Friday, May 6 2016 08:27

 

In his recent speech at the meeting of the ruling Republican Party's Council President Serzh Sargsyan set conditions to the resumption of the negotiations, particularly, introduction of confidence-building mechanisms, targeted statements, and guarantees that Azerbaijan will not launch a new aggression and terror attacks against the Karabakh people.In this light, do you see any change of priorities in Yerevan’s policy after Baku’s four-day aggression?

 

Mr. Sargsyan's preconditions addressed to the mediators and Baku are noteworthy, as the leadership of Armenia voices its readiness to resume the peace talks. All these preconditions are set with a single goal - to bring Armenia back to the negotiating table to continue the discussion of the formula "specific territories in exchange for uncertain status." In this light, no changes are seen in the priorities of Yerevan's policy so far. 

 

Parliament of Armenia will soon discuss the Bill seeking recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic submitted by two opposition lawmakers. The fact of the Bill’s discussion coupled with the views by some well-informed experts gives a reason to think that Yerevan really weighs recognition of Artsakh’s independence. What do you think about these processes and their possible consequences?

I understand that they want to put an end to that problematic issue once and forever, but recognition of NKR by Armenia is a strategic task and its solution must be beyond the current political situation. Of course, there are really favorable conditions for Armenia to start moving towards recognition of Artsakh’s (NKR) independence, but I would recommend not doing it through a single act of parliament.  Unfortunately, most of our political analysts have insufficient political and diplomatic instruments to ensure successful implementation of political tasks and promote our interests on the international arena.  As for our diplomats and parliamentarians who have these instruments, most of them are not sophisticated in the pressing political issues and political philosophy. Consequently, political analysts often call for momentary radical decisions and do not even imagine that it is possible to achieve the desirable results without tensions and their consequences. Meantime, diplomats prefer standard rules of the diplomatic etiquette and real political steps to imitation of heavy activity. It is quite realistic to combine the knowledge and skills of both the teams and achieve the desirable result without additional problems, but this requires a relevant decision by the ruling elite.

What are the major factors of the geopolitical capitalization and value of Ilram Aliyev whom no one dares to insult even after his recent aggression against Nagorno Karabakh and the ISIS-style atrocities committed by the Azerbaijani forces?

At present Azerbaijan has a key geopolitical and strategic position in the South Caucasus. It depends on Baku’s stance whether the Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku-Central Asia axis will remain relevant or it will be blocked by a probable Moscow-Baku-Tehran axis. In addition, Russia has no one to stake on in Azerbaijan. The only more or less acceptable partner for it is Ilham Aliyev. If there is no Aliyev, Moscow will have to forget about its control over the South Caucasus. However, even if Moscow manages to agree with Aliyev at the current stage, the effect will be temporary, as the growing Russian-Turkish fight for the domination in the Turkic world, Russia will need more than just Azerbaijan. Anyway, Baku’s price in the international political “market” will be high, though for a while.

Will the military and political results of the ‘four-day war’ let Azerbaijan continue his adventure within the coming days? What will be the possible scenarios of Azerbaijan’s next aggression against the people of Karabakh? 

Azerbaijan has lost the surprise element and a huge number of Azerbaijani solders were killed during the military actions, mostly officers of the elite special units. Civilians suffered from the military action too.  I do not think that Aliyev’s regime will unleash another large-scale offensive. However, if Aliyev does it eventually, it will be a desperate step. However, we must prepare very well to a situation that Aliyev’s regime may receive a significant support of political-diplomatic and military nature.  Successes in the battlefield have facilitated our tasks, but we must manage to convert our military victories into tangible political and diplomatic advantages.

 

Recently, the first president of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan has met with the leadership of Nagorno Karabakh in Stepanakert, Earlier, Ter-Petrosyan held talks with Serzh Sargsyan. Do you think that Ter-Petrosyan's "groundwork on Karabakh" dating back to 1998 may become relevant for the new agenda of the peace talks?

 

 Much has changed since 1998.  What has not changed is that the peace process is still based on "the territories for status" principle. Both then and now this formula delays a worthy and long-term solution to the issue.