Saturday, July 18 2015 11:13

 The complicated situation regarding the Russian-owned “Electric Networks of Armenia” has seriously triggered the Armenian society. According to you, will the upcoming audit at ENA answer questions that concern Armenia in all terms? What do you think are the prospects to settle the situation?

 

I do not think the audit to be carried out at "Electric Networks of Armenia" will solve the energy problems in Armenia. These problems are mainly conditioned by the fact that most energy generating facilities, particularly the Armenian NPP, as well as all the electric networks, are in need for modernization. This means huge funds, which Armenia lacks. On the other hand, given the current inflation status in the country the current tariff can remain the same only through extra funds provided by the state budget.

At the same time I believe that the audit will result in disclosing certain shortcomings in the activities of the "ENA" CJSC.  These drawbacks can be corrected through changes in the management of the company. However, even replacing the owner will hardly solve the energy rate problems in Armenia, which are a result of system problems in the Armenian economy. As a matter of fact, the tariff issue depicts the current crisis. Even if Russia supplies Armenia with free energy there will still be numerous problems conditioned by the extremely poor living standards of the local population. This is the main reason for the current protests being held in Armenia, while the energy price hike is just an excuse.

 

“ElectricYerevan” protest rallies in Armenia have proved that the Armenian-Russian relations are not as smooth as they seem to be. Could you please speak of the main problems in the current stage?

 

Every sort of bilateral relations bears problems, even in the case of the U.S, and Great Britain. Given the lack of common borders, Russia's strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, the consolidation of the Russian-Turkish relations and many other factors it would be surprising if Moscow and Yerevan had no problems. The fact that Russia supplies Azerbaijan with military equipment leads to one of the most serious problems in respect of our relations. The fact that Azerbaijan masters the "Uragan" and "Solntsepek" heavy multiple launch rocket system and rocket propelled flamethrower arouses serious concerns. The Ukrainian events have proved that the employment of the mentioned systems can cause numerous victims in the local population. Therefore, the Russian side should think over the sort of equipment it supplies to Baku.  

I believe another source for the Armenian-Russian problems is the inefficient activity of Russian companies in Armenia. I would mention the Russian-owned "Electric Networks of Armenia". I think Gasprom OJSC and several other Russia-based companies "enjoy" the same negative attitude, too. The other problem lies deep in the fact that several Armenian enterprises are idle due to the fact they have been conveyed to Russia as means to pay the state debt of Armenia. Most Armenians believe that as a close ally Russia should have written off all the debts instead of demanding properties.  However, most of these debts were accumulated in the USSR times and currently it is impossible to pay them off. As for the Armenian enterprises in Russia's possession, I do agree they remain idle.

 

According to various Armenian and Russian unofficial sources, the Russian 200-mln-USD loan, allocated to Armenia, will be spent on purchasing “Iskanders”. What is your opinion regarding this issue? Is there currently any strategic or tactical motivation to deploy “Iskander-M” missile systems in Armenia?

 

As a military expert, I see no need for the supply of Iskander-M missile systems to Armenia. The engagement distance of the given systems may be 500 km, therefore, the supply will aggravate not only the Russian-Azerbaijani, but also the Russian-Turkish relations. To some extent, their combat effectiveness is redundant even for the Karabakh conflict.

Besides, the latest escalation in the conflict zone in March 2015 has revealed the changes in the how-to-fight tactics.  In August 2014, the Azerbaijani side made attempts focused on intelligence- gathering operations, now they focus on reconnaissance and sabotage operations. In particular, mines were used more actively and the reconnaissance and sabotage groups were even able to penetrate into the first line of defense.   Under such conditions the Armenian army should give high priority to surveillance equipment and data acquisition, which would allow not only hampering the Azerbaijani reconnaissance and sabotage groups' activities but also enhancing the combat efficiency of the Armenian troops. I suppose that up-to-date communications tools would be useful for the Armenian armed forces, especially given the mountain terrain.

 

For several reasons, that even Armenia believes to be objective; Russia keeps trying to consolidate its relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. To what extent does the “red line” in respect of the relations with Armenia stretch given that Moscow will not cross it conditioned by the geopolitical consideration of the relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey?

 

Russia will not make allies with Azerbaijan unless the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled. This is even more unrealistic in respect of NATO-member Turkey. Yerevan, Baku and Ankara can cooperate both as dialogue partners and observers within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. However, I do not think this is possible on the Eurasian Economic Union platform where Armenia’s status will be much higher than those of the mentioned countries if they express a wish to participate in the Eurasian integration.

Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Russia-Azerbaijan relations move to a completely new level in 2014. Several Russian officials have paid working visits to Baku – Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Rogozin. These meetings took place after President of the European Commission Jose Barroso’s arrival in Baku, where he had tried to persuade the Azerbaijani government to sign an agreement on the association with the EU.  

After Russian minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu’s visit to Baku Russia and Azerbaijan discussed the enhancement of the 2013-2016 military cooperation project. The project envisages training exercises for servicemen.

 

When asked to comment on Armenia’s prospects within the EAEU, firs of all, Eurasian skeptics suggest talking about the sad prospects of the Eurasian integration project. What do you think are the EAEU prospects?

 

Eurasian skeptics should pay more attention to “thriving” Europe, which will probably have to pay more than 50 bln USD to keep Greece in the EU and within the euro zone. Given the problems of the migrants, deterioration of the socio-economic situation in Ukraine, as well as the need to increase the defense expenditures and many other factors, it would be naive for Armenia to expect any tangible financial or economic support from the EU. There were high expectations from the Eurasian Economic Union. It is noteworthy that on May 8 the leaders of Russia and China took a decision on cooperation in the Silk Road Economic Belt project.  I think that it will stimulate the development of Armenian economy. Nevertheless, I guess Yerevan should be able to resolve its domestic problems independently by enhancing the efficiency of the national economy management. In that case, Armenia will not have to be torn between the European and the Eurasian Economic Union. It is the latter that creates real opportunities for economic growth of Armenia. But the implementation of these opportunities mostly depends on Yerevan rather than Moscow or Beijing.