Thursday, June 20 2013

What are the main reasons of unrest
in Turkey?

 Certainly, the direct reason of unrest in Turkey was a decision about liquidation of the Gesi Park in
the center of Istanbul.
The decision to name the third bridge on Bosporus
after Yavuz Sultan Selim known for suppression of all Shiits and Turkish
Alevits, in particular, also had a certain effect. Prerequisites for the last
unrest in Turkey
were accumulating for a long period of time. First of all, one should separate
the displeasure of certain layers of the Turkish society with the policy
conducted by Erdogan's government in the sphere of human rights, in particular,
freedom of speech. About 100 Turkish journalists are either in prisons or are
persecuted. Of course, this causes displeasure of the society. Another reason
of unrest is displeasure of certain circles of the Istanbul
and Ankara
society with the authoritarian person and the ruling ways of Erdogan, he said
and added that the Turkish premier is known for his inability to listen to
advices, and for doing what he wants. I don't want to give higher priority to
that, however, there is also certain displeasure with the policy of Turkey's
islamization. 

Does it
mean that islamization is not the key reason of unrest in Turkey?

  No, it does
not. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that islamization was the main
reason of unrest in Turkey,
though it plays some part. One should revise the reasons of unrest only in a
body. The key reason of unrest in all over the country was using of a huge
force by policemen against a small crowd of peaceful ecological activists at
Taksim. The unrest spread in all over the country since the beginning of June.

Don’t you see tendencies for
transferring of the unrest into “the Turkish spring” similar to the “Arab
spring”?

 The ongoing unrest in Turkey is not 'a Turkish spring,'
as Erdogan and his government came to power in a legal and civilized way all
the three terms. The most organized forces among the Arab spring protesters
were Islamists. Therefore, Islamists have largely come to power as a result of
those protests. In Turkey,
the situation is different. 
Nevertheless, there is something that connects it with the Arab spring.
I mean social media, social networks, flash mobs that are organized to awaken
certain groups of the population and consolidate them around activists. .

It is not
for nothing that Recep Erdogan called Twitter and Facebook the key enemies of
the Turkish public. By data of 2012, 32 out of 36 million Turkish users have
Facebook accounts. In this context, Twitter and Facebook - all that connects
the Arab revolutions and the unrest in Turkey.

 By the way, what Turkey does the West need today?
And does Erdogan’s government suit the USA?

 The availability of Erdogan's government in Turkey suits the USA, first of all, which own any
levers of influence at the situation. Washington
is behind Erdogan, as just the AKP (Justice and Development Party) was ensuring
Turkey's
stability. Just Erdogan is, in general, conducting the policy in the course of
the American policy in the Middle East. I
think that just for this reason the USA
has already used its levers with a purpose of localization of the protesting
movement in Turkey.
By the way, this a difference of the situation between Turkey and the "Arab spring.

The opposition blames Erdogan for
the attempts to Islamize Turkey
even more. There is a viewpoint according to which today the USA is also interested in islamization of Turkey…

I would not
sex up  the interest of the USA in islamization of Turkey and strengthening of the Sunit vector,
taking into consideration the fact that the USA
does not own the levers which would allow it to seriously promote enhancing of
sunizm like a contradiction to shiizm in Iran. The USA is simply interested in Erdogan
like a geo-political player, which in general is playing according to their
rules. As for Erdogan, he is directly interested in islamization of Turkey.  In fact, a new elite group has come to the
power, in which AKP is just a visible political part. Different muslims groups
have been functioning within the party, which were removed from the power for a
long period of time during the regime of Ataturkists in Turkey.

You said about the role of servicemen… 

I think
that in the political sense today's role of servicemen is nullified. And
Erdogan's policy directed at isolation of servicemen from policy has brought
its fruits.

The
participation of Turkey in
the events in Syria
is considered to be one of the main reasons of displeasure in the Turkish
society. What do you think?

As for Turkey's participation in the events in Syria,
we can notice a certain link, but in this context, the displeasure of the
Turkish society finds room in the general displeasure with foreign policy
conducted by Erdogan. We were witnesses of demonstrations against direct or
even indirect participation of Turkey
in the civil war in Syria,
in Istanbul and
other Turkish towns especially the bordering ones.

The official Baku
has not yet reacted at the processes in Turkey. What are the reasons of
that?

The reason
of the close-mouth approach of official Baku
towards the last domestic political processes in Turkey
is the fear that Turkish unrest may transfer to Azerbaijan especially on the
threshold of the presidential election in October. I think that one may expect
such impulses in the domestic political life of Azerbaijan. The demonstrators in Turkey
overcame the most important - the fear of state and force using. This is for
the first time that in Turkey
the crowd did not step back because of force using. And despite everything, the
people are at Taksim. And the absence of fear of force and repressions may
transfer to Azerbaijan
and become a serious problem for its authorities. And the authorities of Baku understand it very
well. 

Aliyev is again going to run for
president and his wife has become a deputy chairperson of “Ani Azerbaijan”
party. This is evidence of endlessness of the political course of the Aliyevs
and Pashayevs…

Actually, there are no signs of changing and
everything will develop the way it used to develop for
many years. It is obvious that everything will develop according to the known
scenario drawn out for many years. And aggressive rhetoric of Baku's leadership, which is an indivisible
part of their policy, will also continue the same way. There are just several
months before the election. Anyway, the authorities will still hold out thanks
to these slogans for that period of time.

What are the most possible option of
the scenario of further development of events in Turkey?

 I thought that immediately after returning
from Africa, Erdogan will call on his
supporters to come to the square, but this did not happen although there were
all the signs for that. It is very much possible that somebody managed to
beguile him out of this spontaneous step, as in case of an open confrontation
between Erdogan's supporters and opponents, it will be hard to avoid split of Turkey.
Nevertheless, demonstrations will be held though not so much organized to avoid
clashes. The majority in Turkey
are Erdogan's supporters. For this reason, he said  he can easily gather a million of protestors.
For this reason, I think that the protest movement in Turkey will come to nothing.

More or less progressive part of the
Turkish society gathered at Taksim. May a problem of the Armenian genocide
recognition get a new impulse at least in these layers of the Turkish society?

 It is not
ruled out. But stemming from a bitter historical experience, the Armenians must
not forget that the entire history of the Ottoman empire and Turkey has taught the Armenian
people that usually similar events end in pogroms of the Armenians. At present,
a known historian Taner Akcham and other Turks have arrived from Europe and the
USA to Istanbul to take part in the last events.
Akcham together with his likeminded people have initiated to build a temporary
monument to the victims of the Armenian genocide at Taksim. But other groups of
the protesting movement were "against" it, saying this may damage the
whole movement.