Monday, January 20 2014

What fundamental changes do you see in the security system of the South
Caucasus over the last five years?

After the protracted status quo around
Abkhazia and South Ossetia was broken by the August 8 War, and with Russia's
political, diplomatic and military methods, restoration of the relations
between Moscow and Tbilisi will actually be a long process. Anyway, the process
has started with a constructive dialogue, which is a necessity, I think, given
Russia's growing role of the security and stability guarantor in the South
Caucasus. Moscow plays a big role in maintenance of peace in the region,
exerting certain efforts to resolve the conflicts in the South Caucasus. The
USA and EU, and the regional powers - Turkey and Iran, are also actively trying
to influence the processes in the region offering their multi-level peaceful
and even not-peaceful initiatives.

However, the Armenian-Turkish border still
remains blocked as the normalization of the two countries relations was linked
to the Karabakh conflict. In this light, we saw how limited are the efforts of
the Turkish diplomacy. Such limitations are observed also in other
countries. 

Well, do you think that reactivation of the Abkhazian section of the
railway that links Armenia and Russia is among the topics of the
Russian-Georgian dialogue?

Georgia and Abkhazia have recently
understood the need for breakthrough mechanisms ensuring normal economic and
communication exchange in the South Caucasus region. This is why the unblocking
of the Abkhazian section of the railway linking Armenia with Russia is one of
the most important issues in the Russian-Georgian dialogue. Certainly, this
dialogue includes the issue of unblocking of the main transport routes. The
resumption of the railway and motor service via Abkhazia is an extremely
important issue for Armenia. It is actively being discussed, but it is quite
obvious that there are serious political obstacles for this project. Both
Georgia and Abkhazia have recently changed their attitude towards this project,
because creation of such mechanisms would mostly predetermine the outcome of
the diplomatic talks. One can say with confidence that a new war or conflict
around Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or South Ossetia does not meet the interests
of Russia, which stakes on new integration formations in the post-Soviet area.
I’d like to say that the region faces the risk of extension of cross-border
threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and potential destructive ideas.
This brings Russia closer to the South Caucasus countries, including Georgia,
thereby creating additional opportunities for a dialogue and cooperation.

What does particularly impede reopening of the Abkhazian section of the
railway?      

There are external and internal obstacles
in the way of unblocking of the Abkhazian section of the railway. Among the
internal prerequisites, I would first of all mention Azerbaijan's 20-year-old
aspiration to isolate Armenia from any communication projects. The stance of
some allies of Azerbaijan is also one of the prerequisites.

Armenia has probably taken into
consideration the survey of International Alert (UK) about the prospects of
reconstruction of the Abkhazian railway, which has been idle since 1991. They
have made rather substantiated estimations but, in general, they have arrived
at the conclusion that the railway operation is inefficient, first of all,
because the possible cargo traffic is insufficient. I think this point of view
sounds somewhat cunning. If considered alongside with Russia's expansion into the
markets of the South Caucasus and the Middle East in the context of
construction of the North-South corridor, this issue will sound quite
different.

Not everything is formed on the basis of
mere economy and pragmatic calculations. 
There is geopolitics, which eventually influences economy. There are
also issues related to development of the region and Armenia's integration into
the future Eurasian Economic Space. There are also external prerequisites to
launch the Abkhazian section of the railway, and this issue should be
considered with regard to Abkhazia, because there are roads linking Armenia to
Russia via the Upper Lars checkpoint and these roads are operating.

In Armenia and Azerbaijan they think that
the balance of forces on the line of contact of the three parties to the
Karabakh conflict is maintained exclusively due to their own efforts. What is
Russia’s role in preservation of the status quo? 

 

Certainly, the status quo and balance of
forces are maintained also by the efforts of the conflicting parties. However,
Russia's role in the process is tangible enough, specifically in maintenance of
the power balance. It is not a secret that 
resumption of military actions in the region is an extremely negative scenario
for us, with all that it implies. In this light, Moscow tries to link
resolution of the conflicts in the region to other interests and positions of
some regional and global actors. For instance, the meeting of the Armenian and
Azerbaijani presidents in Vienna was a result of Yerevan's integration in
Russia's Eurasian projects. Besides, the Kremlin maintains the balance of
forces in the region at several levels. Mechanisms - bilateral
military-political and strategic cooperation of Russia and Armenia and a
similar cooperation within the CSTO. Naturally, Russia cooperates also with
Azerbaijan in a variety of fields, and this cooperation is much deeper than it
may seem at first sight. 

What is the role of Russian arms deliveries to Azerbaijan in the above
strategy of Moscow?

 I think
that the Caucasus policy of Russia, first of all, has a purpose of prevention
of a large-scale war in the Karabakh conflict zone.  Such a policy is
a long-term one and is based on the strategy for prevention of external
provocations which may theoretically become a sparkle for inflammation of this
frozen conflict. The forthcoming new stage of the Russia-Iran partnership will
create new opportunities for prevention of the new Karabakh war.  Taking into consideration the fact that because of
several reasons Iran is not interested in worsening of the situation at its
northern border, especially in the regions populated by the people called
Azerbaijanis, this partnership may be rather fruitful.

Due to Armenia’s upcoming accession to CU, arms deliveries to
Azerbaijan, increasing military presence of Russia in Armenia, and some other
similar steps have significantly strengthened Russia’s positions in the region.
Will that become a factor help us see a lights at the end of the tunnel in the
Karabakh conflict?

very time when events happen in the South
Caucasus, which are evidence of Russia's strengthening, in certain centres they
immediately remember about the unsettled Karabakh conflict, and about the
necessity of more effective mediation in the conflict.

In this context, I should say that before
Sargsyan-Aliyev meeting in Vienna that took place after a two-year break,
several leading western mass media published articles predicting a new
large-scale war around Karabakh. Naturally, such propaganda publications hinder
development of a normal and effective dialogue for finding of the way for
peaceful settlement of the Karabakh conflict. 
I am sure that the true Karabakh settlement may be based only on a
mutual compromise. However, the "Madrid principles" contain no
compromise because of their crudity. 
Without implementation of the available agreements on prevention of
incidents at the border and at the line of contact, mutual compromises foreseen
by these principles are practically impossible.