
on Ukraine as "the most competent and right decision." To avoid the
Ukrainian scenario in the post-Soviet area, the political forces, even the
confronting ones, need to display special wisdom and high sense of
responsibility.

 

The establishment of an actual customs point on
the border between Russia and Belarus has once again revealed the flaws of the
Eurasian Economic Union and the gap between realpolitik and Moscow’s
integration projects. Can one say that Eurasian integration is still relevant
and that it explains Russia’s striving for a bipolar world?

 

I think
that following continuous geopolitical perturbations the mankind will come to a
multipolar world, where everything will be determined by the relations of the
regional superpowers and each of the superpowers will have its own zone of
influence. The EEU demonstrates further possible emergence of such a multipolar
world. In the global politics, we cannot disregard such a superpower as China.
I can also point out the Arab world, India, Iran, as well as the project on
creation of a single Europe-Asia space from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The decisive
role in that complicated political game will belong to the common interests of
a group of regional superpowers, which will inevitably clash with another
group’s interests. The creation of the Eurasian Economic Union is undoubtedly a
positive step, because it implies integration, rapprochement and cooperation.
The recent tension among the EEU members is a quite normal phenomenon. The
creation of the European Union required decades and we have repeatedly
witnessed conflicts and clashes among its members. The EEU is a young
organization and, actually, it is still being formed. Therefore, one should pay
no attention to the customs problems between Russia and Belarus. We will
witness many such conflicts but it does not mean that the idea of Eurasian
integration was dead-born. Quite the opposite, it means that the idea is alive
and it is developing. The most important thing is that economic interests
should prevail over military and political ones and that the EEU should meet
the interests of all its member states and their people.