Tuesday, August 6 2013

Mr.Karapetyan, what do you think of Armenia’s
possible signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union? What
benefits and probably risks does the document contain?  

 

The
signing of the document on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), as
part of the Association Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Armenia,
contains certain risks. The thing is that Armenia signed a similar agreement
within the CIS last year. The DCFTA can threaten the similar document within
the CIS. That document allows our exporters to obtain a big profit due to the
customs regime with Russia and other countries of the CIS.  Russia is known to have no free trade
agreement with the EU, and we are going to sign such a document with Brussels.
I cannot imagine how we can have free trade agreements with both Russia and the
EU. I am sure neither of these players will agree to such a state of
affairs.  We face big risks. I think it
would be quite reasonable to ask the Armenian Foreign Ministry representatives,
who were negotiating with the EU, to explain what mechanisms the DCFTA has got
to mitigate the specified risks. One should take into account that the EU has
already announced the completion of the negotiations. So, all the possible
inconsistencies, discrepancies and risks must have been removed already. We
have the right to know how they have been removed.

 

What about the political aspect of
the Association Agreement? Can we expect any serious reforms in Armenia in
terms of development of democratic institutions, improvement of the electoral
system, etc.? 

 

I hope the Association Agreement
contains all the aspects you have mentioned. Though the Armenian National
Congress is not familiar with the document, it hopes that the Agreement will
contribute to development of our country, strengthening of our institutions,
adaptation of our legislation to the European standards. If there are proper
controlling mechanisms, this document should certainly be welcomed in every
possible way. 

 

Recently the foreign ministers of
Turkey and Azerbaijan have expressed their discontent with the OSCE Minsk
Group. How viable are Ankara’s efforts of political intervention in the South
Caucasus and enhancement of its role in the Karabakh peace process?  

 

The OSCE Minsk Group can change its
name, but the format, i.e. what countries lead the Minsk Group, is the most
important thing. So, no matter how the name of the structure changes, Russia,
the United States and France will remain the mediators in the Karabakh peace
process. As regards Turkey, I do not think its active involvement in the peace
process is possible, because Armenia won’t simply let it do that. However,
Ankara will have a certain impact on the conflict, not least because of the
“football diplomacy” of Serzh Sargsyan. It is the so-called “self-motivated” foreign
policy of Serzh Sargsyan that speeded up Ankara’s efforts in the South
Caucasus. Moreover, it is due to that policy that we have reached a deadlock
today and no one doubts that. There is no hope that the relations with Turkey
will improve in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, Turkey has received
Armenia’s consent to set up a commission of historians to study the facts of
the Armenian Genocide. Though Turkey takes no formal part in the Minsk process,
nevertheless, during the high-level meetings with the Russian or U.S. sides,
Turkey’s representatives easily raise the Karabakh problem and blame Armenia
for “occupying the Azeri territories”.

 

Back on the Karabakh topic, I should
also recall that no high-level meetings have been held for 1.5 years. These two
key problems in the foreign policy will unlikely be resolved in the near
future.  On the whole, the uncertainty in the foreign policy of Armenia
and the socio-economic problems force dozens of thousands of our citizens to
leave the country to look for a better life abroad.  

 

How realistic is the tension in
Armenia-Russia relations in the light of Armenia’s negotiations with the
European Union?

 

I think the Armenian authorities
have no resources to conduct an adequate policy to resist the foreign challenges.
They are gradually becoming inadequate in the eyes of the world community.
Indeed, Russia does not wait for Serzh Sargsyan. One can estimate Russia’s real
attitude towards Armenia even by the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin
is going to pay his forthcoming visit to Azerbaijan, not Armenia, though the
latter has been waiting for him for over a year. Moscow is gradually losing
confidence in its strategic partner. Therefore, at a crucial turning point
Russia prefers negotiating with our rival on the key regional problems.