Saturday, October 19 2013

The ruling party of Armenia claims
that the decision to access the Customs Union stems from national security of
Armenia. How much grounded is that statement, given that Russia sells
weapons to Azerbaijan amid Kazakhstan’s demands to immediately close the
borders with Nagorno Karabakh? What did really motivate Armenia to access the
CU?

 

The national security of all countries, including
Armenia, is a complicate system having its secrets and nuances that are not
subject to disclosure. I suppose that Armenia’s decision was based on long-term
interests of your people. The geopolitical location of your country, as well as
the political, economic, military and other developments around it should also
be taken into account.  It is necessary
to take into account also the social and economic situation in the country,
external factors, the attitude of external forces towards Armenia, their
possible pressure and the country’s ability to resist that pressure or use it
in its favor. I could bring further arguments to show how complicate was that
decision, but the responsibility for that decision is laid upon the leadership
of Armenia and the people will assess whether it was a right decision at the
next democratic elections.

 

As regards the sale of arms of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan’s pressure on Nagorno Karabakh’s ‘hot-button subject,’ one can
assess those actions only taking into consideration all the aforementioned.

 

In
Armenia’s decision to access the Customs Union besides strategic factors, there
were also specific calculations and historical experience of partnership with
super powers. Now we observe a new world order where every country is free to
decide what integration process is more beneficial for it, though some
political forces still force their vision of ‘cold war.’  Armenia has decided that it is more favorable
for it to access Russia’s Customs Union to establish ties with the countries of
that integration bloc.

 

What
prospects will Armenia have in the Customs Union and will there be any
prospects at all? What impact will this decision have on the republic? Experts
say that by making this decision the republic has once for all refused European
integration. How much grounded is this opinion? What has Armenia lost by
refusing the Association Agreement?   
 

 

When speaking of “Armenia’s intention
to join the Customs Union”, one should remember that Armenia has been negotiating
with the representatives of the Customs Union and the European Union for a long
time. In the meantime, Armenia also announced its intention to get integrated
into the Eurasian Union. The country has been participating in the European
Neighborhood Policy since 2004 and in the Eastern Partnership program since
2009. Moreover, a public opinion poll conducted in 2005 demonstrated that
almost two-thirds of the country’s population would like to see Armenia in the
European Union. In the meantime, Armenia has close ties with Russia and it
stated in both 2006 and 2010 that there was no alternative to those relations.

 

The process is rather complicated. In the course of time the
participants’ approaches towards the two major integration projects have
changed. For instance, on 10 July 2013, Stefan Fule, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy, said in Yerevan that the European
Union did not make Armenia choose between the integration projects. Your issue
(http://www.arminfo.info/index.cfm?objectid=B96E67A0-EA06-11E2-A9410EB7C0D21663)
said that Fule did not know whether Russia exerted pressure on Armenia though
he followed the news and was aware of a number of problems. Fule thought that
the signing of the Association Agreement would not restrict Armenia's
interaction with other countries. It would help Armenia to strengthen its
positions even more, he said. In the meantime, the European Commissioner
stressed that there should be elementary compatibility between the two
integration projects. He said that the EU did not force its partners to
restrict their relations with Russia. He added that the EU would encourage the
cooperation with Russia in the fields that met Armenia's interests. 

 

On 11 September, 2013, Fule pointed
out that the member states of Eastern Partnership could expand their
cooperation with the Customs Union, however, as observers only, since the
Customs Union membership was incompatible with Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area. A day later he met with Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian
and stressed that the issue of initialing the Association Agreement was no
longer on the agenda given that on Sept 3 Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan
announced Armenia’s decision to join the Customs Union and to contribute to the
formation of the Eurasian economic union. 
 

 

On October 8, Edward Nalbandian, Foreign Minister
of Armenia, had a meeting in Brussels with Catherine Ashton, the EU High
Representative for Foreign Affairs. Minister
Nalbandian underlined that Armenia wished to move forward the partnership with
the EU in all possible directions relying on those achievements and progress
which were jointly made in recent years in Armenia-EU relationships. High
Representative Catherine Ashton noted that the EU wished to continue the
development of comprehensive cooperation with Armenia in all areas, which could
be compatible with the decision of Armenia to join the Customs Union (http://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/item/2013/10/08/eu_hight/).

 

The impression is that Armenia will
be able “to keep a foot in both worlds” and create a similar development
prospect for other countries as well.  

 

What should
Armenia expect from the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius? Will EU offer
Armenia a new format of cooperation?

 

The Eastern Partnership has undergone
various changes since its establishment. Its initial goal announced in 2008 was
to develop integration processes of the EU and the partner countries: Ukraine,
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. The situation has changed
after the Constituent Meeting in Prague on 7 May 2009 when a new joint
declaration was adopted to boost the political and economic integration between
the EU and the EaP countries. However, the political and economic impact on
these countries has not been fully justified.

 

 The prior component of EU's new initiative
is the energy component, particularly, energy supply to Europe alternative to
Russia's deliveries. Another evident goal is to break Russia's geopolitical
influence in Eastern Europe and strengthen the EU's positions there. Some
Russian experts still think that the EU intends to finally disintegrate the
post-Soviet area via the Eastern Partnership project and bring the CIS
countries out of Russia's influence.

Actually, none of the six countries is
able to fulfill the EU's requirements. Ukraine is closer to the EU partnership
more than others, but it has faced an impassable barrier - "Timoshenko
case."  Ukraine will be able to
overcome these obstacles only if it fulfills the EU's requirements, which have
not been coordinated with the Ukrainian public yet. As for Armenia, it is out
of the question.

 

Thank you,
Mr. Kemény.