Friday, November 22 2013

 

In response to the calls to recognize de jure the de facto independent
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Russian politicians and experts first of all advise
Yerevan to recognize it. Doesn’t this stance run counter to the Minsk Group’s
activity, given the intention to “give a new impulse” to the Karabakh peace
process, expressed on November 19 in Vienna?  

 

Unfortunately,
today one may say about the OSCE Minsk Group that "the patient is likely
to be dead than alive". At present, it is neither a strait jacket nor a
negotiating platform or an intermediary. If in Baku and, as some experts say,
in Yerevan as well, they possibly adopt a decision on resumption of the war,
the OSCE MG will suppress nobody. Therefore, recognition or non-recognition of
the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia will not affect the future of
the MG. Meanwhile, by recognition of the NKR independence Armenia would break
the status-quo and become the initiator of changing of the rules of the game.
However, Yerevan does not risk to do that. 
It is more secure and effective to react to someone else's mistakes than
to make risky steps. However, nobody will recognize the NKR until Armenia does
it itself.

 

What can you say about the prospects of the Karabakh peace process given
the latest developments?  

 

Today
the Karabakh conflict has no prospect for settlement and the regular meeting of
the two presidents will change nothing. We need the OSCE Minsk Group to become
more active, and this is possible only if there is full consensus between the
intermediaries. The intermediaries do not consider the Karabakh conflict
settlement a priority task, the NKR is not among their priorities. Actually,
the problems of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria and the Middle East are priority
for the USA. The conflicts around Abkhazia and South Ossetia are more important
for Russia. and the Trans-Dniester conflict - for the European Union. The
Karabakh conflict is too complicated. There is no simple solution to it. We
need permanent insisting and joint pressure of the intermediaries upon the
parties to the conflict to make compromises for its settlement. Another
important condition for success in settlement is involving Stepanakert in the
negotiating process. Otherwise, any peaceful settlement based on compromises
may be easily blocked. On the other hand, as today the conflicting parties have
no serious local or external reasons for resumption of the battle actions, the
most convenient time has come to revise the peaceful process and to look for
the new levers of its reanimation.

 

Are the Madrid Principles a relevant
basis for that?

 

It
remains a question if the Madrid Principles are actually necessary as none of
the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict accept it. Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh cannot accept the point about return of territories around
Nagorno-Karabakh, while Azerbaijan defies the points suggesting opening of a
corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh and conduct of a referendum on
Nagorno-Karabakh's status. As regards the return of refugees to their former
homes, this is simply impossible - especially after the Ramil Safarov case. But
without these points, there will be no international security guarantees. And
so, the parties should either continue imitating peace talks until something
changes or change the concept of the mediators' activities. As regards the OSCE
Minsk Group, they are waiting in vain for the parties to realize that they need
to settle their conflict. Recently, the French co-chair urged Armenia and
Azerbaijani to decide on their own when to involve Nagorno-Karabakh in their
talks.  But this is something Azerbaijan
will hardly agree to. This is a deadlock situation, and if it continues, the
parties may at some point decide to reformat the Minsk Group, which will result
in its collapse.

 

Could you specify any steps that
would help prevent it?

 

The
change of the Karabakh conflict settlement tactics by means of a number of
steps, particularly, by the refusal of the United States, European Union and
Russia from any types of zero-sum games and from formation of spheres of
influence in the region is of vital necessity. Maximum possible
demilitarization of the South Caucasus region and coordinated pressure on the
conflicting parties to make them give up the aggressive and man-hateful
rhetoric should be considered as an integral part of this problem.
Conventionally speaking, any official call for military resolution of the
conflict or admission of such a scenario of developments should be condemned.
The unacceptability of military settlement of the problem has been repeatedly
emphasized. Probably, it should be done even more often and at various levels.
One should also ensure constant presence of a big number of Minsk Group observers
near the Line of Contact. Pressure should be exerted on the parties to stop the
development and settlement of the regions whose future status is being
negotiated. These are the regions around the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast, except the corridor in Lachin and probably the one in Kelbajar, as well
as the parts of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, which are
currently under control of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. In addition, it is
necessary to establish negotiation platforms, at the local level at least, and
the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh should take part in the
negotiations. One should pay special attention to humanitarian issues. In
particular, the issue of possible launch of the airport in Karabakh should be
tackled constructively with participation of the OSCE Minsk Group, not through
ultimatums or threats. Finally, it is necessary to ensure the mediators'
equidistance and impartiality about the conflicting parties.  First of all, this requires ensuring agreement
between the mediators themselves. The suggested ways and steps are not the
solution to the problem, but they are able to take the negotiations process out
of stagnation and to ensure positive dynamics. One cannot hope for more now.  

 

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu regularly states Turkey’s
willingness to lift the blockade from Armenia in exchange for Armenia’s
unilateral concessions in the Karabakh problem. What else can substantiate
Davutoglu’s consistency, besides Azerbaijan’s energy blackmail?    

 

The
Armenian-Turkish dialogue has become the hostage of not only the "special"
relations between Ankara and Baku but also the domestic political situation in
Turkey. Turkey is at the crossroads. This was strictly demonstrated by the recent
upheavals all over the country. It would be careless in such a situation to
make sharp steps in the foreign policy and adopt risky decisions. Normalization
of relations with Armenia is among these risky decisions not only because of
the energy blackmail of Baku. Therefore, it is obvious that Ahmet Davutoglu's
recent statements are banality and of the rhetoric nature. There will be no
progress in the Armenian-Turkish dialogue until Turkey's movement vector is
specified. And if the future of Turkey is linked with the forces oriented at Premier
Erdogan, there will be no progress in this dialogue in future either.

 

The advocates of Armenia’s European integration think that the intention
to join the Customs Union marks the beginning of the Armenian statehood collapse.
Is there any logic in such statements, as well as in the Kremlin’s policy
against the labor migrants from the CIS member states Moscow is going to
involve in the Customs Union?   

 

I
see no grounds for saying that membership to the Customs Union may cause a
collapse of statehood in Armenia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Integration
can reduce a nation's sovereignty but it can also offer new competitive
opportunities. And the Customs Union - if it proves effective - is not an
exception. For Armenia the Customs Union is a military-political rather than
economic project - no coincidence that Azerbaijan is trying to resist the
Armenians' efforts to join it. And the non-enthusiastic approach of Belarus and
Kazakhstan towards Armenia's plans to join the Union may well be a result of
this resistance. As regards the growing oppression of labor migrants in Russia,
this is hardly a government policy but just a wave of xenophobia. On the other
hand, the Kremlin may use this situation to divert people's attention from
urgent social and economic problems.

 

Ukraine – the key target of Moscow’s Eurasian integration project -
seems to be resisting the Kremlin’s policy…

 

It
would be much better if Ukraine went together with Russia to Europe instead of
choosing between Russia and Europe. This conflict of two integration projects
(European and Eurasian) makes Ukraine's future vague and will hardly benefit
any of the parties. As a result, Ukraine is being torn apart and is suffering
from sanctions.