Tuesday, February 10 2015 13:13

Did the recent voting at
PACE – where it was decided not to restore Russia's voting rights until April- show
perturbations that may result in a new geopolitical situation in the South
Caucasus?

 

The voting was demonstrative and
paradoxical. Three of the countries that voted 'against' the resolution
supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine have territorial problems.
Those countries were Azerbaijan, Serbia and Cyprus. That voting demonstrated
that there is no full consensus in the situation around Ukraine and its
interpretation by the global actors. Those three countries sought to show their
stance on all the international principles of decision-making concerning the
territorial integrity. In other words, Azerbaijan, Serbia and Cyprus
demonstrated that they anticipate similar actions concerning their own
problems. Since, nothing of the kind has happened, they were reluctant to vote
'against' the resolution to show their protest.

 

Nagorny Karabakh
conflict also deals with the principles of self-determination and territorial
integrity…

 

These issues are raised during the
settlement process, of course. On the other hand, the political configuration
in the South Caucasus is changing, given the policy of the leading actors and
the current distribution of forces. Officially mediating in the Karabakh
conflict, Russia keeps developing its relations with both Armenia and
Azerbaijan. However, one can see that Russia's benefits from the partner
relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan are quite different. Armenia unlike Azerbaijan
is a recipient of Russia's military and economic assistance. Meanwhile, Baku is
a good trade and economic, and, which is the most important, military-technical
partner of Russia.  In 2014 alone, Sergey
Shoiu made a $5 million arms deal during his visit to Baku. Given the current
problems of the JSC Rosoboronexport  -
Russia's major company engaged in arms export - Russia cannot undervalue such a
big order by Azerbaijan.  Therefore, if
Baku supported the anti-Russian resolution, it would negatively affect its
partnership with Russia. Furthermore, Azervbaijan not only would fail to settle
its territorial problems, but also would face confrontation with Russia -
something it does not need at all. Consequently, Azerbaijan's vote was rather
pragmatic and justified, like the voting of Cyprus and Serbia, I think. It is
untimely anticipating any drastic changes in the region from the PACE voting,

 

Many believe that Russia
has lost the confrontation with Ukraine. Do you share these views? Will this
change the distribution of forces in the region and the balance around Nagorny
Karabakh?

 

There are categorical assertions
that Russia has failed to manage the Ukraine crisis, but these assertions
belong mostly to the media outlets that interpret the situation in conformity
with their editorial line. That is why, one should not draw any far-reaching
conclusions from this so far. Nothing is that simple in the Ukrainian crisis.
What we are witnessing now is an extremely painful transformation of the
international and regional relations with predominance of destructive elements.
It is not likely that a new 'construction' will emerge from the ongoing
transformation.  Destabilizing processes
continue getting new geopolitical accents, additional negative and dramatic
nature. Actually, not only Russia and Ukraine, but also all the neighbors of
Russia suffer from those processes, particularly, the EEU member Kazakhstan
that even has no border with Ukraine.

 

What about Armenia and
Azerbaijan?

 

As for Armenia, it is suffering also
because its external borders are, actually, the borders of the EEU. I cannot
say how the real situation in the case of Armenia will extrapolate, but Yerevan
will inevitably face difficulties, given that special laws that would
facilitate its special state can be adopted only in cooperation with the EEU
members. Further protraction of the Ukrainian crisis will negatively affect the
countries like Armenia, first of all. The situation is developing so rapidly
now that any decision on Ukraine influences the development of the Ukrainian
crisis. Therefore, no one can make any forecasts. As for Azerbaijan, it has
already displayed its choice in favor of Russia by the voting at the PACE.
Nevertheless, the issue of Azerbaijan's strategic choice is still open, because
no global super actors present Baku with a dilemma. The reason is that the EU,
U.S., and Russia are now satisfied with what they receive from Azerbaijan:
Moscow - arms deals, Brussels and Washington - energy resources.

 

And how does Karabakh fit into this
configuration? 

 

Unfortunately, Karabakh does not at
all fit into the current geopolitical configuration because no real ties
between Karabakh and Azerbaijan are observed. In the meantime, serious
geopolitical decisions affect the conflict. At the moment, one should not
expect any radical changes in the situation around the Karabakh conflict. Nor
should one expect Azerbaijan to make a real geopolitical choice. Russia is not
interested in the change of the status quo, because in that case it will lose control
over the conflict, especially amid the conflict with Ukraine. So, at the moment
the conflicting parties are left to their own devices. What we see today on the
Armenian-Azerbaijani border confirms that the parties are trying to force
benefits out of the general geopolitical context. Further protraction of the
Karabakh conflict is unacceptable. Specific facts and figures also prove that.
A few years ago, the ceasefire regime was annually breached no more than for
2-3 thsd times, and now the number of ceasefire violations has increased dozens
of times, which demonstrates a latent war.   

 

So, do you see an impulse for
resolution of the conflict?  

 

Certainly, I do. And that impulse is
natural. The escalation of the arms race in the region, where mountains of
weapons are stockpiled, sooner or later raises the need to use these weapons.
This is what we see today. Despite numerous calls for peace, foreign actors
make no real management of the conflict. Naturally, Azerbaijan is not happy
with the current situation and tries to give relevant signals to the
world.  That is, they try to say that
protraction of the situation will not lead to durable peace in the region.
External actors and Armenia, naturally, interpret these signals in their own
way, which just makes Azerbaijan use force. Therefore, as Karabakh peace talks
are stagnating, shelling appears to be the only method of political dialogue.

 

What are the prospects
of that dialogue?      

 

This dialogue has two potential
outcomes: either a short-term small-scale war or even more ceasefire breaches.
This perspective is constantly growing. Such latent conflict is not likely to
spiral into a large-scale war, as it is not within the interests of big actors.
Russia and the West will not keep calm amid growing threats to their national
interests, for instance, explosions of oil pipelines or new problems in the
Caspian Sea region. Nevertheless, they need to manage the situation carefully
enough not to spark a large-scale destructive war. This is what explains the
calls for settlement of the conflict by means of the 'Madrid Principles.' To
resolve the conflict, implementation of those principles, not political
rhetoric is required.