Despite
the latest Russian-Abkhaz agreement on strategic partnership and
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hints that it is necessary to re-launch the
Abkhaz railway section to restore the railway communication with Armenia, many
experts believe that the Russian-Abkhazian treaty has shot down that project.
What is your opinion?
The given document will probably increase tension in
the Russian-Georgian relations. This scenario may be prevented only in case if
pro-Russian forces continue to gain power in Georgia. There are such prospects given the latest
changes in the Georgian Government. On
the other hand, along with technical problems there is another, a very
important question connected with reactivation of the Abkhazian section of the
railway i.e. where the will be the Georgian border and the customs point. The
railway will not be reactivated, unless this question gets an answer. Given
that the new treaty between Abkhazia and Russia implies a border between
Abkhazia and Georgia, the incumbent authorities in Georgia will never agree to
it.
Well,
what were the reasons of such statement by the Russian president?
Russia's policy is a PR by 80% today. For instance,
the treaty with Abkhazia was a serious step, in this view. In fact, that treaty
will bring nothing essential either to Abhkazia or to Russia. Neither it will
be useful for a third party. It was a treaty in the Eurasian Union spirit. At
present, parallel to the events in Ukraine, Moscow is trying to develop certain
events in other regions too. Look at the changes in the government of Georgia
and the recent escalation of situation at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. In
fact, we see the most important in the Kremlin’s policy - everything has been
developing in Ukraine not the way Vladimir
Putin wanted. And this should be compensated by acquisitions in other
places. On the other hand, these acquisitions, as Putin thinks, are called to
compensate the failure in Ukraine.
Do you
mean that resignation of Irakli Alasania and his ministers was a result of the
Kremlin’s lobby?
Not everything is clear in what has recently happened
in Georgia. One thing is clear that rather prominent men in Georgia have left
the government, and not so much prominent ones have remained. Nobody knows why
the men having a strict pro-Western orientation have left the government. So,
it is quite natural that the new government has got all the chances for turning
the vector of the Georgian foreign policy towards Russia. The main property of
the "secretary general" of the Georgian authorities is in Russia with
all the consequences stemming from that for him and Georgia.
You
talked about Ivanishvili’s loyalty to, let’s say, Russian value system. Isn’t
it a factor for future de-blockading of
Georgia’s border with Abkhazia?
I don’t think so. With Bidzina Ivanishvili being
adherent to Russian values, Armenia can hardly hope for Georgia reopening its
border with Abkhazia as this is against Russia's interests. In Moscow they are
not interested in Armenia's economic development. They need blockaded Armenia
for if Armenia had a link with Russia, it would ignore the blockade and there
would be no more Armenian-Turkish problem. Russia needs an Armenia constantly
feeling a threat from Turkey.
Could
you comment on the current stage of the Ukraine crisis? I don’t mean the
military actions. What are your forecasts of further developments?
Russia has begun to panic after Petro Poroshenko's
decision to stop financing Donbass. This has put the Russians into a kind of
zugzwang. On the other hand, growing corruption in Kyiv may well lead to
further Russian expansion and even new elections.
Despite the failure of the latest round
of negotiations of Iran and six world powers on the Iranian nuclear problem,
Tehran’s entry to the world market is, sure, able to provoke a reduction of the
Russian gas and oil prices. What holds the West from using “the Iranian
playcard”? Is it Russia’s stand?
In
the current situation that has arisen due to both Russia's stand and the latest
steps of the Islamic State, Iran has turned into a natural ally of the West.
However, the capacities of that natural ally still remain as a potential. The
problem is the West's aspiration to save its face in the policy regarding Iran.
Tehran also has a similar problem. This explains the difficult course of the
negotiations on the nuclear problem. Nevertheless, given that the talks have
not been stopped and have even led to some elements of lifting the blockade
from Iran, the prospects are quite encouraging.
Armenia’s
import-oriented economy will face a problem with compatibility of iots customs
regime with the EEU criteria already in 2016. How will they settle that
problem, if they do it at all?
The
key problem Armenia will face in the Eurasian Economic Union is that this is a
way to nowhere. The last restrictions imposed by Russia on some foodstuffs from
Belarus have proved that this structure is not serving its purposes. So, it is
early to say how things will be in Armenia in 2016, simply, because it is not
yet clear how things will be in Russia. In this light, I have certain doubts
about the future of the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin is losing authority in
Russia. He has no more bread and circuses to offer to his people. Nationalism
is not effective any more, so, he may need a new conflict in the post-Soviet
area so as to boost the morale of the Russians. This may have quite
unpredictable consequences but Putin no longer cares. What he needs today is an
event rather than a solution to it.
A
rhetorical question arises as to whether Armenia is controlled by internal or
external forces?
Armenia
is controlled by both internal and external forces. Th degree of self-rule of
any country depends first of all on the legitimacy of the country's authorities
and on its place in foreign interests and capability to resist the foreign
challenges. Today the legitimacy of the Armenian authorities leaves much to be
desired. The country is involved in the zone of vital interests for Russia.