Tuesday, June 11 2013

One of the deputies of the ruling
Republican Party of Armenia
has recently said that “Moscow will always raise
gas price for Armenia
to depend on it more and more”. Do you share such a viewpoint? How do you assess Russia’s policy regarding its only ally in the South
Caucasus, Armenia?

 Unfortunately, sometimes interests of separate
corporations and companies in foreign policy of Russia are put above the state
interests. The situation a little bit differs in Armenia,
as in Azerbaijan
certain circles want to resolve the Karabakh conflict with a help of force. Nevertheless,
the Kremlin feels the problem of vulnerability of security in the South Caucasus. And the last visits by Russia's Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu and
commander of General Headquarters, Valeriy Gerasimiv, to Armenia are evidence of that.  Their purpose was to enhance Russian military
presence in the South Caucasus, where Armenia's
significance for Russia
can hardly be overestimated. Now the point is not how to strengthen dependence
of Yerevan on Moscow and to hinder strengthening of the
western vector of its foreign policy, including the relations with NATO.  It is more important not to let regional war
in the South Caucasus with unpredictable
consequences. I think that  Israel's bombing-missile air attack upon Iran's nuclear
and military objects may become a favorable start of the regional war.
Saying  that Russia has got the military
presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the expert emphasized that the
potential of the troops deployed there is limited, as because of several
reasons Moscow is not interested in creation of the fully-fledged military
bases there. This military presence principally differs from the military base
deployed in Gyumri.

  According to the non-official information,
some missile complexes “Iskander M” and “Tornado-G” were delivered to the
102-nd Russian military base in Gyumri. What is the reason of it, taking into
consideration the all-regional tension?

If these missile complexes were really delivered, it
means that Moscow
is concerned about the situation being formed in the sphere of regional
security. Russia has
obligations on protection of Armenia
in case of the military threat, although it does not have similar obligations
regarding Nagornyy Karabakh. Nevertheless, presence of the above-mentioned
weapons in Armenia are of
the stabilizing nature, as they will stop Azerbaijan
and Turkey
to settle the Karabakh conflict with a help of force.

 What are the tendencies of extension
of US and Europe’s influence in the South Caucasus?
What are the scenarios of possible integration of Armenia?

 At present, the South Caucasus is not a
priority of foreign policy of the USA. Of course, in Washington they would like to weaken the relations of Russia with Armenia. But they understand that
extension of US influence in
Armenia will require its
involvement in the Karabakh conflict settlement, that is to say, the USA will be forced to support Yerevan's position in this matter and enhance
its security. However, this will result in worsening of US relations not only
with Baku but also with Ankara, which is more important. Washington cannot let
it. For this reason, the Americans will not initiate true rapprochement with Yerevan. Instead of that,
they will support the seeming enhancing of relations like an element of
imposing pressure upon Moscow.
At present Europe is in a hard situation as it
suffers financial and economic crisis, resulted in decrease of GDP.  This means that Brussels
does not own big financial funds to be invested in the states of the South Caucasus region. We have got  some uncertain development of Georgia after
premier Bidzina Ivanishvili's coming to power. In such conditions Brussels will occupy a
waiting position, as it is concerned about the local problems. Taking into
consideration all above-mentioned, development of the Russian-Armenian
relations has no alternative, but not because Moscow wants that very much, but because of
the created foreign political conditions.

 Several events happened in the Russian-Azerbaijani
relations for the last years and even months, such as – the Russians left
Gabala. What are the tendencies of the relations between Moscow
and Baku?

 I think that till
October 2013, that is to say, before holding of presidential election in Azerbaijan, the relations with Russia will not
become better. To improve the bilateral relations, they need the high level
meeting. Only within the frames of such a meeting, they can remove all the
accumulated tension regarding several issues, in particular, Baku's intention
towards force settlement of the Karabakh conflict, the increasing purchase of
Israeli weapon and the increasing growth of this country and its secret
services in Azerbaijan, as well as, sharp worsening of relations with Iran, the
fact that Moscow supports alternative organizations of Azerbaijani diaspora,
stopped buying Azerbaijani oil, etc. But the meeting of president of Russia and Azerbaijan has not been scheduled
yet.

 The displeasure of Iran with the temporality nature of the Azerbaijani
state is one of the reasons of the bad relations between Baku and Teheran. What are the tendencies in these relations?

I think that  further development of relations between Baku and Teheran are linked with  the forthcoming presidential election in Iran on 14
June. It is very much possible that Said Jalili or Ali Akbar Velayati will gain
a victory.

Anyway,
the influence of the current president Ahmadimejad will be nullified. In its
turn, this will create favorable conditions for certain improvement of
bilateral relations, but only after the expected victory of Ilham Aliyev at the
presidential election in Azerbaijan.

 What are the reasons of
local instability in Turkey?
How can they threat the region? And what is the possible scenario of their
development?

 I think
that having taken the course for islamization of the country and started
actively mediating in the armed conflict in Syria, Prime Minister of Turkey
Recep Erdogan made two serious mistakes. The fast islamization required
withdrawal of servicemen from the true levers of power. This resulted in the
situation when Erdogan  himself lost
ground within the country, although strengthened his personal power. As for an
active mediation in the local conflict in Syria, it has led to worsening of
Erdogan's relations not only with opposition but also with wide layers of local
population displeased with deployment of foreign rebels at the territory of the
country. Nevertheless, I think that the situation in Turkey will be improved soon. And
disorders in Turkey
will turn Erdogan into a more careful politician when conducting local as well
as foreign policy.

 The Syrian conflict seems to
gradually pass to another field. What impulses we have to expect from the events
in Syria
in the near future?

 The Syrian problem has faced a stalemate. The
opposition is extremely split, but it receives financing and weapons from the
countries pursuing various and often contradictory interests in Syria. In such
situation, it is extremely difficult to achieve any progress in resolution of
the given problem. The point is not just the destructive role of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also the West's
two-faced policy that calls for dialogue but prepares for military interference
under a vain pretext, for instance, application of chemical weapons by the
Syrian army.

Enjoying
monopoly of information resources, the West and its partners in the face of
Arabian monarchies, can easily create a background necessary for armed
interference.  However, the USA does not want it, while Britain and France lack resources for a
military operation. Turkey
cannot think of an armed conflict at present either. The upcoming conference in
Geneva will hardly be a success, because Iran
will not be invited to it or will not be allowed to decision making, which
means that it will be impossible to reinforce even the plan coordinated with
other participants. In the meanwhile, it is Tehran that supports the current authorities
in Damask. The recent 4 billion dollars aid to Damask is the best evidence of
that.

The Syrian
Army will probably achieve certain success fighting the armed opposition
shortly. It may even restore control over Aleppo
and lift the blockade of the Syrian-Iraqi border, which is the main corridor of
aid for Damask. However, it will hardly manage to fully suppress the armed opposition
and will be reluctant to seek a dialogue with it, but, this time, maybe on
better terms for Damask.