Monday, May 16 2016 06:29

In an interview with ArmInfo, Hovhannes Igityan, member of the Board of the Armenian Pan-National Movement Party, ex-chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Relations, explains the need to revise some aspects of Armenia’s relations with Russia. He also shares his own vision of the reasons of the April war and assesses Armenia’s foreign policy conducted over the past few years.      

 

The April war demonstrated the gaps in the two Armenian republics’ security system based on the strategic alliance with Russia. Isn’t there any alternative to the defense cooperation with Moscow? 

 

After 3 Sept 2013, when Serzh Sargsyan unexpectedly voiced Armenia’s intention to join the Customs Union and then the Eurasian Economic Union, the West started perceiving the Armenian-Russian relations as a result of Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan. It was on that day that Armenia finally lost any alternative. But even after that the West said that it understands Armenia’s “choice”. Meanwhile, the ruling Republican Party of Armenia stated that the EEU was Armenia’s choice made with due regard for the security of Artsakh and Armenia. All that security system was completely based on provision of the Armenian sovereignty to Russia. For instance, was it so necessary for Armenia to bind itself with the obligation to buy gas from no one else when making a decision to buy gas from Russia? Was it so necessary to completely ban the presence of any foreign instructors in Armenia by the agreement on deployment of Russian forces in Armenia? There are dozens of such examples. As a result, over the past three years Armenia deprived itself of any economic, political and military alternative to Russia’s presence to Armenia and even the smallest opportunity to restrain Azerbaijan.

 

Was it the “four-day war” that tested the situation?  

 

Yes, it was. Over the past three years Azerbaijan has been firing at not only the line of contact with Artsakh but also the border with Armenia in Tavush province. Baku has been testing the allied agreement with Armenia within the CSTO for years. When launching the “four-day” hostilities, Aliyev, who was in Washington by the way, tested the reaction of the international community first of all. Amid the tense relations with Turkey, isolation of Russia, Moscow’s disregard for the Minsk agreements on Ukraine, Armenia’s statements in Russia’s favor, it turned out that it is Armenia that has become Russia’s guide in the region. So, in its negotiations in the West, Aliyev presented any blow against Armenia as a blow against Russian interests and expansion into the South Caucasus. This is proved by the weak statements made by the international community and first of all by the OSCE Minsk Group and addressed not only to Azerbaijan but also to Armenia. In addition, Baku has finally received an opportunity to clearly hear the reaction of Russia and the CSTO member states to the aggression against Armenia. And Baku has heard a totally pro-Azerbaijani stand of Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin’s stand, which is far from being pro-Armenian. And finally, Azerbaijan needed to test the Russian military hardware it spent billions on, as well as to test the response of the NKR Defense Army.

 

Have Armenia and Artsakh drawn the relevant conclusions from the Azerbaijani “offensive reconnaissance”?

 

Instead of dismissal of three generals of the Armenian Armed Forces, I would like to hear about the resignation of the political leaders from Serzh Sargsyan’s team, who considered the political, economic and military model in Armenia to be a guarantee of non-resumption of war. As regards the generals, they should not have been dismissed for corruption and professional flaws. They should have undergone criminal proceedings. So, I see no conclusions yet.  

 

What can you say about the behavior of Russia?

 

I do not say that Russia is a monster. I just say that the Armenian leadership displays a wrong behavior in its relations with Russia. Adulation has never been effective and it cannot act as a political factor.  

 

Was adulation a part of relations with Russia during Kocharyan’s presidency or did it emerge when Serzh Sargsyan came to power? 

 

Some people from Kocharyan’s team used adulation as a political factor. However, Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency made it a mechanism of foreign policy.    

 

Why doesn’t the Armenian leadership even try to use the resources of the Armenian lobby in the Karabakh issue the way it does in the Armenian Genocide recognition issue? After all, the issue of the Armenian Genocide recognition can be temporarily shelved amid the threat to the Armenian statehood…  

 

If not shelved, it can be dealt in parallel. Even in the western countries, where there are 3-4 thousand Armenians, the Armenian communities can influence the political decisions of those countries, and not only the Armenian ones. However, exerting efforts towards recognition of the Armenian Genocide, these communities do not almost tackle the Karabakh issue. The issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide has never been privatized, unlike the Karabakh problem, when Robert Kocharyan brought Karabakh out of the negotiation process. Later, Serzh Sargsyan continued Kocharyan’s affair and gave the Karabakh problem settlement monopoly to Russia.

 

Does it mean that the Armenian leadership took the trump cards from the Armenian Diaspora’s hand? 

 

Unfortunately, it does. The largest Armenian community lives in Russia. Unlike the democratic countries, the presence of a large Diaspora is not a factor influencing the steps of the political leadership in Moscow. The Russian Armenians play the role of hostages. It has repeatedly been reported at the level of propagandists and Putin himself that in Russia there are more Armenians than in Armenia itself and that the major part of Armenia’s budget is secured due to the transfers from Russia. Let me point out the example of France, given that I dealt with Armenia’s first agreement with France. No one remembers that in the early 1990s Armenia and France were negotiating not only on political or economic partnership, but also on military cooperation. Articles 8 and 9 of that agreement implied military cooperation. Now there are at least 10 such countries that could successfully cooperate with us in defense.

 

And the matter also concerns supply of weapons…

 

The Azerbaijani aggression dictates some rules. Azerbaijan uses Russian weapons and fires at the Armenian settlements. The Armenian armed forces and the NKR Defense Army have not enough means to detect and destroy those weapons. If the sale of Russian weapons to Armenia is delayed, other countries can sell weapons to us, however, Moscow will perceive Armenia’s acquisition of such weapons from France, for example, as violation of allied obligations. Moscow will also perceive the visit of any foreign military specialists to Armenia as a “stab in the back”.

 

In other words, Armenia needs to revise some provisions in its agreements with Russia, doesn’t it?

 

Yes, it does. It is necessary to understand which of these articles hamper Armenia’s cooperation on the international arena. Those provisions should be revised in a friendly way. For instance, Azerbaijan does not miss the opportunity to make anti-Russian statements and speak of forced cooperation with NATO member Turkey and deployment of Turkish bases. Against that background, Armenia prolongs the agreement on deployment of the Russian base for 25 more years, though there were 10 more years left before the expiry. If this had not been done in 2010, the talks on prolongation would have started this year. But the trump card was voluntarily given to Moscow. So, Azerbaijan’s behavior is worthier than the behavior of Armenia. Moscow initiated the prolongation of the agreement with Armenia as early as in 2010 with a view to boost the military and technical cooperation with Azerbaijan.

 

So, it appears that Russia cannot be blamed for anything, because our authorities themselves gave the trump cards to Russia and paved the way for unhampered military and technical cooperation between Baku and Moscow…    

 

It does. It is another question why our authorities behaved so. Robert Kocharyan misappropriated huge funds and then gained a foothold in the Russian political and economic elite. It is obvious that this was his initial goal. I do not know why Serzh Sargsyan is behaving so. But I can say that Serzh Sargsyan’s team is the weakest of the three presidents’ teams.     

 

So, you think that adulation is not a political category and does not simply work in politics. 

 

Many think adulation works but it does not. An adulator cannot be a partner. Now it is time to test the reliability of the structures Armenia has been relying on for many years. For instance, it is necessary to apply to the CSTO for help in case of the very first large-scale shelling of the northern borders of Armenia. If the CSTO refuses to help, it will finally become clear that the given organization does not work. It is necessary to lay down logical demands to Russia instead of blaming Russia for all deadly sins. One of such demands is that Russia should freeze military and technical cooperation with Azerbaijan as long as the latter is using Russian weapons against Armenia. There are all legal prerequisites for it. Armenia also has backlashes for any of the three possible replies of Russia (positive answer, negative answer or disregard). Naturally, it is early to speak of them. It is necessary to work with all countries which have expressed concern over the “four-day war”, not only with the OSCE Minsk Group countries.

 

How reasonable is Armenia’s political recognition of Artsakh today?

 

I think this issue should be raised from the viewpoint of security guarantees for Artsakh. In April Azerbaijan broke the logic of the peace process. The peace process prevented any use of military force during the negotiations. But Baku blames Yerevan for failing the negotiations, pointing at Serzh Sargsyan’s threat to recognize the independence of Artsakh.  

 

So, don’t you think that a couple months after Armenia’s recognition of Artsakh, other countries - for example, Uruguay – may also recognize Artsakh? This would form a qualitatively new situation around the conflict settlement.    

 

The OSCE Minsk Group process itself implies the legal right to recognition of Artsakh’s independence by any country. Yerevan regularly speaks of the Karabakh Armenians’ right to self-determination and willingness to take any decision. Azerbaijan, in turn, threatens to destroy all Armenians of Karabakh and retrieve “all our lands”. Therefore, one should not play diplomacy where diplomacy is irrelevant. Azerbaijan stopped the diplomacy long ago. So, Armenia should clearly tell the world that it sees Karabakh’s security in its independence that includes all elements defending a small state against aggression of big states. I think this is not being done because in such important issues our authorities take into account other countries’ opinion. However, Yerevan’s rhetoric about Artsakh should have changed long ago.