Thursday, May 16 2013

Armenia gradually turns into an area of
purpose-oriented cooperation of leading geopolitical actors having quite
different interests when it comes to other issues. Many analysts say that
Yerevan’s inertial foreign policy should be stopped sooner or later, as the
country needs breakthrough decisions given the acute economic and political
challenges. What do you think of that?

 

I am not sure that we will see any
‘breakthrough tendencies’ emerging out of Armenian foreign policy at any time
soon. Despite the fact that I would agree with the view that Armenia – and more
so the entire South Caucasus region – has evolved as a playground for larger
geopolitical forces, both Armenia and its immediate neighbourhood have become
subject to a certain ‘power balance’ in terms of foreign policy. Armenia holds
the territorial and military high ground in relation to the unresolved conflict
over Karabakh, whilst also entertaining a strong axis with Iran.

Azerbaijan, whilst clearly unsatisfied over the
current state of affairs with Karabakh, has emerged as the region’s energy
locomotive, and is unlikely to risk war with Yerevan lest it loses the gains
the country has made with respect to its energy economy. Georgia too has
entrenched its position in the region, and despite the recent election of an
evidently more Russia-friendly Prime Minister, Tbilisi continues to advocate
its pro-EU path. None of these regional stakeholder states are likely to risk
any major foreign policy adventures – or change of course – at any time soon.
Armenia, in particular, is likely to continue favouring the status quo and
exercise an extremely cautious foreign policy.

Maintaining the status quo over Karabakh
provides the current political elite in power in Yerevan with a certain degree
of legitimacy and as long as links with Moscow remain strong, I cannot see any
territorial or other types of concessions which Armenia could be compelled to
make to Azerbaijan. Neither is Armenia an EU membership candidate country,
although it is seeking to modernise based on European standards, this is clear.

This means that there is not really much
leverage that Brussels has over Yerevan to make concessions, particularly in
regional foreign policy making. All of this points to more conservative foreign
policy making coming out of Yerevan, looking ahead, rather than any
breakthroughs or audacious steps. I would only see scope for radical change in
Armenian foreign policy if the region is hit by some form of major crisis (such
as a major spill-over of the Syrian conflict into the region, particularly that
which may involve Iran), or regime change either in Armenia or some of the
neighbouring countries.

 

 

 

Do you see any upward trends in the influence
of the USA and Europe in the South Caucasus amid Russia’s policy, which is
assessed as inconsistent and uncoordinated even by Russian experts?

 

 

I think
that most Western experts of the region’s geopolitics would agree that the
South Caucasus is not exactly the top foreign policy priority for Washington,
Brussels or the top EU member states. This has been quite clear since the time
of the late Bush presidency (US), in contrast to earlier years, when Washington
was placing visible political capital behind the Saakashvili regime in Georgia.
Many experts would agree – I feel – that the August 2008 war was a kind of
watershed in terms of regional geopolitics – the return of Russia and the
departure of the West.

While this may not exactly be the case (one can
argue that the West is still there, and that Turkey, remains largely a
pro-Western state in the region), we have certainly been seeing a more active
role played by Russia, as well as Turkey, in the region’s geopolitics (esp in
the area of the wider Black Sea). The more important point regarding this question
lies well beyond the Caucasus, however. The South Caucasus is clearly a very
important geopolitical arena for a number of external powers. However the
region today does not exactly constitute one of the world’s ‘hot spots’ in
terms of military conflict, civil war, etc. When it comes to major foreign
policy questions, the physical time of high level Western policy makers today
still remains dedicated to the regions of the world which have been an arena of
crisis for much of the Cold War period – the Middle East (in 2011 Libya, in
2012 and today: Syria), the Gulf and the Korean Peninsula. Today, even
countries like Mali demand more time from top foreign policy makers in London
and Paris than does the Caucasus. The states of the South Caucasus are not bereft
of their problems, but the sad truth is that the region needs another war to
really ‘buy into the time’ of the top Western foreign policy makers.

 

 

Would you make any forecasts on Armenia’s most
probable vector of integration?

 

I really don’t think this is a question capable
of sparking any real excitement among specialists on the region at the present
time, as I don’t really think that it’s a choice of East Vs West for Armenia.
Armenia’s main domestic policy challenge at the present time is modernisation
of the state and commensurate institutions: which type of political and
economic strategy to implement in order to put the country onto a more
effective development path so that the Armenian people can start to realise
their maximum human development capacities. I do not see this question being
answered by a choice of ‘we either join the Russian-led project or promote
deeper economic integration with the EU. One should not be seen in total
exclusion of the other: it is just as inconceivable that Armenians based in
Russia will stop channelling capital into the country as Diaspora Armenians
living outside of the ex-USSR. The Armenian Diaspora is the real driver for
foreign capital coming into the country, and the real bridge between Yerevan
and the outside world. None of this is contingent on Armenia having to make a
choice: East or West. The patronages that the Diaspora creates within the
country have become rather strong since the end of the Cold War, although they
should not necessary be seen as a panacea for the county’s problems. I see this
scenario as largely continuing into the future, continuing to underscore
Armenia’s close political and economic ties with both East and West. One should
also take into account Armenia’s special geographical position as it is seen by
Armenian national patriots, and the need to securitize it: the fact that the
‘300 Spartans are surrounded by Xerxes and the armies of Asia’ should not be
taken lightly. Despite the fact that Armenia since the end of the USSR has
often been seen as a weak state due to its lack of economic progress, it is
security issues, rather than the economy, which have shaped Armenia’s foreign
policy in recent years.

 

 

 

 

The OSCE Minsk Group is said to have exhausted
its opportunities to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Do you see any
alternatives to it? What if Armenia recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence?
What effect will it have on the process?

 

 

Yes, people tend to ridicule the Minsk Group
now days and widely refer to its incapacity of conflict resolution over
Karabakh. This position is often brought up by Azerbaijan, since the Minsk
Group is often seen as unable to break the status quo over Karabkah, by which
Azerbaijan feels discriminated. In fact Baku would most likely prefer to change
the entire architecture around the Karabakh peace process – bring it within the
framework of the UN, involve more Muslim countries, as well as the EU, etc.
This is quite normal from Baku’s perspective: it feels that it has lost
territory and desires its return. However Armenia will not budge an inch in the
present climate. Yerevan stands behind the Minsk Group and the so-called Madrid
Principles as the primary means of promoting conflict resolution. It is likely
to continue doing so. This is also normal (from an international relations
theory perspective) – Armenia has the high ground and wants to keep itself
there. Hence we have stalemate over Karabakh and the Minsk Group led peace
process – as a peace process – is going largely nowhere. This scenario is
likely to remain as long as the current architecture remains in place and as
long as Russia has a commanding ‘equity stake’ in the process.

In terms of alternatives, well, if we are
serious about resolving the conflict (or at least convince people that we want
to move into that direction), we need to radically alter our approach to the
game altogether. We need to push for a new breed of external stakeholders to
become far more actively – even audaciously – involved. My colleague George
Niculescu and I recently wrote a study about how economic incentives (through
the promotion of regional energy and infrastructure projects) might contribute
towards breaking the stalemate over Karabakh (see: www.gpf-europe.com). I have also briefed
Armenian decision makers on the ‘possible merits’ of economic incentives at a
conference in Yerevan last November.

I argued that Armenia’s long term security will
be better served by strengthening the country’s longer term economic security,
rather than defining national security purely on the basis of the Tsarist
Russian catch-cry “armiya i flot”.

 

 

Would you dwell upon the necessary instruments
and mechanisms?

 

In this context it is fundamentally important
to start building the type of regional economic space in the entire South
Caucasus that large scale foreign investment and the international community
would like to see: highly interdependent regional economies, open borders, free
movement of people, a more relaxed approach to the concept of state sovereignty
in a region comprised of both states and entities. 

 

Throwing in a gas pipeline project connecting
Azerbaijan to Armenia and Turkey would be the ideal scenario for long term
peace building, as unrealistic as it may seem at present. This approach would
include Armenia making concessions to Azerbaijan, possibly even returning some
territory, or granting territorial concessions of some kind. Azerbaijan would
then have to be bound by security guarantees and non-aggression towards Armenia.
The Minsk Group – which I don’t think should be disbanded – would then serve
its real mandate of separating the sides and keeping them from waging war
against one another.

 

 

Further international engagement could come
from not just the traditional stakeholders like Moscow, Washington or
Brussels/EU national capital, but totally new actors such as the International
Olympic Committee (IOC), which could be used to promote foreign investment and
regional economic integration, and dis-incentivise conflict altogether. We need
to revive the spirit of Baron Pierre de Coubertin, Founder of the modern
Olympic movement at the end of the 19^th Century, and the Olympic
Games as the ultimate symbol of peace. However, this is not just utopia. The
IOC could act as a broker, not just a symbol, of peace. An Olympiad typically
brings billions of dollars to the host cities and countries where the games are
held.

 

I have participated in four Olympiads and have
seen what the games have done to Barcelona and Athens from that perspective.
Could Armenia and Azerbaijan swallow their pride and move towards a regional
peace if the IOC would be persuaded that the Olympics should be jointly held in
Baku and Yerevan in 2024 ? The IOC, working in coordination with the Minsk
Group and the UN, have the power to radically alter the existing peace building
architecture in the region. They also have the clout to demand that both
Armenia and Azerbaijan keep the peace in exchange for the 50 billion or so
dollars that an Olympiad could bring to the region.