Alexander Krylov: Both the OSCE MG co-chairs and the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have got tired of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh

Russia’s military presence in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia is limited enough. In the meanwhile, Russia keeps
increasing its military presence in Armenia through equipment of the102nd
military base in Gyumri. What are the reasons of such different approach?

The reasons of different approaches regarding a
military presence of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are obvious like the
reasons of growing of the military presence in Armenia via the upgrading  of the 102-nd Russian military base in Gyumri
with new types of weapon.There is no Iranian factor in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, whereas Armenia, Russia's CSTO ally, being in a complex geo-political
situation, requires reliable security.  Against the background of the
growing instability of the Big Middle East, its problems will first of all
affect the South Caucasus states, including Armenia. Such an option is
possible, as the scenarios of the Iranian nuclear problem settlement with help
of war, or by means of domestic political instability and civil war with a
purpose to change the regime, are being discussed. It is very much possible
that the situation in the eastern Turkey, bordering to the South Caucasus, will
also become unstable because of resolving of the Kurdish problem in this or
that way and the possibility of changing the borders. And if Turkey does not
manage to get rid of the present political crisis, it will worsen the situation
even more. And finally, the influence of the Karabakh conflict: in the
conditions of tension, it is especially important to ensure reliable missile
and air defense of Armenia. It is obvious that there are not such big threats
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and their security may be guaranteed by more
limited means. 

Representatives of all the three
co-chair states of the OSCE Minsk Group more and more people speak of the
necessity of breaking the status quo in Nagorno Karabakh. Do these trends
predetermine an outcome of the peace process?

Both
the OSCE MG co-chairs and the populations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have got
tired of the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
This does not however mean that the co-chairs will act as radically as
their colleagues did in Kosovo and will impose some solutions on the conflicting
parties. Given the continuing back-door diplomacy, we can hardly expect any
foreign interference in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Nor will we see any
peacekeepers in the area soon. I think that both Armenia and Azerbaijan would
prefer keeping the things the way they are to facing an external interference –
for this would make them hostage to the interests of external forces. The
examples of the Middle East, North Africa and Serbia have shown that instead of
solving problems such interferences create new ones. A compromise would be the
best solution for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but until then they better stick to
the status quo.

May a possible change of power in
Iran after the June 14 presidential elections reduce tension in the relations
of Tehran and Baku or maybe there are other factors influencing those
relations?  

The
reason of tension in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran is not the
person of their leaders, but the policy conducted by them. And the election in
Iran will hardly change the policy of Iran regarding the USA, Israel in the
context of the nuclear program. In general, Baku's active support of the
anti-Iranian coalition is the reason of tension in the Azerbaijani-Iranian
relations, especially if we take into consideration the fact that the card of
the "South Azerbaijan" is being actively played within the frames of
this policy. Iranian nuclear problem really exists. But in case of its force
settlement, it may result in great upheavals for the whole region. For this
reason, in such a situation, one should not wait for fast normalization of the
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations.

Ongoing unrest in Turkey made AKP
offer the public a referendum on Gezi Park liquidation. Does it mean that
Erdogan has refused the policy of the country’s Islamization? May the domestic
destabilization in Turkey affect the region? What is the most probable scenario
of further developments?

It is not refusal from Erdogan’s
previous policy. Erdogan’s policy cannot be characterized Islamization or
‘creeping Islamization.’ After all, Istanbul and Ankara look quite secular and
less Islamized rather than the capitals of many EU states. Erdogan’s policy
brought Turkey success in social-economic development and he has many
supporters. However, there are many who oppose his policy: starting the supporters
of radical Islamism up to supporters of radical choice in favor of the current
western democracy and lifestyle. Erdogan has occurred in the center and gets
blows from everywhere. In addition, there are problems with army, discontent
with the policy of interference with Syria’s affairs etc. However, it is in
favor of Erdgoan that external forces (USA, Al Qaeda) so far refrain from
active involvement into the situation and the unrest is of domestic nature. He
still has a chance to stay in power and his maneuvers with the referendum on
Gezi Park, dialogues with opposition forces may be effective and help reduce
tension. This is the most probable scenario of developments so far. However,
everything may change under influence of an external factor. Anyway, progressing
unrest in Turkey will make the situation in the Big Middle East even more
complicate and fraught with more shocks.