Wednesday, August 28 2013

 The more time is left till the November initialing  of DCFTA and the Association Agreement with the EU by Armenia, the more the tension around this document to be signed in Vilnus. The content of this document consisting of 1500
pages has not been published yet because of an unknown reason. For this reason,
when analyzing the reasons, aspects and arguments of the discussion that
started between Armenian, Russian and European experts, we are forced to
present not specific points of the agreement, but their general geo-political
context. Anyway, we have to confess that because of several impartial reasons,
the given way of the analysis has turned to be more effective than possible
analysis of the text of DCFTA and the Association Agreement covered with a
stamp "incognita".

From the very
beginning of the negotiations between Armenia and the EU regarding these
documents, the background of the negotiating process gained numerous myths
which directly contradict the reality. The key one of them is the myth invented
by the Armenian authorities and political experts, according to which the
initialing of the agreements with the EU does not at all  contradict development of relations with
Russia. However, recent events are evidence of the contrary. First of all, I
mean the growing pressure upon Yerevan, in which Russia and partly Europe are
using secondary factors, which seem to be such at first sight. The pressure is
still imposed through the non-stop discussion between Yerevan and Moscow, as
well as in Yerevan between pro-Russian and pro-Western experts. The
participants in the discussion submit any arguments but not the ones that meet
reality. Let's offer several options, how Europe, the Euroatlantic
community  and Russia motivate the games
around Armenia.   

It turns
out that the discussion around the Association Agreement of Armenia covers more
global geo-political space than even the territory of six countries involved in
the Eastern Partnership. After the "cold" war, the Euroatlantic
community started creating  a  new "security zone" which supposes
integration of the neighboring states. Incidentally, unlike the myths, which
say that economy, communications and even pipelines lay on the basis of this
integration, actually, the European security is in its basis, which
undoubtedly, the USA is also interested in. Within the frames of this logic,
the Association agreement with the "Eastern Partnership" countries is
undoubtedly a political document of the Western policy influence in the 6 CIS
countries including Armenia. In particular, a new format of the EU and NATO
policy is being today formed at least regarding the two South Caucasus states.
However, at present this format does not suppose obligatory membership of
Armenia and Georgia in these two structures. This seems to be the key
motivation of Brussels and Washington, why the Eastern Partnership Programme
arose. Today this programme is simply supported by a new economic format, such
as the Association Agreement and DCFTA.        

It is clear
that Russia is not pleased with such a situation, not only because of its
natural and grounded empire ambissi0ons, but also the concern about its own
security. The availability of  the explosively
dangerous North Caucasus, supported by Washington, Turkey as well as Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, is enough. And Georgia and Armenia, neighboring to this region
and involved in the circle of the Western security system, increase the fear of
Moscow more. The "Eastern Partnership" programme idea was put forward
by the EU at the suggestion of Poland, an "old friend" of Russia, out
of spite of the integration ambitions of Moscow at the territories of the
post-soviet space. But taking into account the availability of Ukraine which
wanted to join Europe long ago, and which Russia cannot keep even with a help
of the gas blackmail, undoubtedly this idea has all the chances to be completed
successfully. In this context, Russia's Customs Union programme with a prospect
of setting up of the Eurasian Union is a natural attempt of contradiction to
the policy of the Euratlantic community on extension of its own influence
space. The difference is that at the time of the Eltsin's Russia this extension
was implemented through fast joining NATO 
of the former Warsaw Treaty countries, today it is being implemented
within the frames of the soft power through the economic integration
programmes.

We have to confess
that both European integration and Eurasian integration promise certain
economic dividends to Armenia. In this context, signing of the DCFTA supported by
the promised  aid 3-4 billion EUR, really
looks to be attractive to Armenia. In general, Yerevan's stance is grounded by
the fact that Armenia agrees to the Association agreement with the EU as it
hopes for the economic prosperity. However, there is no calculation how DCFTA
will affect the market and structure of the import-oriented economy of Armenia
after joining the well-developed and competitive European market. Moreover, one
cannot speak about competition with Europe in the sphere of industry and
agriculture. For this reason, we have got an impression that no Association
agreement and DCFTA can lead  Armenia to
the economic growth as it practically has no real sector. We cannot either
answer the question if the Customs Union is beneficial to Armenia. Neither the
government nor the political leadership seem to have the answer to these
questions. In this context, we may agree to those experts which have got an
impression that Armenia does not have an active dialogue with Russia, or
it  takes place at the top level,
when  one man defines the destiny of the
whole people. They think it is inadmissible in both cases, as in such
conditions external players do not know, what to wait from such Armenia and
what surprises its authorities may bring. This results in total distrust in the
complementary position of the Armenian authorities.    

By the way,
Yerevan has similar distrust in the West as well as Russia. First of all, just this
circumstance makes the authorities of the republic look for the counterbalances
between Moscow and Brussels. This distrust and concern have been recently demonstrated
open in the statement by Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister, Shavarsh Kocharyan,
which said when commenting on the Moscow's statement that sale of weapon to
Azerbaijan is just business, that "Armenia's intention to make the
Association Agreement with European Union is also a pure business, whereas the
sale of weapon always has a political context".

"One
thing is when we speak about the Association Agreement or DCFTA. In these
conditions we shall not lose our sovereignty and can adopt decisions about our
own tax policy. But we shall lose certain sovereignty when resolving similar
problems, if we become a member of the common customs system", - Kocharyan
said.

Incidentally,
the Armenian authorities put security into the hands just of the Russians, as
in Yerevan as well as Moscow and first of all in Brussels they understand very
well that Europe does not want and cannot ensure security of Yerevan and
Karabakh because of several partial and impartial reasons. Today Moscow has been
playing this part, especially thanks to deployment of the 102-nd Russian
military base at the territory of Armenia. So, to put under blow the
availability of the Armenian Karabakh and bad or good but independent Armenian
state in order to please ghostly prospects of Armenia's European integration
would be wrong and will not be the solution that reflects reality. Though it
seems to be a paradox, but just unsettlement of the Karabakh conflict,
preserving of status-quo of 1994 is the key tramp card of Yerevan in its
relations with external players. In these conditions, losing of Karabakh will
nullify the role and significance of Armenia in the regional policy and put the
Armenian statehood  under the threat of
disappearance.     

Undoubtedly,
Russia unlike NATO can provide Armenia's security at present stage. The point is
that Moscow alone cannot any more fulfill functions of Armenia's security
guarantor. I do not mean even the problem of the weapon sale to Azerbaijan. The
danger is that from time to time self-interest of some representatives of the
Russian elite prevail over the interests of the state. Here is hidden the key danger
for Armenia but not in the empire ambitions of Russia. In this context, the
elite ruling in Armenia should be extremely careful when choosing the foreign
political discussion between the West and North. At present, Yerevan must think
not about the content of DCFTA or any other integration document, but how to
become a partner in the developing geo-political combinations. There are many examples
in the world, how even a small state may become a partner, for instance,
Israel. So, on this way Armenia has to take part in various strategies, to work
in the direction of becoming a partner, as it is very much dangerous to remain
a raw material  in the context of the
above-mentioned.